Problems of Communism

Soviet Collectivization
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Book Reviews
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JLY-AUGUST 1976

CHINA'S POLITICS AND POLICIES

Parris Chang
Robert A. Scalapino
A. Doak Barnett

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Problems of Communism

4

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China: Politics and Policies

1 Mao's Last Stand?
by Parris H. Chang

18 The CCP's Provincial Secretaries
by Robert A. Scalapino

36 Peking and the Asian Power Balance
by A. Doak Barnett

49 Was Stalin Really Necessary?
A Debate on Collectivization
by James R. Millar and Alec Nove

BOOKS

63 China and Grain: A Matter of Import
by Kenneth R. Walker

67 Mass Campaigns, Past and Present
by Thomas Fingar

70 Mao, the Teacher—Society, the School
by David M. Raddock

73 The PLA: Peacetime Model and War Machine
by Harvey Nelsen

77 The Yenan Years
by Michael Lindsay

82 Sino-Soviet Relations: Moscow's View
by Kenneth G. Lieberthal

Cover: Organized groups, mostly of schoolchildren and factory workers, marching on T'ienanmen Square April 8, 1976, to "celebrate" the fall of Teng Hsiao-p'ing and the appointment of Hua Kuo-feng as Premier of the People's Republic of China. Photo by Ross Munro/*The Globe and Mail* (Toronto).

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China: Politics and Policies

EDITORS' NOTE: The 1970's have witnessed substantial changes in the politics and policies of the People's Republic of China. A number of these changes are discussed in the following articles. Mr. Chang explores the impact of Teng Hsiao-p'ing's reemergence as an internal political force by 1975 and his subsequent purge from the Peking leadership after the death of Chou En-lai in January of this year. Mr. Scalapino examines the shifts that took place in the ranks of provincial secretaries between the early 1970's and the end of 1975 and assesses their implications. Mr. Barnett looks at the perceptions and calculations that seem to have underlain Peking's decision to revamp its foreign policy in 1968-72, with an eye to gauging the possibilities for further alterations in the near-term future.

Mao's Last Stand?

By Parris H. Chang

The political upheaval in China dramatized by the sudden ouster of Teng Hsiao-p'ing from his leading party, government, and military positions in April 1976 has once again brought into sharp relief many of the burning issues and deep-seated conflicts which have gripped and divided the Chinese Communist leadership in the last decade. These conflicts, in terms of both policy and power, relate directly to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) of 1966-69 and its aftermath. The campaign to "beat back the right-deviationist wind [seeking] to reverse correct verdicts," which began to gather momentum in the fall of 1975 and reached a climax with Teng's second downfall, was in fact a continuation of the GPCR. The struggle is not yet over, and its outcome will affect both major policy issues and the make-up of China's post-Mao leadership. This essay will examine the effects of the GPCR ten years after its unleashing and will analyze how its legacy figures in China's current leadership conflict.

Mr. Chang is Professor of Political Science at The Pennsylvania State University (University Park) and a well-known writer on contemporary Chinese politics. He is the author of Radicals and Radical Ideology in China's Cultural Revolution, *1973, and* Power and Policy in China, *1975, as well as of many articles published in this and other scholarly journals. He is currently preparing a study of the military dimension of Chinese politics.*

Backlash Against the GPCR

It is exactly ten years since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership met to formally endorse the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Initiated by Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the GPCR was principally aimed at removing from power "capitalist-roaders" like former head of state Liu Shao-ch'i and former Party Secretary-General Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who were allegedly out to restore capitalism in China, and at shaping Chinese society

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according to Maoist revolutionary values. The celebrated "16-point Decision" approved by the CCP Central Committee on August 8, 1966, formally sanctioned Mao's call for purging all "capitalist-roaders" from the party and creating a new power structure firmly committed to Maoist revolutionary goals.[1] The GPCR was an unprecedentedly massive campaign, generating severe political turmoil and economic disruption and victimizing a large number of party officials.[2] These officials not only were dismissed from their posts but were also humiliated and abused by being subjected to the harsh ordeal of public "self-criticism" and "struggle" meetings and/or paraded through the streets wearing dunce caps. It is not surprising that, ten years after its inception, the GPCR still remains a focal point of bitter controversy within the CCP leadership.

For the radicals in the party, who were the prime movers of the GPCR in the 1960's and have since been staunch defenders of its values, the continuing conflict over the assessment of the movement and its legacy is crucial. The 1976 New Year's Day editorial in the party press, echoing the radical viewpoint, called this conflict "a concentrated reflection of the current struggle between the two classes (proletarian and capitalist), the two roads, and the two lines," declaring that "to approve or negate this great revolution is in essence a struggle between continuing the revolution on the one hand and restoration and retrogression on the other." The editorial quoted Mao as lauding the GPCR as "absolutely necessary and most timely for consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, preventing capitalist restoration and building socialism" and as "a powerful motive force for the development of the social productive forces in our country." It went on to emphasize the following accomplishments of the GPCR:

Officials accused of leading "anti-revolutionary groups" are subjected to public ridicule in Peking on January 26, 1967, during the Cultural Revolution.

—Wide World.

The three-in-one combination of the old, the middle-aged and the young has invigorated leading bodies at all levels, and millions of successors to the cause of proletarian revolution are tempering themselves in accordance with the five requirements set by Chairman Mao. The revolution in literature and art exemplified by the model revolutionary theatrical works has resulted in an efflorescence of creative work in socialist literature and art. The revolution in education is advancing . . . in the direction pointed out by Chairman Mao, and gratifying results have been achieved in the efforts to transform schools into instruments of the dictatorship of the proletariat and bring up workers with both socialist consciousness and culture. The revolution in health work is overcoming the rural shortage of doctors and medicines, barefoot doctors are steadily maturing, and the cooperative medical system has become more consolidated. By entering May 7 cadre schools, going down to do manual labor and studying afresh, large numbers of cadres have increased their awareness of the need to continue the revolution and regained their revolutionary youthfulness. More than ten million school graduates have gone to the vast countryside where they are persevering in the revolution and growing sturdily.[3]

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[1] *Peking Review* (Peking—hereafter *PR*), Aug. 12, 1966, pp. 6-12.

[2] For an analysis of the purge, see the author's "Mao's Great Purge: A Political Balance Sheet," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1969, pp. 1-10; also, Charles Neuhauser, "The Impact of the Cultural Revolution on the Chinese Communist Party Machine," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, Calif.), June 1968, pp. 465-88.

[3] New Year's Day editorial, simultaneously published in *Jen-min Jih-pao* (hereafter cited as *JMJP*), *Hung Ch'i*, and *Chieh-fang Chün Pao* (all Peking), Jan. 1, 1976.

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On the other hand, a large number of veteran cadres in the party take a negative view of the GPCR and vehemently dispute the positive results claimed by its defenders. Some are said to have questioned the rationality of Mao's violent approach from the very beginning by arguing: "Since Liu Shao-ch'i and his handful usurped part of the power in the dictatorship of the proletariat, it needs only an order from Chairman Mao to dismiss them from office, [so] why should the present [violent] method be adopted?" [4] It is only natural, moveover, that those party officials who were actually toppled from power and persecuted during the GPCR should harbor resentment against the movement and what it represents. They not only have challenged its legitimacy but also have criticized it for having divided and demoralized the party ranks and having produced severely adverse consequences for the nation. The attitudes of these veteran officials were critically described in a lengthy 1974 "central study class" report by Wang Hung-wen, a radical leader and beneficiary of the GPCR, who has been Vice-Chairman of the CCP since August 1973:

The problem is that today there are some comrades in our ranks, including party and nonparty members, who, just as seven or eight years ago, still do not comprehend the GPCR; they do not take it seriously and do not work hard for it. Some of them even confound right and wrong and confuse black and white; a few individuals even color the GPCR pitch-black and depict it as a ravaging flood or a predatory beast, and some say that they shudder at the thought of the GPCR. It is stated in the Constitution approved by the Tenth Party Congress and in the resolution of the party that the GPCR will be carried out many times in the future. But some say that the GPCR was totally unnecessary and it should not be carried out any more. In particular, the senior and middle-level cadres have divergent views. Some of them say: "The GPCR has scored a great victory nationally, but we do not see it here." What they mean is that if victory cannot be seen here and there, then, in aggregate, it cannot be seen in the whole country; why was, then, the GPCR necessary?[5]

Wang's remarks clearly indicated that the issue of the GPCR has polarized the party ranks and that those officials who were disgraced ten years ago and have since been restored to positions of power have sought to take revenge against their former persecutors. He accused the ex-victims and enemies of the GPCR of being

. . . totally oblivious to the fact that the GPCR has struck down two bourgeois headquarters [of Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao], thereby preventing the state from changing its color; instead, they have been engrossed with the attacks by the masses, and upon rehabilitation and back in power, they try to rectify the masses whenever an opportunity presents itself. . . . Some say: "Since we were dragged out and struggled against during the GPCR, we still have to settle accounts [with our persecutors]. We are already very generous for not charging interest, but what is there to prevent us from taking vengeance?" We must loudly warn such comrades: it is too dangerous, what do the masses owe you? . . . If you must settle accounts with the masses, they have the right to again seize power back from you.

There is no question that the events of the past few years have tended to discredit the GPCR and to vindicate the stand of its critics. The shocking circumstances of Lin Piao's death in 1971 and the subsequent exposé of heinous crimes attributed to him did not reflect well on the GPCR inasmuch as Lin had been closely involved in its planning and execution.[6] Moreover, Lin's demise and the purge of his followers from the leadership ranks gave new impetus to the drive of the conservative elements to rehabilitate their colleagues deposed during the GPCR. Indeed, a large number of disgraced veteran cadres, including even some who had been charged by the radicals (presumably with Mao's full approval) with serious political crimes, were "liberated" and returned to active roles in politics. An outstanding example was Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who

[4] *JMJP* editorial, July 1, 1971.

[5] Wang Hung-wen, "Report to the Central Study Class" (Jan. 14, 1974), as published in *Chung-kung Yen-chiu* (Studies on Chinese Communism—Taipei), Dec. 10, 1974, pp. 95-96. This internal document of the CCP came into the possession of the Nationalist Chinese authorities.

[6] Because of Lin's close identification with the radicals and his major role in the GPCR, his disgrace in 1971 quickly became a political football in the struggle between radicals and conservatives. The conservatives first took the offensive by denouncing Lin as an ultra-leftist, thereby seeking to discredit the radicals and to challenge the legitimacy of the GPCR itself. However, starting in January 1973, the radicals countered with a concerted campaign repudiating Lin as an ultra-rightist ("leftist in form but rightist in substance") and linking him ideologically with Liu Shao-ch'i, the central target of the GPCR. Since then, both sides have continued to push their conflicting interpretations of Lin's political role in their efforts to discredit each other.

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

Members of the Shanghai group: from left, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Wang Hung-wen, and Yao Wen-yuan.

—Photos left and right by Charles Paynter/Camera Press and center by Sygmachine.

had been Party Secretary-General and a Vice-Premier of the State Council when he was purged as "the second top capitalist-roader in the party" in 1966 and disappeared from public life until his rehabilitation in 1973.

The restoration of these former alleged "capitalist-roaders" to office had serious politicial implications. For one thing, their political comeback squeezed out—or blocked the political advance of —young cadres who had been promoted during the GPCR, and in so doing it weakened the power base of such radicals as Wang Hung-wen, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Chiang Ch'ing, and Yao Wen-yuan, who had achieved rapid political prominence through their support of the GPCR. At the same time, the reinstatement of those who had opposed the GPCR had the effect of calling into question the very legitimacy of the movement; indeed, the conservatives, in denouncing Lin Piao for ultra-leftist crimes, did so primarily to discredit the GPCR and its "newborn things." Moreover, once reinstated in power, they moved, step by step, to modify and dilute the innovations introduced during the GPCR and to resurrect policies which Mao and his radical supporters had sought to do away with. By the end of 1975, the policy pendulum had swung so far to the right that there was a discernible "thermidorian reaction" to the GPCR in every area of Chinese life.

It has been in this shifting political context that Mao and his radical supporters have been trying in the past few years to arrest what they see as a process of "retrogression and restoration" and to reaffirm the values of the GPCR. Thus, in 1973-74, they mounted the "anti-Lin Piao, anti-Confucius campaign" with the avowed objective of checking the trend toward "rightist restoration." [7] However, the overall political impact of this effort was short-lived and limited. The campaign failed to generate sufficient political support and quickly petered out in the summer of 1974.

The current campaign to "beat back the right-deviationist wind [seeking] to reverse correct verdicts," which began to accelerate in China in the latter part of 1975, represents yet another phase of the continuing battle waged by Mao and the radicals to defend the values of the GPCR. The clear link with the GPCR was underscored in March 1976 by an authoritative article which reflected the radical point of view. It stated:

Around last summer [1975], a right-deviationist wind trying to reverse previous correct verdicts was whipped up in society at large. Its aim was to negate the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution personally initiated and led by Chairman Mao ten years ago and the socialist new things that have emerged during the Cultural Revolution, to reverse the correct appraisal of the Cultural Revolution and

[7] For a detailed discussion of this campaign, see the author's "The Anti-Lin Piao and Confucius Campaign: Its Meaning and Purposes," *Asian Survey*, October 1974, pp. 871-86.

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practice revisionism. . . . The bourgeois representatives who whipped up the right-deviationist wind to reverse correct verdicts were mainly those capitalist-roaders who were exposed and criticized during the Cultural Revolution but refused to mend their ways.[8]

As the campaign unfolded, there were increasing indications that one of the radicals' main targets was Teng Hsiao-p'ing, a rehabilitated victim of the GPCR, who had staged a dramatic political comeback since 1973 to emerge once again as one of China's most powerful leaders. Throughout 1975, Teng functioned as *de facto* Premier in place of the mortally ill Premier Chou En-lai and was widely expected to become Chou's successor. Following Chou's death on January 8, 1976, however, Teng suddenly disappeared from public view immediately after delivering the eulogy at Chou's memorial service on January 15, and Hua Kuo-feng was named Acting Premier shortly thereafter. Then in early February, Teng came under intense criticism, culminating in his dismissal from all posts on April 7. What happened? Many pieces of the jigsaw puzzle are still missing, but enough has emerged to enable us to look more closely at Teng's comeback and the political controversy that developed around him.

The Resurgence of Teng Hsiao-p'ing

Teng reappeared in public in April 1973, after seven years of political eclipse. His rehabilitation was not just nominal, for within less than two years after his return to the political scene he acquired several powerful positions in rapid succession. Restored to a vice-premiership in April 1973, Teng was elected to the Central Committee at the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973, was admitted to the CCP Politburo and made a Vice-Chairman of the party's Military Affairs Commission in December 1973, and was elevated to a vice-chairmanship of the party, membership on the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and the posts of senior Vice-Premier of the State Council and PLA Chief of Staff in January 1975. He seemed to possess more power than he ever had before the GPCR.

Several factors accounted for Teng's extraordinary political comeback. First, in the wake of the Lin Piao affair and the drive against powerful Lin supporters in the regime, the leadership had an urgent need to broaden its base of power by rallying the support of all anti-Lin forces, and the rehabilitation of Teng and many other veteran officials was a necessary step to meet this exigency. Secondly, as the dismissals of large numbers of veteran officials during the GPCR had adversely affected the running of the government and the management of the national economy, there was a widely felt need to reemploy the talents of many such officials sidelined since the GPCR; and Teng, as a skillful administrator with much experience in both domestic and external affairs, obviously had assets that made him in demand. In retrospect, however, a third factor appears to have been even more crucial—



Teng Hsiao-p'ing pictured in late 1975 when he was China's Vice-Premier under the ailing Chou En-lai.

—UPI.

[8] "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution Continues and Deepens," *PR*, March 19, 1976, p. 9.

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the failing health of Premier Chou, who was known, if only within the top leadership, to be suffering from cancer as early as 1972.[9] Anticipating death in the near future, Chou appears to have played a major role in securing Teng's rehabilitation in 1973 and to have actively promoted Teng as his successor thereafter.

There is no doubt that Mao himself at least acquiesced in Teng's return to power.[10] Beyond that, Mao may even have considered Teng's return politically useful. For example, Teng's military background and his close personal ties with many ranking PLA leaders may have made him, in Mao's estimation, an ideal person to handle a host of problems in party-PLA relations and to help re-establish firm political control over the military establishment. As a matter of fact, Teng quickly proved his worth to Mao in this respect, for in December 1973 he was instrumental in arranging and carrying out an orderly reshuffle of regional PLA commanders whereby a number of key military leaders were transferred from their long-entrenched "independent kingdoms" and stripped of their positions in the provincial party and government apparatuses. It is possible that, in consenting to Teng's return, Mao and other radicals may initially have had a devious plan to coopt Teng—to win him over to their side and use him to checkmate Chou and divide the conservatives. Indeed, for a while it looked almost as if Teng meant different things to different groups in the regime and was being courted by all—a very advantageous political position which enabled him to wield considerable influence.

Much to the chagrin of Mao and the radicals, however, Teng turned out to be an "unrepentant capitalist-roader" after all. In the conflict between radicals and veteran officials during the anti-Lin Piao, anti-Confucius campaign in 1974, for example, Teng sided with the latter and helped to crush the offensive launched by the radicals. On the other hand, Premier Chou and other veteran officials lost no time in building up Teng's leadership status, as evidenced by his promotion to a number of higher-ranking posts during the Central Committee plenum and National People's Congress of January 1975, already noted above. Also indicative of the predominance of the conservative elements in the regime was the fact that the new PRC Constitution approved by the NPC formally endorsed the right of peasants to farm private plots and engage in sideline production, reaffirmed the principle of income distribution according to labor ("to each according to his work"), and guaranteed to citizens the right of private ownership.[11] These provisions have long been considered necessary by the veteran administrators like Chou and Teng to ensure the public's incentive to work and to boost China's economic development, but they have been opposed by the radicals as ideological backsliding and as condoning and expanding the "bourgeois right."

The major decisions taken at the January 1975 meetings of the Central Commitee and NPC clearly ran counter to Mao's wishes. However, possibly because he lacked sufficient support at the time to block or reverse them, he chose instead to dissociate himself from them by staying away from both meetings. Moreover, he soon moved to negate these decisions by inspiring a new radical campaign to study "the theory of proletarian dictatorship."[12] Mao was quoted as having complained in advance of the January decisions that despite Communist rule since 1949, China still retained the birthmarks of the old society in adhering to "an eight-grade wage system, distribution to each according to his work, and exchange by means of money"—all systems that "are scarcely different from those in the old society"[13] and which provide the soil and conditions for engendering the bourgeoisie and capitalism. Yet, to Mao's evident consternation, the Central Committee and NPC not only failed to eliminate these vestiges of the old society, but instead took decisions that, in Mao's view, consolidated and strengthened the "bourgeois right."

Mao's response was the new campaign against "bourgeois rightist" tendencies and calling for a firm

[9] See "Comrade Chou En-lai Passes Away," *ibid.*, Jan., 16, 1976, p. 3.

[10] This can be inferred from a statement in a *JMJP* editorial of April 10, 1976, that "Chairman Mao saved him and gave him a chance to resume work."

[11] See Articles 7 and 9 of the PRC Constitution (adopted Jan. 17, 1975), published in *PR*, Jan. 24, 1975, p. 14. For an analysis of salient provisions of the Constitution, see Chün-tu Hsüeh, "The New Constitution," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1975, pp. 11-19.

[12] The call for the campaign came in a *JMJP* editorial of Feb. 9, 1975, entitled "Study Well the Theory of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." In a follow-up article on Feb. 22, the same paper devoted three and a half pages to quotations from Marx, Engels, and Lenin on the dictatorship of the proletariat.

[13] See the Feb. 9, 1975, *JMJP* editorial. It is interesting to note that the quoted remarks by Mao were said to have been made in December 1974, before the Central Committee and NPC meetings of January 1975 which finally approved the new PRC Constitution. This suggests that Mao tried to persuade his colleagues to curb the "bourgeois right," evidently without success.

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"dictatorship of the proletariat" over the bourgeoisie. Not surprisingly, the party press, which has been dominated in recent years by the radicals in the leadership, gave enormous publicity to the campaign, with the clear objective of downgrading and discrediting the decisions approved at the January meetings. In March and April 1975, Yao Wen-yuan and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, both prominent radical leaders, published signed articles in *Hung Ch'i,* the party's theoretical organ, in support of Mao's political offensive. Besides fiercely attacking the "bourgeois right" itself, they also inveighed against "people like Lin Piao" and cadres in the party who supported policies that safeguarded and strengthened the social base of the "bourgeois right," accusing them of helping to restore capitalism in China.[14]

Meanwhile, the veteran leaders in the party, including Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, remained conspicuously silent; at least, none of them publicly expressed support for the campaign as Yao and Chang had done. More than that, according to subsequent Maoist charges, they actually opposed the campaign within the leadership and tried in every way to block criticism of the policy of material incentives.[15] There seems little doubt that the veteran party leaders were fearful that the premature elimination of wage differentials and excessive emphasis on egalitarianism would dampen the work incentives of the masses and jeopardize the goal of building China into a powerful and modern socialist state before the end of the century—a major objective proclaimed by Premier Chou at the NPC. Thus, they evidently sought to play down Mao's call for waging unremitting class struggle in Chinese society and to place major emphasis instead on the maintenance of unity and discipline and on leadership efforts to boost the national economy.

The Struggle Over Issues

It is in this context that the seemingly baffling and bizarre charges leveled at Teng Hsiao-p'ing by the radicals in February 1976, accusing him retrospectively of having concocted a revisionist line of "taking the three directives as the key link," become comprehensible.[16] According to the radical allegations, Teng had seized upon two of Mao's earlier directives—on promoting stability and unity and on boosting the national economy—and had put them on a par with Mao's directive on the campaign to study the theory of proletarian dictatorship, describing the three directives as "interrelated and inseparable" and claiming that together they constituted "the key link for all work." By juxtaposing the three directives and thus giving them equal importance, Teng was alleged to have tried to minimize the importance of class struggle and to promote stability-unity and economic development at the expense of ideology—a cardinal sin in Chinese Communist politics. Mao was said to have been severely critical of Teng's attempt to manipulate Maoist authority and to have retorted:

What "taking the three directives as the key link"! Stability and unity do not mean writing off class struggle; class struggle is the key link, and everything else hinges on it.[17]

The question arises why Teng came under attack when he was, after all, only carrying out the economic program approved by the January 1975 Central Committee Plenum and presented to the NPC by Premier Chou En-lai as head of the government.[18] In view of Chou's major identification with the program, was the attack on Teng actually aimed at Chou?

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[14] See Yao Wen-yuan, "On the Social Basis of the Lin Piao Anti-Party Clique," *PR*, March 7, 1975, pp. 5-10; and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, "On Exercising All-Round Dictatorship Over the Bourgeoisie," *ibid.*, April 4, 1975, pp. 5-11.

[15] Kuei Chih, "The Rightist Wind to Reverse Correct Verdicts and the Bourgeois Right," *Hung Ch'i*, March 1, 1976, pp. 20-21.

[16] The charges were elaborated in numerous articles in the party press. A highly authoritative and informative exposé of the issue was provided by two prominent radical writers, Liang Hsiao and Jen Ming, in an article entitled "Criticism of 'Taking the Three Directives as the Key Link'," *JMJP*, Feb. 29, 1976.

[17] *Ibid.* Exactly when Mao made the comment is not known, but he must have done so sometime before January 1, 1976—that is, while Premier Chou was still alive. This is clear from the fact that the 1976 New Year's Day editorial in *JMJP* had already quoted the last sentence of Mao's remarks, calling it the Chairman's "latest instruction," but had omitted the first sentence. It was not until the Liang Hsiao-Jen Ming article of February 29 that the remarks were quoted in full, making it clear that they had referred specifically to Teng's formula for "taking the three directives as the key link."

[18] The program outlined a two-stage plan for the development of the national economy: in the first stage, "an independent and relatively comprehensive industrial and economic system" would be built by 1980; in the second stage, "the comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology" would be accomplished by the end of the century "so that our national economy will be advancing in the front ranks of the world." See Premier Chou En-lai's "Report on the Work of the Government," delivered before the NPC on January 13, 1975, in *PR*, Jan. 24, 1975, p. 23. The second-stage program came to be referred to as "the four modernizations."

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To answer this question, it is important to note that the basic goals of the economic program do not appear to have been in dispute, and that what apparently was in contention was the approach to their implementation. In his eagerness to promote China's economic development, Teng seems to have tried to soft-pedal Mao's emphasis on revolutionary values and moral incentives and to have pushed a series of measures which the Maoists considered "revisionist." Also, Chou's steadily deteriorating health and confinement to the hospital put Teng squarely in the forefront, and he was really in charge of running the government. To judge by the available evidence, Teng pushed hard to get the economy moving through a series of conferences concerning the steel and national defense industries, military affairs, agriculture, education, and science and technology between May and October 1975.[19] The subsequent allegation that he used the "four modernizations" as "a big club" and incited people to fan up an "economic gale" [20] thus seems to have a certain plausibility.

Teng's so-called revisionist line is also said to have been embodied in a lengthy and comprehensive policy paper which, according to his detractors, was tantamount to a blueprint for the restoration of capitalism in China.[21] The paper in question, entitled "On the General Program for All Work of the Party and the Nation," was allegedly prepared under Teng's guidance in the summer of 1975 and completed in draft form on October 7, and was intended for publication shortly thereafter to serve as a general plan for all work over the next 25 years.[22] To judge by the passages quoted by its critics, the paper did indeed place great emphasis on economic development, gave top priority to the "four modernizations," and fixed stricter rules and regulations for factory and enterprise managements to follow in enforcing work discipline. More important, it also called for "rectification"—*i.e.*, leadership reorganization, policy changes, or both, in nine areas: industry; agriculture; communications and transportation; finance and trade; science and technology; culture, education, and public health; literature and art; the army; and the party. To the radicals, "rectification" meant a systematic endeavor by Teng to purge their followers and to substitute his revisionist measures in place of the policy innovations of the GPCR, thereby reversing the GPCR's "correct verdicts."

In response to Teng's call for rectification, officials in several departments were claimed by the radicals to have mapped out concrete plans for action in the fall of 1975. For example, a 20-point plan "Concerning Certain Problems in the Speed-up of Industrial Development" was said to have been formulated during August and September.[23] It was also claimed that between July 18 and September 26, a newly-appointed "capitalist-roader" in the Academy of Sciences prepared, under Teng's close supervision, a "Report Outline for the Academy of Sciences" which was submitted to a conference at the Academy personally attended by Teng at the end of September and approved as a guide for the work of the Academy and of the nation's scientific-technological establishment as a whole. In the field of education, a similar report outline was said to have been under preparation by Chou Jung-hsin, Minister of Education, in early October 1975.[24]

From what has been revealed concerning the thrust of these plans and Teng's role in shaping them, it appears that Teng believed that various measures instituted during the GPCR, by placing too much emphasis on ideology and political considerations, were retarding China's economic development and therefore needed to be "rectified." One very important issue had to do with the GPCR innovations in education. These innovations had

[19] According to Chinese press reports and wall posters displayed in Peking, Teng attended at least six national conferences in 1975: a Conference of Representatives of the Iron and Steel Industries on May 29; an enlarged Military Affairs Commission meeting on July 14; the "Learn-from-Tachai" Conference in Shansi on September 15; a conference on the Academy of Sciences' work plan on September 26; a Conference of National Defense Industry Key-point Enterprises; and a conference of party secretaries from 12 South China provinces (the last two undated).

[20] Liang Hsiao and Jen Ming, *loc. cit.* On the "four modernizations," see fn. 18.

[21] Tso Ch'ing, "Read an Unpublished Document," *Hsueh-hsi yu P'i-p'an* (Shanghai), April 14, 1976, pp. 11-19; see also an article by the Mass Criticism Group of Peking and Tsinghua Universities, in *JMJP*, April 3, 1976.

[22] Tso Ch'ing, *loc. cit.*, p. 11.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 18. Yü Chiu-li, who appears to have played a major role in shaping this industrial plan as a Vice-Premier and concurrently Minister in Charge of the State Planning Commission, disappeared from public view between January and July 1976.

[24] See Kang Li and Yen Feng, "Before and After the Appearance of the 'Report Outline'," in *ibid.*, pp. 20-27. The "capitalist-roader" referred to appears to have been Hu Yao-pang, who had been purged as Secretary of the Chinese Communist Youth League during the GPCR and was rehabilitated and appointed Party Secretary and Vice-President of the Academy of Sciences in July 1975. Real power in the Academy apparently was in the hands of Hu, and not of the President of the Academy, Kuo Mo-jo, who has been merely a figurehead. It is clear now that the attacks in the press on deviations in the field of science and technology were directed at Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Education Minister Chou Jung-hsin, and Hu Yao-pang, and not at Hua Kuo-feng, as some Western observers have suggested.

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placed heavy emphasis on political indoctrination, practical training, and combining education with labor; had downgraded theoretical knowledge and research; and had required college students to be admitted on the basis of political qualifications. Teng, however, evidently viewed the GPCR changes as lowering academic standards and impeding China's efforts at modernization, and he wanted students to be admitted to advanced education primarily on the basis of their academic credentials. Teng is quoted as having complained that "the quality of education is low," that "scientific research has lagged behind," and that these deficiencies "have hampered the four modernizations." He allegedly called "not reading books" and "not having culture" "the greatest danger" and "the greatest crisis" today.[25] Other statements attributed to Teng are similiar in thrust:

Quite a few problems have developed in our schools. Some students can't even read. The Chairman says students should be putting their studies first. Chou Jung-hsin, you are the Minister of Education; there are currrently a lot of problems to do with studying, why haven't you said anything about it?

Scientific and technical schools should be well-run. You have to choose those students who are good in mathematics, physics, chemistry, and foreign language. The children of cadres should not be given privileges . . . we are in a crisis.[26]

What emerges from the "facts" adduced to "prove" Teng's opposition to the policies of the GPCR and his design to effect a "capitalist restoration" is a picture of a practical-minded, blunt man strongly committed to China's economic growth. Many of the remarks attributed to Teng show him to be quite a pragmatist. For example, he allegedly said that he cared "only about a rise in the national economy, not about how it was to be done".[27] More specifically, he considered material incentives necessary for "mobilizing the enthusiasm" of workers and peasants, advocated a return to "relying on specialists in running factories and academic institutes," and was willing to import foreign technology and machinery to speed up China's economic growth. For this he was accused of opposing Mao's precept of "putting politics in command" and of trumpeting "servility to things foreign" instead of adherence to the Maoist principle of self-reliance.[28]

In short, the radicals have portrayed Teng as harboring essentially the same pragmatic outlook that prompted his often-quoted 1961 remark that "it doesn't matter whether a cat is black or white; any cat that catches mices is a good cat"—a heresy that figured prominently in his initial downfall during the GPCR. In 1975, as in the 1960's, Teng's pragmatism was seen by the radicals as a direct challenge to Mao's insistence upon revolutionary purity and values, and once more it got him into political hot water. This time, however, Teng apparently recognized the political risk he was taking and chose to go ahead anyway. He is quoted as having remarked: "I am not afraid of being toppled a second time." [29]

The Struggle for Power

The ongoing political conflict in China, however, has not been merely a struggle over principles—*e.g.*, "pragmatism" *vs.* revolutionary purity—and over policy issues, important though these may be. It has also been very much a struggle for power in which Teng was prominently involved. In its latest phase, this struggle has centered on the promotion of young cadres and the rehabilitation of old ones, and as such, it has a vital bearing on the choice of China's leaders in the post-Mao era.

The promotion of young cadres is, without question, the most important plank in the "platform" of the radicals. To perpetuate the innovations of the GPCR, the radicals realize that they must have political power, and that therefore they must place their supporters in positions of authority in the leading organs at all levels. Hence, they have termed the promotion of young cadres "a major issue of right and wrong" and a yardstick by which to measure a person's attitude toward the "GPCR and Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line." More than that, they sought to institutionalize their young followers' right of access to positions of authority by pushing through the insertion in the 1973 Party Constitution of provisions sanctifying the principle

[25] Liang Hsiao and Jen Ming, *loc. cit.*

[26] These quotations are from wall posters seen at Peking University and reported by foreign newsmen. See *Asahi Shimbun* (Tokyo), March 7 and 11, 1976, and *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), March 29, 1976.

[27] Liang Hsiao and Jen Ming, *loc. cit.*

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] *Ibid.*

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of "combining the old, the middle-aged, and the young."

On the other hand, there is no question that Teng and other veteran party officials resented the fact that their former tormentors during the GPCR —the radicals and their young followers—had been catapulted into positions of power. Teng is said to have disparaged these young cadres who "rise like a helicopter" and to have insisted that they should only "be promoted step by step." [30] Thus, Teng's call for "rectification" was naturally perceived by the radicals as a scheme to get rid of large numbers of such cadres who had risen to leading posts as a result of the GPCR. In their view, Teng's policy in this regard presented a grave threat to the radicals' position in the party, for all their leaders are comparative newcomers who emerged from the GPCR; moreover, some of them (*e.g.*, Wang Hung-wen and Yao Wen-yuan), as well as a considerable number of their followers in the Politburo (*e.g.*, Ni Chih-fu and Wu Kuei-hsien) and Central Committee on down to the provincial and local party organizations, are relatively young. Not surprisingly, one of the radicals' major charges against Teng was that he tried to "sabotage the three-in-one combination of the old, the middled-aged, and the young in the leading bodies, as advocated by Chairman Mao." [31]

In contrast to his negative and even hostile attitude toward the young cadres, Teng patronized the veteran cadres, many of them reviled and purged during the GPCR. He made no secret of his belief that the toppling of "some good party cadres" had been an error, and he called for their speedy rehabilitation and restoration to positions of responsibility.[32] In 1975 alone, probably under Teng's aegis, seven rehabilitated cadres were appointed as first secretaries, and many more as secretaries, of provincial party committees.[33] A considerable number of personnel changes also took place in the PLA's central and provincial hierarchy during 1975, especially after July, and out of some 30 new appointments at the center, more than a score went to rehabilitated PLA cadres.[34] The return of these veterans to high positions seems to have been part of the efforts made to implement Teng's "General Program for All Work of the Party and the Nation," which called for rectification in all areas of activity and, particularly, for revamping the various organs of leadership.

The poster campaign against "right-deviationists seeking to reverse correct decisions" picks up steam in February 1976. Photo shows citizens reading wall posters at Tsinghua University in Peking.

—Wide World.

In the eyes of the radicals, these personnel changes threatened to have still wider political ramifications. The restoration of rehabilitated officials to key posts in the party and the PLA would enable Teng to consolidate his control over policy and to strengthen his own power position with a

[30] *Ibid.*

[31] *Ibid.*

[32] Tso Ch'ing, *loc. cit.*, pp. 12-13; also Liang Hsiao and Jen Ming, *loc. cit.*

[33] The seven appointed as provincial party first secretaries were Chiang Wei-ch'ing (Kiangsi), Liao Chih-kao (Fukien), and P'ai Ju-ping (Shantung), all appointed in January 1975; Chao Hsin-ch'u (Hupeh), appointed in May 1975; Chia Chi-yun (Yunnan), appointed in October 1975; Chao Chih-yang (Szechwan) and An P'ing-sheng (Kwangsi), appointed in December 1975.

[34] The 1975 personnel changes in the PLA included a large-scale reshuffling of the top officers in at least 17 of China's 29 province-level military districts (MD's), involving the replacement of the Commander in at least 10 MD's and of the Political Commissar in at least 8 MD's. Among the rehabilitated PLA cadres who received new appointments in 1975 were Lo Jui-ch'ing (previously PLA Chief of Staff, now a Deputy Director of the National Defense Scientific and Technological Commission), T'an Chen (previously Director of the PLA General Political Department, now also a Deputy Director of the National Defense Scientific and Technological Commission), Hsiao Hua (previously Director of the PLA General Political Department, now Political Commissar of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences), Wang En-mao (previously Commander of the Sinkiang Military Region, now Deputy Political Commissar of the Nanking Military Region), to name only a few.

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view to preempting the succession to Chou's post. These implications of Teng's actions were obviously not lost on Mao, for the Chairman, from the late summer of 1975, began inspiring a series of countermeasures. The first move was the initiation at the end of August 1975 of a campaign of criticism centered on the classic Chinese novel *Water Margin*. Ostensibly, the criticism was directed at Sung Chiang, a key character in the novel, for having capitulated to the landlord class and betrayed the cause of rebelling peasants in 13th-century China; in reality, it was directed at the Sung Chiangs of modern times—*i.e.*, capitulationalists who would bow to revisionism and betray Mao's revolutionary line.[35] Judging from the content of the critiques published in the press, which contained thinly-veiled attacks on current policies, the Maoists were preparing the ideological ground for imputing to the conservatives in the leadership the role of contemporary Sung Chiangs.

In the fall of 1975, the Maoist counterattack against the "right-deviationist wind" became more sharply focused. Responding to a letter of Liu Ping (a Tsinghua University official), who had complained about the deterioration of academic standards and the low quality of college students as a result of the GPCR educational reforms, Mao called for a "revolutionary mass debate" at Tsinghua to provide a forum for pressing the assault on the "capitalist-roaders" seeking to negate the GPCR and its "newborn things." [36] The "debate" quickly unfolded and spread to other academic institutions in November and December 1975, as "revolutionary teachers and students" put up large numbers of wall posters denouncing the critics of educational reform and accusing them of conspiring to reverse the "correct verdicts" of the GPCR.

On January 1, 1976, one week before the death of Premier Chou, *Jen-min Jih-pao's* New Year's Day editorial made it clear that the leadership conflict had entered a new phase. As noted earlier, the editorial quoted part of a comment by Mao repudiating the conservatives for emphasizing stability and unity at the expense of class struggle—a charge which was to become a leitmotif of the impending campaign against Teng and which signaled an expansion of the conflict to other issue-areas besides education.[37] At this juncture, Chou's death on January 8 seems to have precipitated events by removing whatever constraints his presence had imposed on Mao and the radical leaders and enabling them to point the spearhead of struggle directly at Teng. One can also surmise that the necessity of appointing a new premier to succeed Chou without delay forced Mao to move against Teng quickly, for if Teng were not "stopped" and were permitted to become premier, he would become even more powerful and would be in a position to preempt Mao's own succession. Confronted with such a "now or never" situation, Mao apparently decided soon after Chou's state funeral on January 15 to intervene decisively. While much remains obscure, what evidence exists suggests that the Rubicon was finally crossed around the end of January, most likely at an enlarged meeting of the Politburo, and that Mao then vetoed Teng's appointment, apparently in defiance of majority opinion, forcing a tenta-

Lines of mourners file past the body of China's late Premier, Chou En-lai, in January 1976.

—Camera Press.

[35] See editorial, "Unfold Criticism of *Water Margin*," *JMJP*, Sept. 4, 1975. Having witnessed Khrushchev's "destalinization," Mao seems to have been obsessed with the fear that the revisionists in the CCP would attack him posthumously. Hence, in the GPCR, Liu Shao-ch'i was reviled as "China's Khrushchev." The obsession again manifested itself in the Mao-inspired criticisms of *Water Margin*. The critics complained that Chao Kai, the founder of the rebel group, was excluded from the roster of 108 heroes after his death, and that Sung Chiang, who succeeded Chao Kai, changed the name of the rebels' headquarters from *Chu-yi T'ang* (Uprising and Solidarity Hall) to *Shun-yi T'ang* (Loyalty and Solidarity Hall).

[36] For a detailed account of the debate at Tsinghua University, see reportorial article, "Criticize That Unrepentant Capitalist-Roader in the Party," in *JMJP*, March 3, 1976.

[37] See fn. 17.

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Crowds in T'ienanmen Square on April 5, 1976, before the removal of tributes to the memory of Chou En-lai led to rioting between rival political groups.

—Ross Munro/The Globe and Mail (Toronto).

tive, stop-gap decision to make Hua Kuo-feng Acting Premier.[38]

The Continuing Conflict

The subsequent dismissal of Teng from all leadership posts and the formal elevation of Hua to the posts of First Vice-Chairman of the Party and Premier of the State Council on April 7, 1976,[39] seemingly completed at least a first-round victory for Mao and his radical supporters in their bout with the conservatives in the leadership. Even that, however, appeared to be only symbolic, for the decision approved by the Politburo stopped short of endorsing attack on other "capitalists-roaders" in the leadership. In fact, the radicals have continued to manifest dissatisfaction with the *modus vivendi* and have waged an ongoing struggle to expel Teng from the party altogether and remove other "capitalist-roaders" from office both in Peking and in the provinces. As one radical spokesman wrote in *Jen-min Jih-pao*, "the downfall of one representative figure [Teng] will absolutely not cause the capitalist-roaders to disappear"; they remain able to use their title as "Communist Party members" and their identity as "leading cadres" to usurp leadership power and push through the revisionist line in "legitimate form." [40]

In retrospect, the events of the past year have cast fresh light on the precarious balance of forces in the Chinese leadership. It now appears that, despite his downfall, Teng must have been quite popular and have enjoyed considerable political

[38] Much of the evidence for these statements is necessarily circumstantial in the absence of official disclosures. To begin with, the importance of deciding the succession to Chou makes it virtually certain that the decision had to be weighed at a meeting of the Central Committee or, more likely, of the smaller Politburo. Further, the fact that there was no formal announcement of a Politburo or Central Committee resolution on Hua's appointment, plus the fact that he was designated only Acting Premier, strongly suggests the absence of a leadership consensus and the tentative nature of Hua's appointment. As for the probable presence of strong opposition to Mao's move to "dump" Teng, this may be inferred from reports that a number of veteran Politburo members, such as Yeh Chien-ying, Li Hsien-nien, and Chu Teh, disappeared from public view after January 15 and refused to show up for work, evidently in protest against Mao's attacks on Teng. The inference is further supported by a statement in an article by Liang Hsiao (*JMJP*, May 18, 1976) that "Teng caused a split in the Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao."

[39] For the texts of the Politburo's decisions, issued as resolutions of the CCP Central Committee, see *PR*, April 9, 1976.

[40] See Kuei Chih, "The Capitalist-Roaders Are Still on Their Way," *JMJP*, April 21, 1976.

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support among the veteran officials. This has been suggested by radical charges that after Chou's death Teng's followers "went about establishing extensive contacts" and "surreptitiously plotted to write letters to the Party Central Committee" to demand Teng's appointment as Premier.[41] It was also implicit in the massive demonstration staged by a crowd of 100,000 in Peking's T'ienanmen Square on April 5. Though the demonstrators used the occasion of the annual Ch'ing Ming Festival in honor of the dead to pay tribute to the memory of Chou, the demonstration indirectly reflected wide support for the moderate policies associated with both Chou and Teng—for Chou's policies were inseparable from Teng's, and to honor Chou's memory was in a sense to express support for the besieged Teng.

On the other side of the coin, the demonstration was unmistakably directed against those who were behind the campaign to criticize the policies of Chou and Teng. Accounts of the demonstration in the radical-controlled party press reported that many of the posters and placards displayed by the marchers denounced Chairman Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing, who was known to be playing an active role in the campaign, and Yao Wen-yuan, the leading radical ideologue. Some of the demonstrators were even claimed to have attacked Mao himself in allegorical fashion by chanting, "the era of Ch'in Shih Huang is gone" and "gone for good is Ch'in Shih Huang's feudal society." [42]

There are indeed many signs that Mao's authority and influence are already on the wane. Despite his direct and personal involvement in the anti-rightist campaign, the party authorities in the majority of China's 29 provincial-level units have appeared reluctant to go along. Prior to the T'ienanmen Square incident, for example, they failed to support the campaign publicly and seemed to be boycotting it. Although these provincial officials and the regional PLA leaders did later pledge their support—in rallies, speeches and telegrams—for the Politburo decisions of April 7 removing Teng from his posts and naming Hua Kuo-feng CCP Vice-Chairman and Premier, their display of support seemed to be largely a *pro forma* response to solicitations from the center rather than a spontaneous expression of approval.

China's political strife is certainly far from over. For one thing, the struggle between the "two lines" remains unresolved. Teng's dismissal notwithstanding, the radicals are relentlessly continuing their drive against other "capitalist-roaders" in the party. Nor has the other crucial issue underlying the current leadership conflict—the question of the succession to Mao—really been settled. It is true that Mao, by effecting the dumping of Teng and the elevation of Hua Kuo-feng to the status of heir-apparent, has moved to structure the eventual succession. However, once Mao is out of the political

A poster displayed in a Canton factory on April 19, 1976, shows an armed worker squeezing a caricature of Teng Hsiao-p'ing. The poster reads, "Firmly support the Party Center's decision and remove Teng Hsiao-p'ing from all party and other duties."

—UPI.

[41] Editorial, *ibid.*, April 18, 1976.

[42] See "Counterrevolutionary Political incident at T'ienanmen Square," *PR*, April 9, 1976, pp. 4-5. Many Chinese—both Mao's enemies and his supporters—have used Ch'in Shih Huang, the first Emperor of the Ch'in dynasty, as a surrogate for Mao. For example, one of the charges against Lin Piao after his fall was that he had denounced Mao in 1971 as the "biggest feudal despot in Chinese history, who dons Marxist-Leninist clothes but implements the laws of Ch'in Shih Huang." Conversely, during 1973-74, the party press extolled this notorious tyrant for unifying China under one empire and setting up a strongly centralized system.

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picture, the succession struggle is likely to erupt again in full force, and there will be a new political game.

At age 56, Hua clearly cannot boast a distinguished revolutionary career before 1949, lacks party seniority, and does not possess the stature of a great national leader. And since he has little to distinguish him from other party and PLA leaders in terms of career, seniority, and accomplishments, there must be other rising leaders (*e.g.,* Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Ch'en Hsi-lien, and Wu Te) who feel that they are equally deserving and have an equal right to aspire to the supreme leadership position, and who would therefore have little, if any, inhibitions about challenging Hua's claim to Mao's mantle.

Hua Kuo-feng, pictured in February 1976, shortly after he emerged as Acting Premier of China in the wake of Chou En-lai's death.

—Sygmachine.

Indeed, as Mao himself has stated, a revolutionary leader is not appointed; he emerges from struggle. Despite his current favored position, Hua has yet to emerge from struggle and thereby prove that he deserves to be the supreme leader of the party.

It is interesting to note that, although Hua appears to enjoy Mao's confidence, his past record identifies him more with the veteran party officials than with the leftist radicals. For example, when he delivered the summation at the "National Learn-from-Tachai Agricultural Conference" in Peking on October 15, 1975, he sounded very much on the same wave length as other veteran leaders. His report called for "rectification" of those party committee officials in rural localities who clung to "bourgeois factionalism"—meaning the new, young cadres patronized and promoted since the GPCR by the radicals in the leadership, the very type of people singled out for rectification in Teng's "General Program." [43] Hua's suppression of Red Guard activities in Hunan in the 1960's was well-known and caused him to be attacked in wall posters in Peking in June 1974. Even as late as the spring of this year, radical-inspired posters criticized him for having brought Chang P'ing-hua, who had been purged as party First Secretary of Hunan in 1966 after being bitterly denounced by Chiang Ch'ing, back to power in that province. Consequently, unless Hua now gets on the radicals' bandwagon and actively supports their cause, he is liable again to become their target in the next round of conflict.

On the other hand, if Hua shifts too much to the left and genuinely repudiates the moderate policies implemented in the past two years, he is likely to find himself equally in trouble. He knows all too well that, in order to maintain a viable administration and accelerate China's economic development, strict discipline must be enforced, and those Maoist values which promote "class struggle," dissent, and mass participation will have to be toned down. Furthermore, if Hua identifies himself too closely with the radical cause, he is sure to run into strong oposition from the veteran officials in the leadership. These veterans, particularly those whose service dates back to the Long March, are jealously proud of their records; they value seniority highly and tend to measure a fellow leader's political worth in terms of his contribution to the Communist revolution. Toward Hua, with his relatively undistinguished pre-1949 record, they seem to be understandably

[43] New China News Agency report from Peking, Oct. 20, 1975.

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ambivalent; indeed, it would be surprising if Hua's sudden jump to eminence over the heads of many senior party leaders had not earned him their rancor. In any case, Hua cannot afford to alienate them, for he needs to enlist their support and cooperation if he is to stay in power.

Future Prospects

Thus, subjected to severe constraints and political cross-pressures, Hua is walking a precarious political tightrope. It is too early to tell whether he possesses either the political acumen, sophistication, and diplomatic skill needed to be able to mediate the conflicting demands of contending leadership groups or the administrative talents required to run the vast machinery of China's government. If he fails to hold all the pieces together, he could himself become a victim in the next round of political conflict. If, on the other hand, he should succeed in yoking the rival factions together in a coalition and in forging unity within it—a far from easy task—he would certainly have a strong claim to Mao's title. But even if he does succeed Mao, Hua would not have the kind of prestige and authority that Mao has enjoyed; hence, chances are that he would be only *primus inter pares* presiding over a collective leadership of diverse political elements and relying on negotiation, manipulation, and compromise to exercise his leadership.

At this stage, it is not possible to make a definite assessment of the continuing political struggle or predict its likely outcome. The conflict could take sharp twists and turns in the future as it draws its dynamics from the shifting balance of forces or if the radicals should launch a new offensive. A development of great potential significance in this context, though it has so far been overlooked by most observers, is the fact that the radicals have in the past few years engineered the restructuring and arming of the urban militia, particularly in major cities like Peking and Shanghai, and have succeeded in placing this paramilitary organization under their control. The use of militiamen to clear the rioters from Peking's T'ienanmen Square on April 5 points to the possibility that the organization may in future become a factor in China's political power struggle. Through their control of the urban militia, the radicals now have at their disposal a formidable potential political weapon which, when necessary, they can use as a counterweight to the public security forces and the PLA, both of which were hostile to the radicals' cause in the latter 1960's.

It would indeed be a gross mistake to underestimate the radicals' political strength. They not only dominate the propaganda apparatus but also are in strategic position to manipulate the established symbols of authority because they are personally and ideologically close to Chairman Mao. Moreover, they are no longer merely ideologues, having gradually developed constituencies both in society at large and in the leadership. Rightly or wrongly, some segments of Chinese society which have become alienated from the present system—especially the young—have looked upon the radical cause as a revolutionary crusade to better their lot, and the radicals' efforts to force drastic changes by their attacks on the system have evoked strong support from these disaffected elements. The radicals also enjoy considerable support among the junior cadres in the bureaucracy. Because too many veteran cadres have held onto their leadership positions too long, the radicals' call for the promotion of young cadres has great appeal to those who have been denied opportunities to move up the political ladder. China's ruling elite today is quite aged, indeed the oldest among those of the major powers of the world, and the failure of the system to devise an effective means of infusing new blood into the leadership bodies is a defect that seems likely to have adverse long-term consequences.

In conclusion, several observations about the legacy of the GPCR and its impact on China's political system are in order. First of all, by invoking the active intervention of the masses and bringing into being a new political consciousness among hitherto uninvolved social groups, the GPCR left behind it an ideological legacy that glorifies mass participation in politics. Through their participation in it, ten of thousands of hitherto politically inexperienced youths became skilled organizers and sophisticated political actors, and they have since learned how to operate within the system and shape their own political destinies. In many respects, however, such a legacy can be debilitating to the system. As Samuel Huntington has pointed out,[44] a rapid

[44] Huntington argues that stable political development requires a balance between political "institutionalization" and political "participation," and that accelerated mass mobilization and participation without a corresponding degree of institutionalization results in political instability and disorder. See Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968, particularly Chap. 1.

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Units of the people's militia (women in the foreground) and the People's Liberation Army march at the opening ceremony of the Third National Sports Meet at Peking's Workers' Stadium in October 1975. A mass placard display depicts members of the militia and the PLA.

—Audrey Topping/Photo Researchers.

increase in popular mobilization and participation without the development of effective political institutions to channel such participation produces not political development but "political decay."

The GPCR also created a crisis of authority in China, and this crisis has deepened in recent years. The wildly exaggerated charges leveled against numerous party officials during the GPCR severely tarnished the image of the Chinese leadership. More important, Mao's mobilization of the Red Guards in 1966-67 to rebel against "capitalist-roaders" in the party and his open encouragement of the revolutionaries to "go against the tide" (*i.e.*, to challenge the established authorities)—a sanction since inscribed explicitly in the 1973 Party Constitution—had the effect of inculcating a contempt for all institutional authority that has lastingly undermined the regime's ability to elicit compliance from the population. The riots that occurred in Peking and other Chinese cities in April 1976 underlined the fact that this crisis of authority still persists.

At the same time, the areas of consensus in the Chinese leadership appear to have narrowed increasingly over the past decade. Not only has the leadership been divided over basic national priorities, but there have been evidences of a widespread atmosphere of antagonism, recrimination, and feuding in the party ranks and of deep personal animosity among the top leaders. Instances of the use of violence and even assassination against political opponents[45]—another legacy of the GPCR—suggest that opposing groups no longer accept any "rules of the game" and have no agreement on legitimate

[45] In 1969, General T'an Fu-jen, Chairman of the Yunnan Provincial Revolutionary Committee, was reportedly gunned down by his opponents, and the obituary notice in *Jen-min Jih-pao* indirectly confirmed this by referring to his sudden, "unfortunate" death. Reports from intelligence sources, strongly supported by circumstantial evidence, indicate that unsuccessful assassination attempts were also made against Vice-Premier Hsieh Fu-chih and Politburo Standing Committee member K'ang Sheng. After the fall of Lin Piao, of course, he and his cohorts were officially accused of having made various attempts on the life of Mao himself, and Li Chen, Minister of Public Security during 1973-74, is believed to have been a more recent victim of an assassin's bullet.

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methods of conflict resolution. Moreover, the persisting tendency of various groups to challenge established authority and rules and to go outside the system to mobilize support indicates that China's political institutions are losing their capability to mediate, refine, and moderate group political actions.

Thus, the Chinese political system has begun to display incipient characteristics of a praetorian regime.[46] If the trend toward praetorian politics cannot be arrested and the current leadership conflict projects itself further into society at large, generating severe social turmoil, then it is likely that the PLA will again intervene as it did during the latter stages of the GPCR. Even though the PLA in recent years has disengaged itself to some extent from active participation in politics and has thus far stayed out of the current leadership struggle, it can easily thrust itself into the political arena again, either in the present conflict or in the succession struggle that will ensue upon Mao's passing. This remains a possibility because the system does not strictly define civil-military institutional boundaries and because "the precedent has been set for military intervention in a political struggle." [47]

It is somewhat ironic that China's leadership conflict over the past decade has shown a high degree of continuity. Despite the fact that in 1966 the GPCR supposedly pronounced a death sentence on "revisionism" and forever sanctified Mao's revolutionary line, the struggle between the "two lines" continues to be at the core of what the Chinese leaders are fighting over today, ten years later. Such unusual continuity can perhaps be taken as a testimonial to the fact that a large number of Chinese leaders, in 1976 as in 1966, hold Maoist principles to be dysfunctional or obsolete in a society striving for modernization and, in spite of their purgatory experience during the GPCR, remain determined to chart a new course for the Chinese revolution. If Mao, after having subjected the party cadres to intensive reeducation for many years, has still not succeeded in convincing them of the correctness of his revolutionary line, his current fight to beat back the "right-deviationist wind" would seem to be a losing battle—perhaps his last in view of his rapidly failing health.

[46] These characteristics may be defined as follows: political participation is "not moderated and channeled toward common goals by the reliable functioning of political institutions"; political institutions "are weak, lacking in the moral authority to work out binding, allocative decisions that will be regarded as legitimate by the society as a whole"; and there is a "tendency for the military to intervene in the political arena." See Claude E. Welch, Jr., and Arthur K. Smith, *Military Role and Rule*, North Scituate, Mass., Duxbury Press, 1974, p. 52. Also see Huntington, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-97, for a similar definition.

[47] Ellis Joffe, "The PLA in Internal Politics," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1975, p. 12.

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The CCP's Provincial Secretaries

By Robert A. Scalapino

The twenty-six provinces and autonomous regions and the three municipalities of provincial rank in the People's Republic of China constitute the vital intermediate level of authority between the center and the lower administrative-territorial divisions of the country. In a nation where the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) claims to be the fountainhead of all authority, the source of legitimacy, and the focal point of organization, it is the party structure at the provincial-municipal level that has the important task of executing the policies of the center and—in the course of this function—of implementing (possibly altering) those policies as local conditions dictate. And within the party structure at this level, the party secretaries stand on the top rung of the political ladder. The provincial secretaries are also likely to have important ties and contacts with the center, so that their identities at different times can signal trends—and problems—in national politics. Indeed, as we shall soon suggest, the increasing importance of individuals at the center who concurrently hold leading provincial-municipal party posts, and who thus maintain a local power base, is one of the truly significant developments of recent times.

The present study focuses on a population of 168 full secretaries at the provincial-municipal level, the full complement of such officials as of the end of 1975 (deputy secretaries are not included).[1] One of our concerns will be to compare this group with the group of secretaries holding office in August 1971 when the party, which had been almost obliterated in the course of the Cultural Revolution of 1966-69, can be said to have completed its reconstruction at the provincial level.

When the provincial secretariats were reconstituted in 1970-71, they included 127 full secretaries. As is well known, a very high percentage of these secretaries were professional military men, among them a number of military region and military district commanders who had been coopted for administrative (revolutionary committee) and party roles during and after the Cultural Revolution. Symbolizing the need for order following a chaotic period, these commanders, together with a group of professional political commissars, dominated the provincial party structures, relegating to the background the veteran party-administrative cadres, so severely battered by the political tides of 1966-69. As for the new category of individuals raised to party prominence by the Cultural Revolution—namely, the "mass representatives," *i.e.*, individuals drawn directly from worker-peasant ranks—few of these found their way onto the reconstructed provincial-municipal secretariats as full secretaries. For the most part, they occupied lower ranks in the provincial and district hierarchy

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[1] Data for the present article were collected from a variety of English- and Chinese-language sources, among them: biographical files compiled by the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC); Ho Yü-wen and Li Che, *Fei-tang shih-chieh chung-yang wei-yüan-hui jen-shih tzu-liao hui pien* (A Compilation of Materials on Members of the Tenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party), Taipei, China Mainland Problems Research Institute, 1973; Huang Chen-hsia, *Chung-kung chün-jen chih* (Mao's Generals), Hong Kong, Research Institute of Contemporary History, 1968; *Issues and Studies* (Taipei); *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking); Donald W. Klein and Anne Clarke, *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism*, 2 vols., Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971; National Security Bureau, Republic of China, *Kung-fei jen-wu chih* (Compilation of Communist Personalities), 6 vols., Taipei, 1970; *Survey of the People's Republic of China Press* (Hong Kong); Union Research Institute, *Who's Who in Communist China,* 2 vols., Hong Kong, 1969 and 1970. For a background study of importance, see Frederick C. Teiwes, *Provincial Party Personnel in Mainland China, 1965-1966,* East Asian Institute, Columbia University, New York, 1967.

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or, paradoxically, higher positions, *i.e.*, on the national CCP Central Committee.

What are the precise data? Of the 124 out of 127 full secretaries in August 1971 whose basic job responsibilities outside the secretariats could be identified,[2] 82 (67 percent) were professional military men.[3] Of these, 49 were military commanders, and 33 were political commissars. Only 35 individuals (28 percent) were veteran party-administrative cadres, and of these at least 5 were public security officials.[4] Finally, 6 (5 percent) were mass representatives.

The subsequent period between 1971 and the end of 1975 was a tumultuous one in PRC politics. Another major fissure opened in the top ranks of the party hierarchy with the behind-the-scenes crisis that led to the death and disgrace of Lin Piao, Mao's designated heir, and the ouster of some of his key subordinates. This event in late 1971 necessitated a new Party Congress (the Tenth), which took place in August 1973 and produced a significant number of replacements of suspected Lin supporters on the Central Committee and in key military and administrative posts. The extraordinary difficulties that surrounded the convening of both the Tenth Party Congress and the long-delayed Fourth National People's Congress, finally held in January 1975, as well as the pronounced secrecy which characterized these meetings, clearly indicated that China's political problems had not ended. Communist sources revealed that one of the chief difficulties lay in "removing the remnants of the old Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao cliques," or at least those persons associated with Liu and Lin who had not made "suitable and sincere self-criticisms."

By the time of the Tenth Party Congress, the topmost party figures presumably already knew that Chou En-lai had terminal cancer, since his case, according to official Chinese sources, had been diagnosed in 1972.[5] This required some plan for removing the heavy burdens of the premiership from Chou's shoulders and ultimately replacing him. Mao's health must have been an added cause of great uneasiness as he had apparently suffered at least one stroke, possibly more.

It was under these circumstances and with certain fundamental issues far from resolved—issues encompassing basic educational, economic, political, and military policies—that the astonishing process of Teng Hsiao-p'ing's rehabilitation and reascendance to political power unfolded between August 1973 and early 1975. Increasingly, the evidence suggests that Chou played the major role in engineering this development. Teng's rehabilitation, though certainly the most spectacular, was but one of many. It quickly became apparent that during this period a significant number of veteran party and administrative cadres who had been humiliated by the "radicals" during the Cultural Revolution and ousted from office were being brought back. It was also during this period, in December 1973, that a major shift of military region commanders was undertaken, with 8 of the 11 commanders being transferred to different posts and simultaneously divested of their provincial party and administrative roles, leaving only two regional commanders still holding such positions.

Against this background, what significant changes can be observed in the provincial secretariats as of December 1975? Detailed information on the 1971 and 1975 populations of full secretaries is presented in the table on p. 27, but let us first discuss some of the broader trends.

Declining Military Role

Perhaps the most salient development over the four years was the significant reduction in the total number of military personnel serving in the provincial secretariats, a change which resulted in an even sharper drop in the proportion of military men in the expanding population of provincial secretaries. At the same time, it should be noted that military personnel continue to play a very important role in

[2] In analyzing the data for both the 1971 and 1975 full-secretary populations, the author has omitted those secretaries whose career pattern is unknown when it came to calculating percent distributions.

[3] Definition of the term "professional military men" necessarily involves some complexities. Almost all veteran Chinese Communist leaders played military roles at earlier stages of their careers, as, for example, in the Kiangsi era and during the Long March. As used in this analysis, however, the term applies to those individuals whose exclusive or predominant career in the post-1949 period has been that of a military commander or political commissar in the People's Liberation Army (PLA). As is well known, many such individuals were coopted for party-administrative service after the onset of the Cultural Revolution. With respect to political commissars, it should be noted that in various situations such roles have occasionally been played by party-administrative cadres. Hence, holding that position does not necessarily qualify an individual as a professional military man. Appropriate distinctions have been made in such cases, including the classification of some individuals in a "mixed" category.

[4] Because public security officials generally play extensive party-administrative roles and are naturally difficult to identify, they are grouped here under the category of "party-administrative cadres."

[5] See, for example, *Peking Review*, Jan. 16, 1976.

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the provincial party hierarchies, still occupying a larger percentage of total full secretaryships than does any other single category.

Looking at the situation in somewhat greater detail, we find that the decline in military representation on the provincial secretariats was more than accounted for by the drop in the number of military commanders in such posts, from 49 in 1971 to only 31 in 1975. The dominant role among secretaries of military background is now played by veteran political commissars (their number actually increased from 33 to 39). The precise military role of four other secretaries from the military is not known. All told, the military accounted for 47 percent of those 158 secretaries whose positions could be ascertained. Of the military commanders, 17 can be identified as military district commanders, 2 as military region commanders, and 4 as military region deputy commanders, the precise military positions of the remaining 8 being unclear. Of the political commissars, at least 15 are first political commissars of military districts, 6 are first political commissars of military regions, 11 are subordinate military district commissars, and 8 are subordinate commissars in military regions.

When the service backgrounds of the military men on the secretariats are checked, one discovers some interesting changes between 1971 and 1975. Looking at the 1971 group first, one finds that, among those whose Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) and Civil War (1945-49) roles are known, at least 3 had held posts with the 120th Division/1st Field Army (FDA), prominently associated with P'eng Te-huai and Ho Lung; 12 with the 129th Division/2nd FDA (Liu Po-ch'eng and Teng Hsiao-p'ing); 10 with the New Fourth Army/3rd FDA (Ch'en Yi); and 28 with the 115th Division/4th FDA—or North China FDA (Lin Piao and Nieh Jung-chen).[6] Of those in the secretariats at the end of 1975, 3 had 1st FDA antecedents; 9, 2nd FDA; 13, 3rd FDA; and 18, 4th FDA. As one would expect in view of the Lin Piao affair, those with 4th FDA antecedents showed the greatest attrition (a loss of 36 percent). Interestingly, the number of individuals with 3rd FDA backgrounds increased, while the number with 2nd FDA backgrounds declined, though much less than the decrease in 4th FDA men. One must be exceedingly careful in using military unit categories as central career determinants, especially since the backgrounds of most individuals include various organizational and personal contacts of a later period as well as mixed early careers. Yet it would be unwise to ignore completely personal ties and loyalties (as well as hostilities and rivalries) deriving from career patterns and, in the case of top PLA officers, from their military unit affiliations.

To summarize the data thus far presented, the CCP organization, notwithstanding recent "demilitarization" efforts, continues to have powerful military representation at the provincial level. This is partly reflective of the party's rural-guerrilla antecedents, but it also reflects the continuing instability of Chinese politics and the presence of unresolved policy issues. The data further suggest that the professional political commissars, in terms of both number and position, have become an important—

Ch'en Hsi-lien, who was transferred from the command of the Shenyang Military Region in Manchuria to the command of the Peking Military Region in December 1973.

—Charles Paynter/Camera Press.

[6] For details, see William W. Whitson with Chen-hsia Huang, *The Chinese High Command*, New York, Praeger, 1973.

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possibly the most important—military element in the provincial party structure and hence the key group linking the military and the party. Finally, the linkage has become particularly close between the provincial party secretaries and military men at the military district level, the representation of the regional military in the provincial party structure having receded in prominence. (Additional data concerning the military-party linkage will be presented later when various other breakdowns of the population of provincial party secretaries are introduced.)

While observing the "demilitarization" of the provincial party secretariats, one should also take note of a concurrent move to "civilianize"—*i.e.*, to increase party control over—the military. Thus, one finds that veteran party-administrative cadres have been assigned as political commissars or given other responsible supervisory functions within the PLA. Indeed, there is seemingly an increasing frequency of dual and triple assignments of individuals, causing them to bridge the various party, administrative, and military institutions. This very special type of linkage, which reemerged with vigor during the Cultural Revolution and continues to be widely employed, is worthy of further study. Nevertheless, it does not appear to have negated the fundamental importance of cadres' primary career/organizational ties.

Party-Administrative Cadres

Let us turn now to the professional party-administrative cadres. In the 1975 group of provincial party secretaries, a total of 68, or 43 percent, fall in this category, up significantly from the 35, or 28 percent, in the 1971 group. Of at least equal importance, exactly one-half of the party administrative cadres who were serving in the position of provincial party secretary in 1975 had been criticized, often severely, in the course of the Cultural Revolution, and most of these 34 had been ousted from their positions. Thus over 20 percent of the provincial full secretaries as of the end of 1975 could be considered rehabilitated party cadres, many of them individuals whose careers had seemed ended.

In the light of these facts, some of the charges leveled against Teng Hsiao-p'ing in early 1976 become more understandable. Now designated "an unrepentant capitalist-roader within the party," Teng is charged among other things with having conspired to raise relics of the past and having "restored hermits" who had rightfully been consigned to obscurity—in sum, with having engaged in a "plot" to reverse the verdict of the Cultural Revolution. In these charges—and the data that underlie them—one can perceive a central issue that runs through contemporary Chinese politics: what shall the verdict of history be on the Cultural Revolution? In a more immediate sense, this boils down to the question of who will emerge as dominant in the post-Mao era—those who were consigned to oblivion in the upheavals of 1966-69, or those who did the purging?

Unquestionably, a host of other issues surround this central concern, the precise mix being difficult if not impossible to establish at this point. One certainly cannot ignore the persistence of basic policy differences, given the major attention paid to these in all branches of the media. Personality factors' and the continuing local struggle for power among individuals and factions must also be given weight. Nor can one overlook career motivations. It must be assumed, for example, that a number of the younger, upwardly mobile cadres—many of them projected onto the scene by the Cultural Revolution—took a jaundiced view of moves to bring back the veterans of the Liu Shao-ch'i era and place them in dominant roles. At the very least, this jeopardized rapid career advancement. (We shall return to some of these matters later.)

Some additional data on party-administrative cadres is of significance. As might be expected, a near-majority of these cadres have had lengthy service at the provincial level, at least 30 of the 68. Some 14, however, have had previous service at the center, having been transferred from Peking to their current or previous posts. At least 10 cadres have been primarily involved in service at the municipal level, while another 7 have come up from the district level relatively recently. The provincial secretariats thus show considerable linkages with various levels of party and government, both in terms of prior work experience and personal contacts.

[7] For example, a variety of sources report that Teng Hsiao-p'ing has shown qualities of boldness or arrogance (depending upon one's perspective) that may well have triggered his second downfall. His purported acid comment that "Tickets for the new revolutionary operas don't seem to be selling well," as well as his reported assertion that the new operas represented the blooming of only one flower, not one hundred, are now included in the charges against him. It is also said that on one occasion he read a newspaper while Chairman Mao's two recently released poems were being read! These stories may be apocryphal or exaggerated, but the fact that Teng is also publicly charged with proclaiming the Cultural Revolution "a mess" and asserting that the present (post-1966) period is not as good as the past suggests that he may have been more forthright than was warranted by current politics and the power balance within the CCP.

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Of equal interest is the fact that a strong majority of those cadres for whom data are available are veterans of the particular province in which they serve. At least 36 of the 68 party-administrative cadres have been in their present locations since the 1950's, many of these ever since the Communist advent to power. The average term of service for these veterans within their provinces exceeds twenty years (measured from 1949). (Data on birthplaces are too incomplete to permit any precise calculation of the number of "natives" currently serving in their home provinces among this group, although 11 such can be identified, including several persons of ethnic minority origins. The actual number of "natives" is undoubtedly higher, but probably not as high as in the early years of the PRC.) An additional 17 or more cadres have been in their provinces since the 1960's, with an average tenure of approximately twelve years. Only 9 cadres have been ascertained as recent arrivals, having been transferred to their current provinces in 1970 or thereafter. Although one can also find a number of military men in the secretariats with long records of local service, on balance, the party-administrative cadres have had lengthier service in their current provinces than their military counterparts. Presumably, this gives the civilian cadres a certain advantage in terms of familiarity with local problems and personnel. Overall, it would appear that the average provincial secretary is not a native of the province or municipality in which he serves (mass representatives generally excepted) but has had lengthy tenure there.

Most of the party-administrative cadres appear to have had a mix of training and assignments that make them more generalists than specialists, although once again the paucity of information on this point should make us cautious. Of course, even most of the "generalists" have special assignments or jurisdictions that eventually give them a considerable expertise in a given area. Apart from this, however, some individuals clearly stand out distinctly as "specialists," having had a number of assignments

Ch'en Yung-kuei (center) helps lead a demonstration in Hsiyang on February 11, 1967, during the Cultural Revolution. Ch'en, a man of peasant origin and former leader of the famous Tachai Brigade, currently serves in the Shansi provincial party secretariat and on the CCP Politburo.

—***China Pictorial*** **(Peking), No. 5, 1967, p. 10.**

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in a given field, whether at the central, provincial, or district level. Among these, agricultural specialists would appear to be the most numerous, although some specialists in industrial management, economic planning, and labor relations can also be identified. It would appear that relatively few public security men serve as full secretaries of provincial parties, only 3 being identifiable in this capacity as of the end of 1975, compared to 5 in the 1971 group. It is, of course, quite possible (in light of the incompleteness of our data) that in both 1971 and 1975 public security officials were more numerous.

The Mass Representatives

Turning to the mass representatives, we find that their numbers increased from only 6 in 1971 to 16 at the end of 1975, with twelve provinces and municipalities having at least one such individual. Of the 16, 7 were peasants by previous occupation, 7 were workers, 1 was a "young intellectual" sent down to the countryside, and the background of 1 was unknown.

Of particular interest is the question of whether these individuals (and their counterparts on the party Central Committee) are mere figureheads—appointees whose sole role is to symbolically represent particular social groups—or whether they are developing institutional ties and decision-making power. Obviously, any individual who is appointed a full secretary at the provincial party level is presumed to have considerable authority. Hence, the 16 mass representatives at this level must be regarded as more than symbolic figures (a statement that cannot be made with the same confidence for those holding *only* Central Committee posts). Moreover, such individuals appear to be acquiring important posts in the provincial trade union federations, women's federations, and organizations of the Communist Youth League (CYL)—indeed, all of the front organizations that represent the primary linkages between the party and the masses. At least 5 of the 16 are key officials in the trade unions—normally, the chairman of the provincial trade union federation. Several are leading functionaries in the provincial "poor and lower-middle peasants' associations." One is chairman of the provincial women's federation; two are CYL officers. We can thus hypothesize that those mass representatives who remain upwardly mobile in the party hierarchy are in the process of developing institutional bases in the front organizations, as did veteran party-administrative cadres before them. In many cases, the mass representatives also sit on the provincial revolutionary committee, the top administrative organ.

Linkages to the Center

What sort of links exist between the provincial secretaries and the party center? In December 1975, a total of 83 provincial secretaries simultaneously served as full or alternate members of the CCP's Central Committee, including 10 who also served on the CC Politburo. This compares with 68 secretaries on the CC in 1971 (including 7 on the Politburo). Thus, the provincial-center linkage within the CCP remains strong, with 49 percent of the provincial secretaries sitting on the Central Committee compared with 52 percent in 1971. This extraordinary degree of linkage contrasts with the situation immediately after the Communist takeover in 1949 when there was a trend toward a considerable separation of central powerholders from provincial bases.

Within these global figures on linkage between provincial and central party organs, one can trace some significant developments since 1971. Whereas in that year there were 41 military men, 24 party-administrative cadres, and 3 mass representatives who were simultaneously provincial secretaries and CC members, by 1975 the respective figures were 33, 35 and 15. Thus we have another indication of the dominant role of the military in the earlier post-Cultural Revolution period and the decline in that role in the subsequent four years. On balance, both the party-administrative cadres and (even more dramatically) the mass representatives would appear to have strengthened their linkages with the party center. This is particularly evident from the changes in representation of the various groups of provincial secretaries on the CCP's Politburo. In 1971, the military had 4 men serving simultaneously as provincial secretaries and Politburo members, the party-administrative cadres 2, and the mass representatives none; by 1975 the respective figures were 1, 5, and 4. The decline in the number of Politburo members with a military background who were simultaneously provincial party secretaries was primarily linked to the 1973 reshuffle of military region commanders.

As before, a word of caution seems in order. One

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must not undervalue the current role of the military in the party—both at the center and at the provincial-municipal level—merely because that group no longer holds the same number of posts as during the period of its greatest ascendancy.

It remains to examine the degree to which the populations of provincial secretaries in 1971 and 1975 were representative of minority groups and women. In the earlier group, there were 4 minority representatives who served as full secretaries: 1 Chuang (in Kwangsi); 1 Uighur (in Sinkiang); and 2 Tibetans (in Tibet). There were also 2 women: Pa Sang, who also counts as a Tibetan, and Wang Man-t'ien (in Tientsin). This must be considered a low representation, particularly with respect to women. On both counts, the figures had increased as of the end of 1975. Minority representation stood at 8, with 3 Tibetans (all in Tibet); 2 Uighurs (in Sinkiang); 1 Chuang (in Kwangsi); 1 Mongol (in Inner Mongolia); and 1 Miao (in Kweichow). Two of these (1 Tibetan and 1 Mongol) were women, and there were 6 Chinese women in addition, making a total of 8 women. Three of the Chinese women sat on the Tientsin secretariat, with the others in Shanghai, Shensi, and Hunan. It should also be noted that 6 of the 8 women were mass representatives, indicating the limited degree to which the political role of women had been institutionalized within the traditional party structure.

It is difficult to discern the extent to which these individuals are influential in the decision-making process and can be considered true powerholders. In both Tibet and Inner Mongolia, it is Chinese military men, rather than ethnic representatives, who appear to play the decisive roles. However, both Saifudin (a Uighur in Sinkiang) and Wei Kuo-ch'ing (a Chuang in Kwangsi and, later, Kwangtung) must be regarded as influential in their own right, since they have long played prominent party roles and currently are serving on the party Politburo.

Provincial First Secretaries

Up to this point, we have been discussing our full population, with some attention to trends between 1970 and 1975. Let us now turn to an examination of a particularly important portion of that population —the provincial first secretaries. As of December 1975, 27 incumbent first secretaries could be identified. In Liaoning, no replacement for Ch'en Hsi-lien had been named, possibly out of deference to Li Te-sheng, Politburo member and former First Secretary of Anhwei Province, who had been transferred to Liaoning (as commander of the Shenyang Military Region) in December 1973. In Tsinghai, a similar situation prevailed: First Secretary Liu Hsian-ch'uan appeared to have been assigned permanently to Peking, with no replacement having been announced as of December 1975.[8]

Of the 27 first secretaries, 9 were political commissars, some of whom had had earlier party-administrative experience; 5 were military commanders; and 13 were veteran party-administrative cadres. No mass representatives were serving in this position. As for military ties, of the military commanders whose backgrounds are known, 2 had served with the old 3rd Field Army, 2 with the 2nd Field Army (one of whom had also been with the North China Field Army), and 1 with the 1st Field Army. Those whose primary role was that of political commissar were similarly divided: 2 had been with the 3rd FDA, 2 with the 2nd FDA, 1 with the 1st FDA, and 1 with the 4th FDA.

Among the 13 veteran party-administrative cadres, 7 can be considered rehabilitated after having suffered varying degrees of trouble during the Cultural Revolution. These were the first secretaries of Fukien, Honan, Hopeh, Hupeh, Kiangsu, Shensi, and Yunnan, and it might be noted that in two cases (Yunnan and Fukien) the rehabilitations had taken place relatively recently. Generally speaking, the civilian first secretaries were not specialists, but in a few cases they had had lengthy experience in such diverse fields as agriculture, industrial labor, propaganda, and public security. All the civilian first secretaries had operated at the provincial (or metropolitan) level for a long time.

The average age of the first secretaries whose age was known—all with lengthy careers behind them—was in the mid-60's, and none were younger than 55 (a number were in their late 60's). At least 14 of these men had been in their province for 10 years or more; 5 had been there between 5 and 10 years, with 6 having been there less than 5 years. Linkage with the party center was close: 5 of the 27 were on the Politburo, 13 others were full members of the 10th Central Committee, and 8 were alternate members of the CC.

How do these facts compare with the situation in

[8] Subsequent to December 1975, Tseng Shao-shan, who had been Second Secretary of the Liaoning party organization, was identified as provincial party First Secretary.

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1971? Of the 29 first secretaries then in office, 13 were military commanders, 7 were political commissars, and 9 were party-administrative cadres. The ties of the military men in 1971 were as follows: 2 had 1st FDA backgrounds; 5 held 2nd FDA ties; 4 had been with the 3rd FDA; and 7 had been with the 4th FDA or the North China FDA (5 and 2, respectively). Thirteen of these men had been in their respective provinces 10 years or longer, while 11 had been there less than 5 years, and 5 between 5 and 10 years. The average age of the 19 whose birthdates were known fell slightly short of 59 years as of the end of 1970. Once again, linkage with the party center was strong. Five of the 29 first secretaries were Politburo members, while 18 others were full and 3 were alternate CC members.

Thus, the following generalization about China's first secretaries would seem to be in order. Once again the trend has been toward "civilianization," particularly toward reduction of the number of military commanders serving as first secretaries (the number of political commissars actually increased by 2). Nevertheless, with 14 professional military men (including 5 military commanders) still serving in these roles, the influence of the military at this level remains important. As in the case of military members of provincial party secretariats generally, the number of first secretaries from the military with 4th FDA and North China FDA backgrounds declined the most sharply (in the wake of the Lin Piao affair), while those with 2nd and 3rd FDA backgrounds have assumed correspondingly greater prominence.

Meanwhile, the age of first secretaries has steadily increased. Although they are of a different generation than Mao Tse-tung, or even Chou En-lai, these are men nearing the end of their active careers, being for the most part in their mid-60's and veterans of more than 30 years' service to the army and party. Few are natives of the province in which they are currently serving, but a sizable number have served in their present province for ten years or more. On the other hand, an equal number have been there less than ten years, and six first secretaries less than five years. Linkage with the party center has grown even closer in recent years, signaling the vitally important nature of the provincial first secretaryships. Finally, in a number of provinces, and particularly in the Southeast and South-Central regions, men buffeted by the storms of the Cultural Revolution and consigned to disgrace or oblivion have been rehabilitated and given the top post available at the provincial level.

A different perspective on Chinese provincial-level politics can be obtained by examining the situation in various categories of provinces. We shall look first at the frontier provinces, then the three metropolitan units, and finally the major geographic subdivisions.

The Frontiers

Naturally, security considerations loom large in China's frontier provinces. This is especially true of the six provinces that front on the Soviet Union or its protectorate—the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR). In the Northeast, two provinces have common borders with the USSR, namely, Heilungkiang (which is the most exposed) and Kirin; in the West, Sinkiang's vast border abuts Soviet Central Asia; and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, Ningsia, and Kansu all adjoin the MPR. Two provinces adjoin North Korea in the Northeast, Liaoning and Kirin. In the Southwest, Tibet faces Burma, India, and the Himalayan states of Nepal and Bhutan. Further to the east, Yunnan and Kwangsi lie along the frontiers of Burma, Laos, and Vietnam. Thus 10 of China's 29 provinces and municipalities can be considered frontier areas. What if any special characteristics are revealed in their secretariats?

Let us first explore the six provinces that adjoin the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic. First, with the partial exception of Sinkiang, these provinces showed a remarkable degree of continuity of leadership between 1971 and 1975. While there were additions, notably in the case of Heilungkiang, removals of secretaries were generally due to death or promotion, not to dismissal. In Sinkiang, a province with a background of turmoil, the former first secretary, Lung Shu-chin, commander of the Sinkiang MR and an old 4th FDA man, disappeared and was replaced by the veteran Uighur, Saifudin. Even here, however, the other 3 full secretaries as of 1971 are still in office, having been joined by 4 new men.[9]

(It should be emphasized that there is no necessary correlation between discontinuity of provincial leadership and the existence of instability in a given province. True, leaders may be dismissed because

[9] The situation with respect to the Ningsia secretariat is cloudy. The first secretary continues to be K'ang Chien-min, a veteran PLA commander. The status of two other full secretaries listed as of August 1971, when the provincial committee was reorganized, is unclear. Some sources currently list only K'ang as a full secretary, and this is how we have treated this province.

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Full Secretaries of CCP Provincial and Municipal Organizations, 1971 and 1975

	Basic Career Profile										Linkage to the Center					
	Military[a]		Party-adm.[c]		Mass reps.		Unknown		Total		Full CC[d]		Alt. CC		Total CC[d]	
	1971	1975	1971	1975	1971	1975	1971	1975	1971	1975	1971	1975	1971	1975	1971	1975
NORTHEAST																
Heilungkiang	3(1)	3(1)	1	5(4)		1	1	4	5	13		1	1	3	1	4
Kirin	3(2)	3(1)[b]	2	2(1)			1		6	5	1	1	1	1	2	2
Liaoning	3(2)	2		4(3)					3	6	2(1)	2			2(1)	2
Total	**9(5)**	**8(2)[b]**	**3**	**11(8)**	**0**	**1**	**2**	**4**	**14**	**24**	**3(1)**	**4**	**2**	**4**	**5(1)**	**8**
NORTH																
Honan	2(1)	1(1)	2	2(1)	1				5	3	2(1)	3	2		4(1)	3
Hopeh	4(4)	3(2)[b]	1	1(1)					5	4	1	1	1	1	2	2
Inner Mong.	3(2)	2(1)	2	2		1			5	5	1	3	1		2	3
Peking	5(2)	4(1)	2	2		1			7	7	2(1)	3(2)	3	3	5(1)	6(2)
Shansi	2(1)	1(1)	1	2(1)	1	2			4	5	1	2(1)		2	1	4(1)
Shantung	2(1)	1							2	1	2	1			2	1
Tientsin	4(2)	6(4)[b]	2	2	1	2			7	10	1	3			1	3
Total	**22(13)**	**18(10)[b]**	**10**	**11(3)**	**3**	**6**	**0**	**0**	**35**	**35**	**10(2)**	**16(3)**	**7**	**6**	**17(2)**	**22(3)**
NORTHWEST																
Kansu	2(1)	2(1)	1	1		1		2	3	6	3	2			3	2
Ningsia	2(2)	1(1)					1		3	1			1	1	1	1
Shensi	2(2)	2(2)	1	3(2)		1			3	6	1	2(1)	1	1	2	3(1)
Tsinghai	3(2)	2(1)							3	2	1		1	1	2	1
Total	**9(7)**	**7(5)**	**2**	**4(2)**	**0**	**2**	**1**	**2**	**12**	**15**	**5**	**4(1)**	**3**	**3**	**8**	**7(1)**
SOUTHEAST																
Chekiang	2(2)	4(1)	1						3	4	1	1	1	1	2	2
Fukien	5(3)	2(2)	2	4(2)		1		1	7	8	2	1	1	1	3	2
Kiangsu	3(1)	2		1					3	3	3(1)	2		1	3(1)	3
Shanghai	1(1)	1(1)	4	4	2	2			7	7	4(2)	7(3)	1		5(2)	7(3)
Total	**11(7)**	**9(4)**	**7**	**9(2)**	**2**	**3**	**0**	**1**	**20**	**22**	**10(3)**	**11(3)**	**3**	**3**	**13(3)**	**14(3)**
SOUTH-CENTRAL																
Anhwei	2(1)	2		2(2)		1			2	5	1(1)	3			1(1)	3
Hunan	1	4(1)	1	3		2			2	9	1	2(1)		2	1	4(1)
Hupeh	6(3)	4(1)		5(4)	1				7	9	3				3	
Kiangsi	2(1)	4(1)		2(2)					2	6	1			3	1	3
Total	**11(5)**	**14(3)**	**1**	**12(8)**	**1**	**3**	**0**	**0**	**13**	**29**	**6(1)**	**5(1)**	**0**	**5**	**6(1)**	**10(1)**
SOUTHWEST																
Kweichow	2(1)	2(1)[b]		2(1)					2	4		2	1	1	1	3
Szechwan	5(4)	4(1)	3	4(3)					8	8	4	4	1	1	5	5
Yunnan	3(3)	2(2)	1	2(2)					4	4	3	2			3	2
Total	**10(8)**	**8(4)[b]**	**4**	**8(6)**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**14**	**16**	**7**	**8**	**2**	**2**	**9**	**10**
SOUTH																
Kwangsi	1	1	1	3(1)				2	2	6	1	1	1		2	1
Kwangtung	3(1)	2	2	4(3)					5	6	5	4(1)		1	5	5(1)
Total	**4(1)**	**3**	**3**	**7(4)**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**2**	**7**	**12**	**6**	**5(1)**	**1**	**1**	**7**	**6(1)**
WEST																
Sinkiang	2(1)	3(1)	3	4				1	5	8	2	3(1)			2	3(1)
Tibet	4(2)	4(2)	2	2	1	1			7	7	1	2		1	1	3
Total	**6(3)**	**7(3)**	**5**	**6**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**12**	**15**	**3**	**5(1)**	**0**	**1**	**3**	**6(1)**
PRC TOTALS	**82(49)**	**74(31)[b]**	**35**	**68(33)**	**7**	**16**	**3**	**10**	**127**	**168**	**50(7)**	**58(10)**	**18**	**25**	**68(7)**	**83(10)**

[a] Figures in parentheses indicate those identified as military commanders among provincial secretaries.

[b] In Kirin, Hopei, Tientsin, and Kweichow there was one military secretary each whose basic military profile (*i.e.*, as military commander or political commissar) could not be determined. This amounted to two unidentified military secretaries in the North and one each in the Northeast and Southwest.

[c] Figures in parentheses indicate those of the 1975 party-administrative cadres who had been rehabilitated after experiencing troubles during the *Cultural Revolution*.

[d] Figures in parentheses indicate the number of full CC members serving on the party Politburo.

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they are considered incompetent or guilty of severe errors in judgment and policy or because they must be held responsible for things going badly within their jurisdiction, even if they were not personally involved. However, they may also be removed merely because their loyalty to the center is suspect due to past and current ties, in which case conditions in the province itself may not necessarily have dictated a change. There may also be severe personal and factional rivalries at the local level that require shifts, although in this case one might expect to see these rivalries reflected in problems of local administration and policies. Thus, while dismissals may well reflect local troubles, this is not invariably true. Nevertheless, severe discontinuities in provincial-municipal leadership demand explanation and must be studied closely.)

A second important fact that emerges from a comparison of the 1971 and 1975 data relates to the continued primacy of the military in these six provincial secretariats. Of the six first secretaries, *all* are professional military men, 3 being commanders and 3 being political commissars. Of the 38 full secretaries, military and party-administrative cadres account for 14 each, 3 are mass representatives, and 7 remain unidentified as to role. The new additions of the post-1971 period have boosted the numbers of party cadres and mass representatives, but professional military men continue to play a major role at the top levels of the secretariats, reflecting the premium put upon strategic considerations and internal order.

In several of these provinces, there are sizable non-Han ethnic minorities. Approximately 80 percent of Sinkiang's population, for example, is composed of Uighurs and other non-Chinese peoples. Yet only 4 of the 38 full secretaries can be identified as belonging to an ethnic minority (2 Uighurs and 2 Mongols), although, according to official sources, the minorities are better represented at lower levels of authority. Women are even more weakly represented, with only 1 being identified. While the data on age are not sufficient to permit precise analysis, it would appear that the secretaries (mass representatives as a group excepted) in these six provinces are in their late 50's and early 60's. Linkage to the party center is slightly weaker than the national average, with 15 of 38 secretaries (39 percent) sitting on the 10th CC, including 1 Politburo member and 9 other full CC members, plus 5 alternate CC members.

If we look briefly at the two provinces with borders fronting on North Korea—Liaoning and Kirin—the data reveal similar conditions. The leaderships of both provinces have been stable, the major shift being the advancement of Ch'en Hsi-lien to Peking, with the post of Liaoning first secretary seemingly left vacant as of December 1975. The military role in the Kirin party organization remains strong (3 of 5 secretaries, including the first secretary), while in Liaoning additions have contributed to a "civilianization" trend, with the military reduced to 2 out of 6 (as against 3 out of 3 earlier). Among the 4 newly-added party-administrative cadres, all except Mao Yüan-hsin, Chairman Mao's nephew, fall into the rehabilitated category, with several having been savagely treated during the Cultural Revolution. Linkage to the party center is modest, with 4 CC members—3 full and 1 alternate—out of the 11 secretaries of the two provinces.

Among the southern border provinces, Tibet represents a special case, given the heavily non-Han character of its population and its troubled background. Stability has prevailed within the party secretariat since its reorganization in August 1971, with the same 7 full secretaries in office. As might be expected, Han military men dominate, occupying 4 of the 7 posts, with a veteran political commissar serving as first secretary. All of the nonmilitary secretaries are Tibetans, one being a veteran party cadre, another a relative newcomer to party-administrative work, and the third a female "emancipated serf" mass representative. While the civilian Tibetans appear to be in a secondary position in terms of control over matters in Tibet, they are somewhat better represented at the party center, with two full Central Committee members, whereas the Han political commissar serving as Tibetan first secretary is only an alternate CC member. However, such symbolic prestige may be of less consequence than the realities of local power.

The two provinces bordering upon Southeast Asia—Yunnan and Kwangsi—have shown greater personnel shifts. When the Yunnan First Secretary died in 1975, he was replaced by Chia Ch'i-yün, a veteran cadre whose earlier posts suggest close ties to Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and who in 1968 had been branded a "capitalist-roader," dragged out for trial, and removed from all offices. Another rehabilitated veteran cadre replaced Lu Jui-lin, who was transferred from Yunnan to become First Secretary of Kweichow in 1974. In the case of Kwangsi, Wei Kuo-ch'ing, First Secretary from early 1971, was shifted to Kwangtung as First Secretary in late 1975, apparently to

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tackle reported political problems in the latter province. He was replaced by Second Secretary An P'ing-sheng, a close and longtime political associate. Another Kwangsi secretary (a professional military commissar) disappeared in 1973 under circumstances suggesting ties too close to Lin Piao and Wu Fa-hsien, purged air force commander.

Military influence remains strong in Yunnan, this being one of the few provinces having a military region commander as a secretary, and with another, lower-ranking commander also represented in the four-man secretariat. There is less military representation in the Kwangsi secretariat (1 of 6, but with 2 secretaries unidentified). In addition, 2 of the 6 full secretaries are considered specialists on Vietnam by virtue of their backgrounds. Neither province's secretariat has any known mass representatives, and only one member of a minority (a Miao) has reached the full secretary level. Nor are there any women secretaries. Linkage with the party center is currently modest, with 3 CC members out of the 10 secretaries.

Thus, the generalizations advanced concerning the provinces bordering the USSR and the MPR tend to hold with respect to the provinces facing North Korea, India, and Southeast Asia. Except in Kwangsi —long a region of deep political fissures—the secretariats have either been stable or have experienced changes involving natural death or promotion (Yunnan). The role of the military remains strong in all the secretariats except that of Kwangsi, with at least 12 of the 26 identified secretaries in this category. Party-administrative cadres are slightly ahead with 13 secretaries, while mass representation is weak, with a single secretary. Another two secretaries remain unidentified as to role. Neither ethnic minorities nor women are strongly represented except in the case of Tibet. Among a total of the 26 identified secretaries, one finds no more than 4 minority representatives and 1 woman, only one of these outside Tibet. The average age of the full secretaries would appear to be in the late 50's or early 60's, with the overwhelming majority male Han veterans with lengthy PLA and party service. As in other settings, a sizable proportion of the civilian cadres have been rehabilitated after painful experiences during the Cultural Revolution. Finally, linkage with the party center is less than the national average, with 7 full CC members and 1 alternate member among the 28 full secretaries. Party-administrative cadres and the sole mass representative are favored over professional military men in these central assignments.

Wei Kuo-ch'ing (right), then First Secretary of Kwangsi Province and member of the CCP Politburo, pictured at an International Labor Day celebration in the provincial capital, Nanning.

—Charles Paynter/Camera Press.

Municipality Secretariats

Let us now turn to a very different category: the party secretaries of the three great metropolitan regions of China—Shanghai, Peking, and Tientsin. Each of these municipalities has a secretariat on a par with those of the provinces, and with good reason. Shanghai, which furnishes approximately one-quarter of China's revenue and which was the city where the Cultural Revolution was launched, remains critical to the direction of both Chinese politics and the economy. Peking, being the capital, is the nerve-center of national politics. Tientsin, an important center of transportation and industry and the gateway to Peking, is China's third largest city.

In each of the municipal secretariats, the changes since 1971 have been minimal. Death or, in the case of Tientsin, a widening of representation has accounted for such alterations as have taken place.

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As in the frontier provinces, so in the municipalities the military remains a formidable participant in the party structures, accounting for 11 out of a total of 24 secretaries (6 in Tientsin, 4 in Peking, but only 1 in Shanghai). Another 8 secretaries are party-administrative cadres, while there is an unusually high total of 5 mass representatives. It is interesting to note that both the mass representatives and the party-administrative cadres also enjoy high central status. Two of the 5 mass representatives serve on the Politburo, and the other 3 are full CC members. Of the party-administrative cadres, 3 are on the Politburo, and 4 others are CC members. In contrast, the military claims only 1 full and 3 alternate members in the Central Committee.

In aggregate, there is a very strong linkage between the municipal secretariats and the party center, with 16 out of 24 secretaries serving on the CC. The Shanghai secretariat can list every one of its 7 secretaries as full members of the 10th CC, with 3 being Politburo members—2 of them on the Politburo's Standing Committee. Peking has 1 full and 1 alternate Politburo member, with 4 of its remaining full secretaries serving as members of the 10th CC. Tientsin is considerably less well connected, with only its first secretary on the Central Committee.

Of the 24 secretaries, 4 are women—3 of them on the Tientsin secretariat (3 of the women are also mass representatives). No ethnic minorities are represented on the three metropolitan secretariats. On the other hand, the available evidence suggests that the makeup of these secretariats comes closer to reflecting the "three generational" representation widely heralded in the course of the Cultural Revolution—with a considerable sprinkling of young and middle-aged cadres—than that of the provincial secretariats. Shanghai, in particular, appears to embody the Maoist ideal—with the party clearly controlling the gun, with young and middle-aged cadres in the key positions, and with high-status mass representatives present to reflect the urban working class. However, Shanghai's uniquely low military quotient among its full secretaries raises the question of whether, in case of serious and prolonged trouble, the Shanghai group could command the loyalty of the PLA, and—if so—of what elements?

It remains to group the provinces and municipalities into strictly geographic clusters, commencing with the northern part of the nation.[10] (See the accompanying table, p. 27, which groups the 29 secretariats by region.)

The Picture by Regions

The Northeast region of China comprises three provinces: Heilungkiang, Kirin, and Liaoning. The North includes Honan, Hopeh, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Republic, Peking, Shansi, Shantung, and Tientsin. In the Northwest are Kansu, Ningsia, Shensi, and Tsinghai.

We have already discussed all of the Northeast provinces as frontier areas. However, when the three provinces involved are grouped together as a region, the data reveal slightly different results than those obtained when they are coupled with other frontier provinces. The Northeast secretariats have in general been very stable, a fact due in some measure to the influence of the upwardly mobile Ch'en Hsi-lien, former commander of the Shenyang Military Region. However, the current distribution of full secretaryships here still shows a more pronounced tendency toward "civilianization" than in many other regions or in the nation as a whole, with party-administrative cadres accounting for 11 of the 20 identified full secretaries whereas the military number only 8. It should be noted, however, that both of the first secretaries in office in the Northeast as of December 1975 were military men, one a commander and one a political commissar.[11] Linkage to the center, like that of the frontier provinces, is relatively low, with only 8 of 24 secretaries serving on the central party organs.

Turning to the North, we find, first, that continuity has been remarkably high among the full secretaries, except in Shangtung. Second, 3 of the 7 first secretaries are veteran party-administrative cadres, several of whom have been rehabilitated and appointed in place of military men. The "civilianization" of the first secretaryships is thus somewhat greater in the North as a unit than in the case of the frontier provinces as a group. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that 4 of the first secretaryships continue to be held by military men, 3 of them troop commanders. Moreover, of the 35 full secretaries, 18 are professional military men as compared to

[10] One could make a case for a somewhat different regional division—for example, one based upon the boundaries of the military regions. However, the divisions used generally combine areas with a broader set of common attributes and, not infrequently, also coincide with military region boundaries.

[11] Tseng Shao-shan, who was recently elevated to the Liaoning first secretaryship, is also a veteran military commander.

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Hsü Shih-yu, pictured in Canton on May 1, 1974, five months after he had been transferred there to command the Kwangtung Military Region. Hsü had previously been based in Nanking, where he had served concurrently as Commander of the Nanking Military Region and as Party First Secretary for Kiangsu Province.

—Wide World.

11 party-administrative cadres and 6 mass representatives. Thus, the North has a higher percentage of professional military serving as party secretaries than the national average, and also a considerably higher percentage of mass representatives, but a somewhat lower percentage of party-administrative cadres. Linkage with the party center is high, with 69 percent of the full secretaries serving on the 10th CC, a proportion equalling that for the metropolitan secretaries and substantially greater than that for the frontier province secretaries. In relative terms, the mass representatives again had the strongest central ties, with all of them on the CC, 2 as Politburo members and 4 others as full CC members, as compared to 8 of the 12 party-administrative cadres holding central posts, 1 as a Politburo member, 6 others as full CC members, and 1 as alternate member, while only 8 of the 17 military men were on the 10th CC, 3 as full and 5 as alternate members.

The three Northwest provinces show more of the characteristics of the frontier provinces (and, indeed, one of the three, Kansu, is in that category). Thus, this region is characterized by stability of membership and substantial military representation (6 of 12 identified secretaries) as against 4 party-administrative cadres and 2 mass representatives (the careers of 2 others could not be identified). Ties to the center are also weaker, with only 6 of the 14 secretaries serving in central party posts—1 as a Politburo member, 3 others as full CC members, and 2 as alternate CC members.

Do South China's provincial secretariats exhibit different characteristics? For purposes of analysis the PRC's southern provinces can be conveniently divided into the Southeast (Chekiang, Fukien, Kiangsu, and Shanghai); South-Central China (Anhwei, Hunan, Hupeh, and Kiangsi); the South (Kwangsi and Kwangtung); and the Southwest (Kweichow, Szechwan, and Yunnan).

In the Southeast, the provinces of Chekiang and Fukien have shown strong signs of instability within their provincial secretariats. Chekiang witnessed a complete turnover of its three 1971 secretaries, and in each case the shift was due neither to death nor to promotion, but apparently to dismissal, either because of ties to Lin Piao or because of provincial problems. Chekiang, as is well known, has had serious difficulties in recent times, centering upon labor disputes in the provincial capital but quite probably also involving other matters, including factional strife. It is to be noted that all 4 new secretaries have extensive military backgrounds and can be classified as military men, although 2 of them have also had some party-administrative experience. In Fukien, too, recent changes have been substantial, with 3 of the 7 old secretaries replaced, although only in one case was a dismissal involved. Here, a "civilianization" process has taken place, but 2 military men remain among the 8 secretaries. On the other hand, in Kiangsu, where Hsü Shih-yu long held sway until his transfer to the Kwangtung Military Region as commander, there has been relative stability—for which Hsü can possibly be credited. However, when Hsü departed, a deputy secretary (P'eng Ch'ung) was promoted to first secretary over 2 existing full secretaries.

Thus, some of the Southeast provinces' secretariats display substantial instability, with the relatively more stable ones, those of Kiangsu and Shanghai, probably owing their stability to the recent or current presence of powerful national figures—Hsü

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Shih-yu and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao. The region as a whole is close to the national average in the representation of military, party-administrative cadres, and mass representatives, but the 3 provincial secretariats other than that of Shanghai have high military representation (especially Chekiang and Kiangsu) and weak mass representation. In Fukien, there are several prominent civilian cadres who have been rehabilitated after serious declines during the Cultural Revolution. In contrast, the Shanghai cadres represent those who profited most from the Cultural Revolution in terms of career advancement. Linkage to the party center also looks different depending upon whether or not Shanghai is included. Including Shanghai, 14 of the 22 full secretaries are 10th CC members—3 on the Politburo, plus 8 other full and 3 alternate CC members. Without Shanghai, the figure falls to 7 CC members out of 15, with only 4 of these serving as full CC members and the rest as alternates.

In the South-Central region, the cradle of the contemporary Chinese Communist Party, a similar situation prevails. Two of the 4 provinces making up this region, namely, Hupeh and Kiangsi, have witnessed significant changes in their secretariats, resulting from a combination of factors—death, transfer, and dismissals. The relative stability of Anhwei and Hunan again may be due in part to the credentials of two strong men recently connected with these provinces, Li Te-sheng and Hua Kuo-feng. Military representation is quite strong, 14 of the 29 full secretaries being professional military men, 12 being party-administrative cadres, and 3 being mass representatives. Many of the second category, moreover, are recently rehabilitated. Ties with the party center are relatively weak, with only 10 of the 29 full secretaries serving on the 10th CC, including 1 Politburo member, 4 other full and 5 alternate CC members.

In the Southwest also, significant changes have occurred, some of them as a result of natural causes and others as a result of political upheaval. For ex-

Li Te-sheng (left) and Hua Kuo-feng (right), former party bosses in Anhwei and Hunan Provinces, respectively. Li is pictured in Shenyang in October 1974, ten months after being transferred there to replace Ch'en Hsi-lien as Commander of the Shenyang Military Region. Hua is shown in Peking shortly before he began his rapid rise through the post of Minister of Public Security to Premier of the People's Republic of China.

—Photos by UPI and Charles Paynter/Camera Press.

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ample, while the First Secretary of Szechwan died in 1972, about a year later the Second Secretary of the province disappeared. The First Secretary of Kweichow also left the political scene for unknown reasons. Many of the new party-administrative cadres are rehabilitated men, some having undergone severe criticism and dismissal earlier. Here, too, the military play a sizable role, holding precisely one-half of the 16 full secretaryships, with the remainder held by party-administrative cadres, there being no mass representatives. Linkage to the party center is good, with 10 of the 16 full secretaries on the 10th CC, albeit at relatively low levels (5 full and 5 alternate members).

Looking at the South, we note that once again changes have been both significant and recent. The Kwangtung First Secretary has been shifted and replaced by the Kwangsi First Secretary, and there have been other changes due to death and transfer. Again, a certain "civilianization" has taken place. Military representation in this region is relatively low, with only 3 out of 10 identifiable secretaries being professional military men as against 7 party-administrative cadres (including some who were recently rehabilitated) and no known mass representatives (2 secretaries were unidentified). Ties to the party center are reasonably strong, with 6 out of 12 secretaries of the two provinces being on the 10th CC.

Finally, there is the far West. Comprising the two border provinces of Sinkiang and Tibet, this region shows the stability at the top characteristic of most frontier areas. While the military comprise only 7 of the 14 identifiable full secretaries, they occupy strategic positions. The 6 party-administrative cadres have a heavy representation of the non-Han elements so important in these two provinces, and the single mass representative is likewise of local ethnic origin. Linkage to the center is reasonably good, with 5 full and 1 alternate CC members out of a total of 15 secretaries.

A Summary

What conclusions are warranted on the basis of this examination? First, betokening this era of transition and uncertainty—still less than a decade removed from the Cultural Revolution—the role of professional military men in the Chinese Communist Party is still very substantial. It is vastly greater than in the Soviet Union, or in other established Communist regimes. This becomes apparent when we survey the current status of the military in provincial and municipal party secretariats. The military accounts for between 40 and 50 percent of the secretaries in all frontier areas, in the three municipalities as a group, and in all but one of the main geographic regions. Only in the South did the military drop below this percentage (to 30 percent) as of the end of 1975. Shanghai, to be sure, stands out as a major individual exception, a fact that may continue to have important political implications. The military also provide a majority of the provincial first secretaries. Their presence is particularly strong in the frontier areas; the first secretaries of all six provinces facing the USSR and Outer Mongolia are military men, signaling the supreme importance of security. In the metropolitan secretariats, on the other hand, the first secretaries are in each case veteran party-administrative cadres.

However, the percentage of military professionals among provincial secretaries *has* declined appreciably in the past five years, going from approximately two-thirds of the full secretaryships in 1971 to slightly less than one-half of such positions at the end of 1975. More significant may be the pronounced shift that has taken place in the kind of military professionals serving as provincial/metropolitan secretaries. Both in numbers and as a percentage of the total persons holding provincial secretaryships, troop commanders have declined sharply; on the other hand, political commissars continue to account for one-fourth of all such officials. This is logical, of course, if the party is to reduce the risk of military control, for the commissars are in fact political-military cadres, *i.e.*, liaison officials between army and party, and—since they have no military authority over troops—are presumably less inclined to violate the principle of "the party in control." The extent to which they can serve as party watchdogs over the armed forces and influence or direct the actions of commanders in the event of crisis remains uncertain, to be sure.

Of equal importance, perhaps, is the fact that currently a high percentage of the military men on the provincial secretariats, both commissars and commanders, hold service posts only within military districts (which are coterminous with the provinces), whereas officers of the larger military regions have been largely removed from party roles at the provincial-municipal level. Presumably, this was done to reduce the danger of a new "warlordism," since the commanders of China's eleven military regions have

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enormous power at their disposal and have, in some cases in the past, evidently posed a threat to party supremacy.

When these points have been made, however, the initial conclusion still holds. The military role within the CCP continues to be a truly formidable one at the provincial as well as other levels, lending a strong element of uncertainty to the future of Chinese politics. Here, of course, it is difficult to separate cause and effect. While the history of the Chinese Communists bears out Mao's thesis that power comes out of the barrel of a gun, recent developments—including the very great instabilities emanating from the Cultural Revolution—have provided continuing justification for the military to play a powerful political role, regardless of any ambitions the military might have on its own account. Nor can one guarantee that future increases in the scope of that role will not occur; this will depend upon developments in the coming years. Does the substantial emphasis on the people's militia in the recent past represent an additional effort (emanating from the so-called "radicals") to build up their power against potential opposition within the PLA?

When we turn to the party-administrative contingent among the provincial secretaries, we can discern three impressive developments over the past four years. First, a "civilianization" process has taken place since the immediate post-Cultural Revolution period when China was close to martial law. The share of civilian cadres has grown from 28 to 43 percent of the total full secretaries, with important increases also occurring in the share of civilians among the first secretaries.

Second, while the Cultural Revolution was a catastrophe for a large majority of the old cadres, it was beneficial to the particular group which managed to ride the victorious tides. This group is especially strong in Shanghai, but it has representatives in a great many of the provincial and municipal secretariats.

Finally, the past few years have witnessed the remarkable return to political life of many who were purged or mistreated during the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, approximately one-half of the current full secretaries classified as party-administrative cadres fit into this category.

Needless to say, the ingredients of conflict are mightily present in this situation. When purger and purgee are being pushed back together, can past memories be blotted out? When the Cultural Revolution itself remains a burning issue, are there not bound to be conflicting interpretations of its value? When policies, old and new, are being debated, will not the shadow of the recent past hang over the political landscape? And while Teng Hsiao-p'ing could be heralded at one point as a man who had seen the error of his ways and made a "sincere self-criticism," was he not also a constant symbol of those who had been wronged by zealots? In any case, his second demise must send waves of uneasiness among those whose rehabilitations parallel his, and who owe their restoration to him and like-minded individuals. Despite pledges that the current anti-rightist campaign is to be limited, with culprits being allowed to purify themselves and mend their ways, do not the removal of Teng and the stormy waves that lash at Chou En-lai's memorial suggest the difficulties involved in containing that campaign?

We also find signs that another product of the Cultural Revolution—the mass representative—is slowly acquiring an increased presence at the provincial-municipal secretariat level. More importantly, those from the group that seem destined for long and successful political careers are becoming institutionalized not merely through the party, but also via the traditional front organizations that were stripped of their old leadership in the course of the Cultural Revolution. A new elite is emerging via the labor, peasant, women's, and youth organizations. The revamping of these units and the ouster of numerous older cadres have provided opportunities for some younger or at least fresher elements to move up rapidly. How firm or how precarious their position in the new order will be remains to be determined, but it seems likely that, as individuals, some of them are destined to become part of the post-Mao political elite.

If the mass representatives provide the party with a growing but still fragile horizontal link with the front organizations, paralleling the linkage provided by military figures (particularly the political commissars) with the armed forces, what are the vertical linkages from the provinces to the party center? Here, as we have seen, the connection is a solid one, with 49 percent of all provincial full secretaries currently sitting on the party Central Committee. Moreover, in this regard, the mass representatives and party-administrative cadres are both favored over the military secretaries. This no doubt represents an effort to bolster civilian control of the party at the national level and in some measure to counterbalance the regional and provincial power of the military. It is also clear from the data that the degree

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of linkage to the center is closely correlated to the relative importance of a municipality or province within the national political and economic structure. Thus, Shanghai enjoys clear supremacy at this point, followed by Peking, with such geographic regions as the North, Southeast, Southwest, and South also prominently represented. Proportionate to their respective numbers of full secretaries, the degree of representation of the Northeast, Northwest, and South-Central regions is much lower. Similarly, frontier regions get disproportionately low representation. As one might expect, linkages to the center are greatest for the "heartland" areas of China, especially the eastern regions below the Great Wall, which form the hub of national politics and the locus of much of the nation's production and where the great bulk of China's population resides.

The basic threefold division of the PRC's political elite used for purposes of analysis here appears to be accepted, at least implicity, by Chinese spokesmen as well. At the same time, as noted earlier, one must be aware of the growing tendency to assign individuals from each of these categories—the military, party-administrative cadres, and mass representatives—to dual and triple roles cutting across the institutional spectrum. This tends to create a new kind of "generalist" and complex new linkages. This process of interpenetration may provide checks on the type of narrow institutional allegiances which would represent a further threat to political stability. This is a method sanctioned by both Communist and centuries-old Chinese tradition.

As we have earlier emphasized, there is no necessary correlation between the degree of stability of membership of a given secretariat and stability of the province or municipality concerned. Yet we can detect some relationships of this nature by matching the known events of recent years against the data pertaining to secretariats. In broad terms, South China—the site of China's modern rebellions and revolutionary movements—remains subject to the greatest fluctuations within top party levels. In comparative terms, the North has been very stable during the past five years. And particularly stable have been the frontier regions where the presence of the military at the very top of the party structure is uniformly strong. Stability has also characterized the municipalities, notably Shanghai and Peking, where the "victors" of the Cultural Revolution period are entrenched.

As we have indicated, such stability in the provinces is related in part to the presence or continuing influence of local-regional "strong men," individuals whose upward political mobility and presence at the center serves to protect subordinates. In such cases, seeming stability can mask a highly troublesome local situation, and one cannot preclude rapid and unexpected changes in the future. At the same time, there can be no doubt that in those provinces where serious problems are rife and protracted, whether the issues are essentially factional or policy-oriented, changes at the secretariat level are likely to become ultimately necessary. It is hardly accidental that Chekiang has witnessed major changes in its secretariat in recent times and that important alterations have also occurred in Kwangtung.

Finally, one cannot emphasize too strongly the unique political character of the Shanghai secretariat. In terms of the high degree of party-cadre and mass representation and the paucity of professional military men, in the age-mix of the leading secretaries and their relationship to the Cultural Revolution, and in terms of interaction with the center, this body is truly different from the secretariats of the other municipalities and provinces. But is it a harbinger of the future as Chairman Mao undoubtedly hopes, or merely symbol of his last hurrah—destined to be challenged by other, possibly more powerful forces?

In sum, while it would be foolish to attempt any precise forecasts concerning the Chinese leadership, it seems clear that political instability is likely to be a recurrent phenomenon in this still embryonic state. Mao will leave behind him a combination of weak institutions and strong personalities, a recent history of deep and bitter factionalism, and a political style which periodically directs campaigns against those persons who would claim a share of central power. Future instability may continue to be confined to elitist circles as it has essentially been since the Cultural Revolution, or it may spill over into the mass sector, affecting productivity and public order. But the most improbable development would be the continuation of widespread tranquillity in the immediate post-Mao era.

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Peking and the Asian Power Balance

By A. Doak Barnett

Since the late 1960's, the far-reaching changes that have taken place in China's foreign policies and international relationships, paralleling important changes in the policies and positions of the other major powers in East Asia, have profoundly altered the basic pattern of international relations in the region. The development of a bitter military confrontation between China and the Soviet Union and the intense competition between these two powers throughout East Asia (and worldwide), the limited détente between Peking and Washington, and the full normalization of Sino-Japanese relations rapidly and dramatically altered the basic configuration of big-power relations in the region between 1968 and 1972. During this same period, the United States' disengagement from the Indochinese states and its moves to reduce its military presence elsewhere in Asia, the Soviet Union's efforts to step up its diplomatic, economic, and naval activities in the region, and Japan's steady expansion of its economic influence also had far-reaching effects. The result has been the emergence of a new kind of four-power pattern of relationships among the major powers, to which all the smaller nations in the region have been compelled to adjust in varying ways and degrees.

Although, as indicated, changes in the policies of all four major powers have helped to create this new situation, it is clear that shifts in Peking's foreign policy strategy have been fundamental in transforming the nature of the international balance in the region. Many of these shifts have appeared to involve dramatic reversals of past policies, and the seeming suddenness of some of them has startled world opinion. Inevitably, they have posed a variety of questions about the basic motivations and objectives underlying Peking's foreign policies.

When and why did China's leaders decide to adopt what seemed to be a radically new overall foreign policy strategy? Are Peking's new policies likely to continue unchanged into the indefinite future, or are further major changes possible or likely? What variables are likely to work for continuity, or for change, in Chinese policies in the period immediately ahead? What can one deduce from Peking's recent policy shifts about fundamental Chinese priorities and goals in dealing with the outside world?

The Military-Security Factor

It is obvious to any student of Peking's foreign policies that there is no single key to an understanding of what the Chinese Communists' basic approach to foreign affairs is. China's policies, like those of other nations, are shaped by a multiplicity of attitudes, forces, and factors. Ideological beliefs clearly have a significant influence on the Chinese leaders' world views and strategic prescriptions, especially regarding long-term goals. So, too, do historically-rooted cultural attitudes and the intense nationalist feelings that have moved all modern Chinese leaders. Many of Peking's policies can best be understood as quite pragmatic, *ad hoc* attempts to pursue very limited and immediate national interests and to enhance in a very general way China's international influence. Some Chinese policies represent deliberate initiatives taken by Peking's leaders. Many, however, are essentially reactive; Chinese leaders, like leaders elsewhere, spend much of their time and energy determining how to respond to actions taken by

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others—that is, deciding how to cope with external pressures and forces impinging on them from the changing international environment. Domestic politics and debates determine many foreign policy decisions in China, as elsewhere. So, too, do economic imperatives and the changing views within the Chinese leadership on how best to achieve their development goals.

Analysis of the Chinese Communists' approach to international affairs must take full account of the multiplicity of such factors that influence particular policies; when realities are complex, there is no virtue in ignoring the complexities. However, it is also important to try to understand what Chinese priorities are, to assess what weight Peking gives to different concerns and objectives (especially when various goals appear to be in conflict), and to try to judge what factors have been the primary determinants of the major shifts that have periodically taken place in Peking's overall foreign policy strategy.

The central thesis of this brief essay is that, although ideology clearly influences Chinese Communist leaders' perceptions of the world, and of how to deal with it, in important ways, and although many economic and other interests shape particular Chinese policies, the primary factors determining Peking's most important decisions on overall foreign policy strategy are related above all to their military-security concerns, viewed in a broad geopolitical context. The major shifts in China's overall foreign policy can best be understood, therefore, in terms of changes in the Peking leaders' perception of external threats and in their strategic decisions on how best to try to cope with such threats.[1]

In the late 1960's, for example, the crucial factor influencing Chinese policy was the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations to the point of possible military conflict, a development which led Peking's leaders to conclude—apparently during 1968-69—that the Russians now posed a greater and more immediate danger to China's security than the Americans did. The Chinese leaders' opening to the United States and their normalization of relations with Japan, as well as important adjustments they made in policies toward both Northeast and Southeast Asia, followed logically from that conclusion.

More than is generally recognized, moreover, military-security factors were the critical ones at key stages in the development of the Sino-Soviet conflict from the late 1950's on. Much of the writing on the Sino-Soviet conflict, especially in the 1960's, focused on the ideological differences between Peking and Moscow. There is no doubt that ideological—as well as cultural, economic, and many other —factors must be taken fully into account in any comprehensive analysis of how the Sino-Soviet dispute evolved over the years. On balance, however, the evidence we now have suggests that the most important Sino-Soviet differences were precipitated by conflicts over military-security issues.

In my view, there were three crucial turning points in the Sino-Soviet conflict, each of which qualitatively changed relationships between the two countries. The first was during 1957-59. These years witnessed a divergence of broad Soviet and Chinese strategies toward the United States. Moscow moved toward a coexistence policy (or what would now be called détente) vis-à-vis Washington, and Peking feared that this would seriously compromise important Chinese national interests—in the Taiwan area and elsewhere—which the Chinese leaders at that time believed to require a confrontation policy toward the United States. The crisis resulting from Peking's bombardment of the Chinese Nationalist-held island of Quemoy in 1958 made clear to the Chinese Communists the limits of the assistance which the Russians were prepared to give them under the Sino-Soviet alliance; it also heightened Soviet anxieties that the Chinese could involve the USSR in military conflicts that Moscow wished to stay out of. In this same period, disputes over naval issues further highlighted Sino-Soviet differences on basic military-security questions. Finally, in 1959, soon after the disagreements over the offshore islands crisis and naval issues, Moscow ended its aid to China's nuclear weapons development program—clearly a major blow to Peking. The net effect of these developments was to convince Chinese leaders that the Sino-Soviet alliance was of limited utility to them (and to create doubts about the alliance in Moscow as well).[2] (Peking's 1960 ideological offensive against Moscow, it should be noted, followed rather than preceded these developments.)

The second major turning point was in 1962-63. Again, basic differences focused on nuclear issues. When the Russians moved toward agreement with the Americans on a limited nuclear test-ban treaty,

[1] This article draws upon research and analysis that the author has done for a book-length study, *China and the Major Powers in East Asia*, which is now completed in draft and is to be published by the Brookings Institution in late 1976 or early 1977.

[2] For a detailed supporting analysis of the 1958 offshore islands crisis—with documentation—see the discussion on pp. 38-39.

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the Chinese requested Moscow not to go through with it.[3] The Russians, however, chose to do so anyway, and the Chinese regarded this as an act of Soviet-American collusion aimed primarily at them. From Peking's perspective, the signing of the agreement was probably a "point of no return" symbolizing the end, for all practical purposes, of the Sino-Soviet pact as an operative military alliance. (Again, Peking's intensification of ideological debate with Moscow followed rather than preceded a major falling-out on concrete policy issues. In 1963-64, the Chinese brought many previous policy disagreements touching upon concrete national interests into the open.)

Text footnotes 3 through 8 appear on p. 40.

The third major turning point converted the long-developing rift between Peking and Moscow from a political conflict into a military confrontation. From the Chinese perspective, the combination of the Soviet military buildup around China from 1965 on, Moscow's intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969 raised the possibility that Moscow might be considering a military attack on China.[4] Moreover, Peking's leaders probably felt that even if Moscow was not planning to attack, it was nevertheless pursuing a hostile policy of military-backed pressure on China (similar, in Chinese eyes, to American policy during the Dulles era). Their conclusion, clearly, was that China's priority immediate foreign policy objective should be to do everything possible to deter any Soviet attack and

The 1958 Quemoy Crisis:

IT IS THIS WRITER'S judgment that the offshore islands crisis of 1958 was a critical event which helped to increase the mutual disenchantment between Peking and Moscow and probably had a direct influence on Moscow's decision to cut off nuclear-weapons aid to China—an act which clearly had far-reaching effects on overall Sino-Soviet relations.

Within both the scholarly and the government research communities, there have been different judgments as to the nature of Sino-Soviet relations during the crisis and the effects of the crisis. Some analysts have long maintained that the crisis resulted in serious strains between Peking and Moscow.[1] Others have argued, however, that the Soviets gave the Chinese the kind of support they wanted.[2]

Although it is impossible to find definitive "proof" for any one view, the information now available—ncluding new data that have only recently come to light—strongly supports the thesis that the crisis did contribute significantly to growing Sino-Soviet strains and to the ultimate split.

As is well known, the Chinese have publicly charged that Moscow's statements of support for China on September 7 and 19, 1958, did not come until after "there was no possibility that a nuclear war [with the United States] would break out and no need for the Soviet Union to support China with its nuclear weapons. It was only when they were clear that this was the situation that the Soviet leaders expressed their support for China." [3] Although some analysts have expressed skepticism about the validity of this claim, it seems quite plausible in light of a number of facts that have subsequently emerged.

It now appears very likely, on the basis of statements made by both the Russians and the Chinese, that Mao Tse-tung did not inform Nikita Khrushchev about what China really planned to do regarding the offshore islands, when Khrushchev visited Peking on July 31-August 3, 1958, just before the serious crisis developed. One of Moscow's top government China specialists, M. S. Kapitsa, says that although Chinese plans for action at Quemoy had been made during Khrushchev's stay in Peking, the Chinese "did not consider it necessary to inform him of this." [4] Mao has also indicated that his talks with Khrushchev "did not contain a word about the question of the Taiwan situation." [5]

Some recent Soviet statements directly link the crisis with the problem of nuclear risks and the change in Moscow's nuclear aid policy. In an interview with this writer in Moscow on April 26, 1974, M. S. Kapitsa, the Soviet China specialist just cited, who is chief of the First Far Eastern Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, threw new light on the importance of the crisis from the Soviet perspective. He stated the following: In part because Mao had not informed Khrushchev of his specific plans regarding the offshore islands, the Soviet leadership was disturbed when the crisis heated up. To discuss the situation, Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko made a

[1] See, for example, Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-61*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1967, pp. 206-16, and John R. Thomas, "The Limits of Alliance: The Quemoy Crisis of 1958," in Raymond L. Garthoff, Ed., *Sino-Soviet Military Relations*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1966, pp. 114-49.

[2] See, for example, Morton H. Halperin, *China and the Bomb*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1965, p. 55, footnote 46.

[3] See "Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government," Sept. 1, 1963; text in Garthoff, op. cit., pp. 233 ff.

[4] See M. S. Kapitsa, *Communist China—Two Decades—Two Policies*, Moscow, The Political Literature Publishing House, 1969, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, *Reports* (Washington, DC), No. 51425, Sept. 22, 1971, p. 194.

[5] See Allen S. Whiting, "New Light on Mao—3. Quemoy 1958: Mao's Miscalculations," *The China Quarterly* (London), June 1975, p. 269, quoting from a speech by Mao on November 30, 1958, unpublished at the time in China but contained in *Mao Tse-tung Ssu-hsiang Wan-sui* (Long Live Mao Tse-tung's Thought), n.p., August 1969, p. 254.

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to try to build new counterweights to check the growth of Soviet influence—first of all in East Asia, but worldwide as well. The decisions to open relations with the United States (which was seen as a nation whose power had peaked and begun to wane[5]) and to normalize relations with Japan (which was seen as a prime target of Soviet efforts to encircle China in both a political and a broad strategic sense[6]) were accompanied by significant shifts in Chinese policy toward both Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia.

Peking's primary immediate preoccupation in both of these areas now was competition with Moscow for influence, rather than competition with Washington. The Chinese position regarding Japanese-American security ties changed fundamentally; instead of denouncing the US-Japan security treaty, the Chinese now endorsed it.[7] With respect to Korea, Peking, in order to outdo Moscow, increased its political support of Pyongyang against Seoul and Washington, although it apparently continued at the same time to exercise a restraining hand on Kim Il Sung to discourage him from military adventurism.[8] In Southeast Asia, Chinese fear of increased Soviet influence (and, to a lesser extent, of increased North Vietnamese influence as well)—especially in the Indochina area—led Peking to do all it could to outbid the Russians in a struggle for influence, but its efforts have had only mixed results. During 1975, although Cambodia adopted a definitely pro-Peking stance, new strains developed in relations between Peking and Hanoi (which tilted slightly toward Moscow), and Laos tried

The Sino-Soviet Dimension

secret trip to Peking, taking Kapitsa with him.[6] In Peking, Gromyko and Kapitsa met with the Chinese Politburo on September 6. At that meeting, Mao made statements seemingly indicating a relative lack of concern about the dangers of possible nuclear conflict, which the Russians found very disturbing. (The plausibility of Kapitsa's claim is bolstered by the fact that in a speech at a Supreme State Conference on September 5, the day before the Politburo meeting Kapitsa describes, Mao did discuss the nuclear problem and expressed his willingness to take risks regarding possible nuclear attack.[7])

Kapitsa went on to say that shortly after this Moscow reassessed its policy of nuclear-weapons assistance to China, clearly implying a linkage between the crisis and the change in Moscow's policy on nuclear aid. (The Chinese have asserted that on June 20, 1959, the Russians unilaterally "tore up" their October 15, 1957, agreement to aid China's nuclear-weapons development by providing it with "a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture."[8])

Thus, the chronology of certain key events during the critical September 4-7 period apparently was as follows: September 5—Mao's speech to the Supreme State Conference;[9] September 6—the Politburo meeting attended by Gromyko, as described by Kapitsa, and Radio Peking's public broadcast of Chou En-lai's statement at the Supreme State Conference that China was prepared to resume ambassadorial talks with the United States; September 7—Khrushchev's first letter to President Eisenhower supporting China. One plausible hypothesis, based on these data, is that the Chinese and Soviet reactions to US actions were quite different—that Mao seemed, to the Russians, to be too willing to take risks, and that Khrushchev made his September 7 statement of support only *after* the Russians had made clear to the Chinese the limits of Soviet support and induced them to offer to reopen Sino-American negotiations. This hypothesis is not "provable," and there are some facts that seem inconsistent with it. It can be argued, for example, that the real military dangers of the crisis did not recede until after the US Navy had broken the blockade of Quemoy in late September, or perhaps not even until Peking had issued cease-fire orders in October. Moreover, Khrushchev in his memoirs asserts that "we were all in favor of Mao Tse-tung's liquidating these two islands as points for assault" on China and indicates that the Russians were perplexed when the Chinese later told them that Peking had not really wanted to take the islands.[10]

Whether or not one accepts the foregoing hypothesis about events during the period September 4-7, however, the statements made by both the Chinese and Russians convince this writer that there were very serious differences between the two over the crisis, that these increased Sino-Soviet strains significantly, and that they influenced Moscow's decision to cut off Soviet nuclear aid.

A.D.B.

[6] This trip has never been explicitly mentioned in public print, as far as I know, although Kapitsa, on p. 194 of his book, refers in passing to a talk between Gromyko and Mao "in the beginning of September 1958."

[7] See the extracts of the speech—taken from the text in *Mao Tse-tung Ssu-hsiang Wan-sui,* 1969, pp. 236-37—which are quoted in Whiting, *loc. cit.*, p. 268.

[8] See the August 15, 1963, "Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government—A Comment on the Soviet Government Statement of August 3," in *Peking Review*, Aug. 16, 1963, p. 14.

[9] See footnote 5. Mao, Chou En-lai, and others made additional speeches to the Supreme State Conference, which met September 5-9.

[10] See *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament,* trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbott, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1974, pp. 262-63.

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US Secretary of State Dean Rusk is welcomed at the Kremlin by Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev for the signing of the partial nuclear test-ban treaty on August 5, 1963.

—USIA Photo.

to balance its relations with both the major Communist powers and Vietnam.[9] Elsewhere, in non-Communist Southeast Asia, China deemphasized (without abandoning) the revolutionary component in its policies, instead stressing normalized state-to-state relations with Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.[10] Beyond establishing diplomatic ties, it also made clear that under existing circumstances—*i.e.*, the potential threat that it now sees the Soviet Union as posing in the area—it tacitly approves of continuing security relationships between non-Communist Southeast Asian nations and the United States.[11] Now, Peking repeatedly warns that one should not, while expelling a wolf from the front door, let a tiger in the back door.

The New Strategic World View

In light of these and other changes in Chinese policies, as well as in broad international alignments affecting the region, it is not surprising that Peking has been impelled to redefine publicly its overall strategic world view and to try to explain its new policies, and justify them, to skeptics in China. The most dramatic official statement of that strategic world view was contained in Teng Hsiao-p'ing's 1974 UN speech, which analyzed global affairs in terms of three worlds.[12] Teng identified the two superpowers as the First World, the other industrialized nations as the Second World, and the developing nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as the Third World. The most important struggle in the world, he asserted, is that between the Third World

[3] See, for example, the August 15, 1963, "Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government—A Comment on the Soviet Government Statement of August 3," in *Peking Review*, Aug. 16, 1963, p. 15. This statement said that the Chinese had sent three memoranda to the Soviet government before the signing of the test-ban treaty and declared that Peking had "hoped the Soviet Government would not infringe on China's sovereign rights and act for China in assuming an obligation to refrain from manufacturing nuclear weapons. . . . We hoped that after such earnest counsel from us, the Soviet leaders would rein in before reaching the precipice and would not render matters irretrievable."

[4] There is little doubt that the Russians took actions designed to exert pressure on China and eventually to pose the threat of possible attack, and that the Chinese were genuinely fearful of attack at that time. As early as September 1968, Peking charged Moscow with "military provocations over China's air space," asserting that these were "in support of atrocities of aggression against Czechoslovakia." (See *Peking Review*, Sept. 20, 1968, p. 41.) Soviet nuclear and other threats during 1968 are discussed in *The New York Times*, Sept. 18, 1969, and Harold C. Hinton, *The Bear at the Gate*, Washington, DC, American Enterprise Institute and Hoover Institution, 1971, pp. 29-30.

[5] See, for example, "Outline of Education on Situation for Companies," translated in *Issues and Studies* (Taipei), June 1974, pp. 90 ff., and July 1974, pp. 99 ff. This document will be discussed in greater detail later.

[6] For a brief period during 1970-71, Peking's propaganda strongly attacked Japanese "militarism," and Chinese leaders at that time may well have actually feared that a decline in the US position in Asia might stimulate Tokyo to rearm on a large scale and move toward assuming a regional military role. Peking quickly dropped this line when openings to the United States and Japan were in the offing.

[7] As early as the beginning of 1973, Chou En-lai reportedly told a visiting Japanese official: "Inasmuch as Japan constitutes a nation, weapons of self-defense are essential to it." (See the interview with Takeo Kimura, Japan's former Minister of Construction, upon his return from a visit to China, in *Asahi Shimbun* (Tokyo), Jan. 27, 1973.) In late 1973, Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei reportedly declared that "it is quite natural for Japan to maintain the security treaty with the United States while it lacks sufficient self-defense capacity." (See Kyodo News Service, Dec. 17, 1973.) By 1975, Chou En-lai was saying: "Japan and the United States should develop even more intimate ties." (See "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," *The China Quarterly* [London], June 1975, pp. 373-74.) Privately, Chinese leaders now assert that US-Japan ties are more important than China-Japan ties.

[8] When Kim visited Peking in April 1975, the Chinese declared that they viewed his regime as the "sole legal sovereign state" of Korea and strongly backed his demands for a withdrawal of US forces from South Korea. By this time, the Chinese were no longer telling diplomats of countries other than the US, as they had earlier, that they were tolerant of US forces in South Korea. However, the Chinese firmly stressed (when Kim was in Peking) the need for "peaceful" reunification, and their statements were notably less militant than Kim's. (See the speeches and communiqué in *Peking Review*, April 25 and May 2, 1975.)

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and the First, with support for the Third World to be expected from the Second on some issues. Teng also proclaimed publicly what had been implicit in Peking's policy for some time—namely, that in the Chinese view the socialist camp no longer exists and China now belongs to the Third World.

This new schema (which in some respects is the logical culmination of long-developing trends in Chinese policy that had led to a steadily increasing identification with the developing nations on China's part) reveals important aspects of Peking's current approach to what it calls a world of "turbulence and unrest." It is also, however, quite misleading in many respects. Despite their current stress on the political importance of the Third World, Chinese leaders are still concerned, above all, with potential threats to their security, and with the need to create effective counterweights to such threats. As they now view their security problems in a broad geopolitical context, their perceptions of the current distribution of military-relevant power appear to be very similar in some respects to the views articulated by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in 1971-72—namely, that there are really five major power centers which can play key roles in the current balance in the world: the Soviet Union, the United States, Western Europe, China, and Japan. To judge by Peking's actual foreign policy behavior, as well as by many Chinese leaders' statements (especially private statements), the central task of all the latter four, as Peking sees it, is—or should be—to check the spread of Soviet influence. The Chinese leaders' actions, in short, suggest that they recognize that, in relation to immediate security problems, the industrial nations are far more important than the developing nations. Moreover, Peking does not, in reality, treat the two superpowers as a unit, but instead distinguishes fairly clearly between them, arguing that the contradictions between the two are "irreconcilable," and explicitly or tacitly supporting US positions in most conflict situations where American and Soviet interests clash.

In sum, Peking now appears to base its policies on two different conceptualizations: on the one hand, its publicly-articulated three-world schema, in which both superpowers are labeled adversaries; and, on the other, its unstated view of five major power centers, in which the United States is regarded as a limited "ally" against the Soviet Union. Although overlapping to some extent, these two world views are very different in their implications and involve inevitable "contradictions." Both are important, since each reveals the basis for certain aspects of Chinese policy. But the unstated view is by far the more important of the two, at least for the immedi-

[9] The strains in Sino-Vietnamese relations were doubtless exacerbated by Chinese seizure of the Paracel Islands, which North Vietnam also claimed.

[10] Peking, while endorsing anti-subversion statements, did not, however, stop its public encouragement of Southeast Asian Communist parties or the radio broadcasts originating in China directed to them, and this continued to disturb non-Communist Southeast Asian governments.

[11] See "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," *The China Quarterly*, September 1975, pp. 597-600; December 1975, pp. 809-12.

[12] See the text in *Peking Review*, April 12, 1974, Supplement.

Soviet forces along China's borders in 1969: at left, an observer post in the Soviet Central Asian oblast of Semipalatinsk near Kamennaya Heights, the scene of a clash between Soviet and Chinese troops on August 13, 1969; at right, armored personnel carriers on Damansky Island in the Ussuri River, several weeks after the March 1969 clash between Soviet and Chinese border guards.

—Photos by A. Nogaybayev/TASS via Sovfoto and UPI.

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ate future, because it is more directly relevant to Peking's pressing concerns about China's security problems and to current Maoist thinking on the best way to cope with these problems.

In many respects, a careful examination of what Peking actually does is more helpful to an understanding of its basic strategic approach to China's security problems than an exegesis of its public programmatic statements. Nevertheless, there are several official statements, some published in China and some not, which are extremely revealing with regard to the strategic premises and assumptions underlying the current approach of Chinese leaders to their priority foreign policy problems. Here it will suffice to cite only two: Mao's 1940 directive "On Policy," which was republished—with commentary emphasizing its contemporary relevance—in 1971 (after Kissinger's visit to China and before Nixon had come to Peking);[13] and a classified document entitled "Outline of Education on Situation for Companies," which was issued by a Yunnan People's Liberation Army Political Department in April 1973 for use in indoctrinating PLA men (a copy of this document was obtained by the Chinese Nationalists and published in 1974).[14]

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, then Deputy Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, addresses the United Nations General Assembly's special session on raw materials and development on April 10, 1974.

—Pictorial Parade.

"On Policy" is a very revealing exposition of Mao's basic strategic approach to the problem of coping with the main threat facing China and the Communist Party at any particular time. This approach, which crystallized during the war against Japan, embodies a distinctive balance-of-power strategy based on united front concepts. The Chinese Communist Party, Mao said in "On Policy," must follow a "revolutionary dual policy." It must draw distinctions between various sorts of enemies (identifying the main one at any time) and also between different sorts of "allies." "We build our policy on these distinctions," he declared. It is essential, he emphasized, to maintain "independence and initiative"; nevertheless, "our basic line is to use all possible foreign help, subject to the principle of independent prosecution of the war and reliance on our own efforts." However, in building a united front, the party should pursue a policy that is "neither all alliance and no struggle nor all struggle and no alliance, but [which] combines alliance and struggle,"; it should be a policy of "uniting with [potential allies], in so far as they are still in favor of resisting" the main enemy and "isolating them, in so far as they are determined to oppose" us. "Our tactics," he stressed, "are guided by . . . the . . . principle: to make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few, and crush our enemies one by one."

The 1971 commentary written at the time of the republication of "On Policy" was designed to use the concepts elaborated in that document to explain and justify China's current moves in the direction of an opening toward the United States, and it made explicit certain basic points that had been implicit but not directly stated in the original. "Chairman Mao," said the commentary, "most clearly distinguished between the primary enemy and the secondary enemy and between the temporary allies and the indirect allies." His "tactical principles" involved "a dialectical unity of firm principles and great flexi-

[13] For the text of "On Policy," see Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Peking Foreign Languages Press, 1965, Vol. 2, pp. 441 ff. For the commentary, see "Strong Weapon to Unite the People and Defeat the Enemy—Study 'On Policy,' " in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC), Aug. 18, 1971. The following quotations are from these texts.

[14] See "Outline of Education on Situation for Companies," *loc. cit.* The following quotations are from this text. There is good reason to accept the authenticity of the document.

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The February 1972 meeting between American President Richard M. Nixon and Chinese Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung in Peking. From the left, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, interpreter Tang Wen-sheng, Chairman Mao, President Nixon, and US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

—White House photo.

bility" and explicated "the art of waging all kinds of struggles in a flexible way" so as to "isolate the primary enemy." The commentary also stressed that "the dual policy of alliance and struggle is built on the dual character of all allies in the united front."

The secret Yunnan document issued in 1973 analyzed China's strategic problems in even more explicit terms, applying the kind of Maoist concepts outlined in "On Policy" to the concrete situation of the 1970's. "The two archenemies facing us are US imperialism and Soviet revisionism," it said.

We are to fight for the overthrow of these two enemies. This has already been written into the new party constitution. Nevertheless, are we to fight these two enemies simultaneously, using the same might? No. Are we to ally ourselves with one against the other? Definitely not. We act in light of changes in situations, tipping the scale diversely at different times. But where is our main point of attack, and how are we to exploit their contradictions? This involves a high level of tactics.

It then stated, bluntly, that today "Soviet revisionism is our country's most threatening enemy," which "has been trying to control us and subvert us and destroy us"; moreover, it added: "in terms of geographical positions, Soviet revisionism abuts on China. From this point of view, its threat to our country is much greater than that of the United States and much more direct." Comparing the United States and the Soviet Union, it said:

The present situation is: US imperialism's counter-revolutionary global strategy has met with repeated setbacks; its aggressive power has been weakened; and hence, it has had to make some retraction and adjustment of its strategy. Soviet revisionism, on the other hand, is stretching its arms in all directions and is expanding desperately. It is more crazy, adventurist and deceptive. That is why Soviet revisionism has become our country's most dangerous and most important enemy.

The document denounced "some comrades" who "slander and vilify us, saying that our talks with the United States meant a 'collusion between China and the United States,' an 'alliance with the United States against the Soviet Union,' etc." Such people have a "low ability to make distinctions"; in reality, though Sino-American talks are "alike in form" to Soviet-American talks, they are "different in essence." "It is necessary to have problems settled with Nixon, temporarily," in part because this will "open up the gate of contacts between the people of China and the United States," but also because the US-China opening "frustrates the strategic deployment of the Soviet revisionists," aggravates the contradictions between the United States and the Soviet Union," "aggravates the contradictions between US imperialism and its lackeys," "benefits our liberation of Taiwan," and "delays a world war and gains time for us to step up domestic construction and to make good preparations for a world war."

These analyses highlight Mao's distinctive balance-of-power approach to dealing with external threats. The essence of this approach can be summarized, in simplified form, in the following basic principles:

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(1) The party (and China) should first of all clearly identify the principal enemy at any particular time and then should focus its main efforts on combating that enemy. (2) In confronting this enemy, it should be flexible and exploit all possible contradictions, and it should try to form as broad a united front as feasible, one that will include all who can be induced to oppose the main enemy. (3) In doing this, however, it should maintain a strong posture of self-reliance and should not compromise its essential "independence and initiative." (4) This means that united front "alliances" should be viewed as tactical alignments that are essentially limited and temporary.

This distinctive Maoist approach was first evolved, as already noted, during the Chinese Communists' domestic struggle for power, but it was then applied to foreign policy problems, especially in the early 1940's. In the 1970's, it was revived and strongly reemphasized. It represents a conscious effort to apply to foreign policy the kind of flexible united front strategies that Mao had promoted during China's internal struggles; in a subtle fashion, it also reflects the longstanding Chinese tradition of using "barbarians to oppose barbarians." One can argue that most Chinese leaders during the past century, in attempting to cope with external threats from a position of weakness, have pursued strategies that are comparable in some respects.[15]

The Overall Historical Record

Returning to the fundamental question of the impact of military-security problems, and Chinese Communist conceptions of how best to deal with them, on China's overall foreign policy strategies during the past three to four decades, I would argue that to understand Chinese Communist foreign policy behavior it is important to keep the following facts (or, if you prefer, propositions) in mind:

(1) For 30-plus years—since well before 1949 (when the Chinese Communist Party was still struggling for power, although it already was, in effect, a "state within a state" and had begun evolving a "foreign policy" of its own)—the Chinese Communists' overriding foreign policy preoccupation has been how to deal with the three major powers most deeply involved in Chinese affairs: Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States. (2) For virtually all of this period, they have seen at least one of these powers as posing an actual or imminent military threat to China's (and the CCP's) basic security or very survival. (3) Generally, they have identified one of these powers as posing the main threat (Japan from the 1930's until the mid-1940's, the United States from at least 1950 until the late 1960's, and the Soviet Union from the late 1960's on), and they have usually focused their main efforts on the task of deterring or combating that power. (4) Throughout this period, they have been in a position of great military inferiority vis-à-vis the other powers which they have seen as threatening them, and they have been acutely aware of this fact. Their problem, therefore, has been how to deal with militarily-superior and actually or potentially threatening powers from a position of relative weakness. (5) Their fundamental approach has been, while building up their own power to the extent they could, to try to strengthen their own position and weaken that of their main enemy by employing united-front-based balance-of-power strategies and tactics. In doing so, they have been very sensitive to the real military balance; however, they have also placed great emphasis on political and psychological factors in the changing "balance of forces." While their strategies have been essentially defensive in a basic military sense, their policies have often been offensive in a political sense (and, it should be added, have frequently been seen by their adversaries as posing threats to these adversaries' security interests, thereby helping to create situations of tension and conflict which have on many occasions increased the apparent threats to China's security).

Despite the validity, in my view, of the above generalizations, Peking over the years has by no means been consistent, or consistently successful, in applying all of the concepts involved in what might be labeled the "classical Maoist united-front, balance-of-power strategy," as articulated by Mao in 1940. The prescriptions outlined in "On Policy" did shape the Chinese Communists' foreign policies in the early 1940's, when the party pursued a very flexible united-front approach in its attempt to mobilize all possible support in the struggle against Japan. New data that have recently come to light on the late 1930's and early 1940's, as well as new studies of Chinese Communist foreign policies in that period, indicate, for example, that the party's leaders were prepared to go considerably further than has generally been assumed to try to form a tactical align-

[15] The Nationalists' policy of alignment with the United States against Japan, while different in many respects, had certain features in common with the Maoist approach.

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ment with the United States in order to obtain American military aid.[16]

In the late 1940's, however, Peking's decision to ally with the Soviet Union in order to cope with what the Chinese Communist leaders apparently saw as a serious potential threat from US power based in Japan (and still linked to the Chinese Nationalists), was consistent with the principles outlined in "On Policy" in some respects, but not in others. For a period of time, especially in the cold war years just before and during the Korean conflict, Peking (and Moscow as well) adopted a rigid "two-camp" view of the world, which involved a virtual abandonment of the kind of flexibility that Mao had earlier espoused. This began to change from 1952 on, and eventually Peking worked assiduously to build an anti-American united front, periodically changing and steadily broadening its definition of whom to try to include in it. During 1955-56, at the height of the so-called Bandung period, Chinese policy was extraordinarily flexible; at that time, Peking took various initiatives apparently designed to reduce the level of tension in China's confrontation with the United States, even though the Chinese leadership still regarded Washington as Peking's principal enemy.

In a basic sense, however, the policy of close alliance with the Soviet Union compromised certain important Maoist concepts—or instincts. Instead of maintaining a self-reliant posture, the Chinese Communists moved increasingly into a position of dependency on Moscow in the 1950's in ways which seriously weakened China's "independence and initiative." This was, in many respects, an aberration, at least in terms of classical Maoist concepts, and there is little doubt that Mao himself subsequently regarded it as such.

Then, as the Sino-Soviet split widened, China in the 1960's found itself in the worst of all possible worlds, particularly from the Maoist strategic perspective. Instead of confronting only one principal enemy, Peking now faced two (plus India and Japan), and the leadership became increasingly concerned about anti-Chinese collusion between Moscow and Washington. In this situation, with China increasingly isolated, the Chinese leaders put more and more emphasis on the potential importance of Third World nations. However, their efforts to build a united front among these nations against both the superpowers had only limited results in the 1960's; in fact, at the height of the Cultural Revolution, when Peking's leaders turned inward to an extreme degree, China was exceptionally isolated and vulnerable, lacking any effective foreign support to counterbalance the two superpowers, both of which, as Chinese leaders saw it, now posed serious security threats to China.

Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, center, flanked by other members of the PRC's delegation at the opening of the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, on April 18, 1955.

—Wide World.

The dramatic shifts in China's foreign policies between 1968 and 1972 were Peking's response to this situation, and they represented, in many respects, a return to classical Maoist concepts such as those articulated in "On Policy."[17] It was not surprising, therefore, that Mao's earlier writings were resuscitated to justify and explain the far-reaching policy changes, which doubtless surprised most people in China just as much as they surprised people abroad.

Prospects

Looking ahead, should one expect that Peking's current, distinctively Maoist foreign policy strategy will continue to shape China's basic policies for the indefinite future? Should one assume, in short, that

[16] See, especially, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944: China*, Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, 1967, and *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945: China*, Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, 1969. I am grateful, also, to two scholars for sharing with me their still-unpublished drafts of two excellent studies on the period: Steven Goldstein, *The View From Yenan: Chinese Communist Perspectives on International Relations, 1937-1941*, and James Reardon-Anderson, *Yenan: The Foreign Policy of Self-Reliance*.

[17] Goldstein, *op. cit.*, also points this out.

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Peking will continue to pursue a strategy based on the premise that in the pursuit of its security China should focus its prime efforts on how to deal with one "principal enemy" and, in doing so, should form limited and temporary "alliances" with virtually all enemies of its main enemy? If so, is it likely for the indefinite future to continue to see the Soviet Union as the principal threat, or to continue to believe that loose alignments with countries such as the United States and Japan, however "limited" or "temporary" it may regard these, are necessary to cope with the Soviet threat? The answer is: possibly, but not necessarily. In foreign as well as domestic affairs, it is risky to assume that there will be unbroken continuity between the Mao and post-Mao eras.

Certain things do seem probable. For example, it seems highly likely that security problems will continue to be a basic, probably *the* basic, foreign policy preoccupation of Peking's leaders for many years; that, in regard to China's security, Peking's leaders will continue to be concerned above all with China's relations with the three other major powers in East Asia; and that they will continue to view either the Soviet Union or the United States (or both) as the country (or countries) most likely (and able) to pose serious threats to China's security in the foreseeable future (although they are also very much aware of the possibility that if Japan embarks on major rearmament, it could again pose a threat to China). It is also likely that China—because of its military inferiority—will continue to be very vulnerable to threats from the other major powers (especially the two superpowers); that Chinese leaders will continue to be acutely sensitive to this fact; and that to try to compensate for their relative military weakness they will probably continue pursuing a balance-of-power strategy of some sort.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that China's post-Mao leaders will necessarily pursue a "classical Maoist" strategy. It would not be surprising, in fact, if they were to reassess China's foreign policy options. Should they do so, their decisions on basic strategy could be influenced by numerous variables. Here I will mention only three.

One crucial variable will be the kind of post-Mao leadership that emerges in China. There is considerable evidence that in the past some important Chinese leaders have disagreed with Mao's foreign policy strategies. These disagreements have probably focused less on whether China faced actual or potential threats to its security than on how best to cope with such threats. In recent years, for example, some —probably including certain of China's most militant ideologues—appear to have questioned Mao's willingness to compromise with the United States in order to strengthen the alignment of forces opposing the Soviet Union; their inclination seems to have been to oppose compromise with either imperialism or revisionism.[18] Others, probably including some important military leaders, appear to have disagreed with Mao's apparent determination to maintain a posture of hostile confrontation with China's principal enemy while trying to mobilize all possible opposition



Chinese and Japanese Prime Ministers Chou En-lai and Kakuei Tanaka exchange toasts at a banquet in Peking on the occasion of the establishment of diplomatic relations and termination of the state of war between the two countries in September 1972.

—Wide World.

[18] The quotation cited earlier about "some comrades" who "slander and vilify" the policy of opening contacts with Washington (taken from "Outline of Education on Situation for Companies," *loc. cit.*) is very revealing about existing doubts concerning, and opposition to, compromise with the United States; various kinds of circumstantial evidence suggest that such opposition came especially from ideological leftists, who have also criticized increased economic intercourse and—even more so—expanded cultural contacts with Western nations. In 1974, such attacks focused on a "slavish" mentality about foreign things and on being servile lackeys of imperialism who "view foreigners as one hundred percent perfect and ourselves as totally incompetent." See, as examples, articles in *Peking Review*, Feb. 1, 1974, pp. 7-10, and in *Selections from People's Republic of China Magazines* (Hong Kong), Sept. 20, 1974, pp. 1-3.

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forces against it.[19] Such people seem periodically to have argued, for example, in favor of a more compromising policy toward Moscow, primarily to reduce the dangers of overt military conflict (without necessarily favoring a return to hostile confrontation with the United States). It is quite conceivable that if leaders with this view should come to the fore, there could be a limited Sino-Soviet détente, even though a far-reaching Sino-Soviet rapprochement would still appear highly unlikely.

Future Chinese leaders conceivably could decide, therefore, to move toward a position of even greater flexibility and maneuverability than Mao has favored, adopting policies designed to balance all other powers off against each other. If so, they might try to reduce potential threats to China by avoiding direct confrontations with any other power and perhaps even pursuing policies of cautious, limited détente toward all.

As noted earlier, for a brief period in the mid-1950's, when Chou En-lai's influence on China's foreign policy seemed particularly great, it appeared that Peking might be considering steps in such a direction. It is significant, also, that in the course of defending China's opening to the United States as well as the Maoist confrontation approach to dealing with the Soviet Union, the authors of the Yunnan document cited above revived earlier denunciations of Liu Shao-ch'i for allegedly having promoted a policy of "three reconciliations and one reduction" in the 1960's (meaning, among other things, a policy aimed at improving relations with both the Soviet Union and the United States). Whatever view one may have of the validity of this accusation,[20] it is plausible that some Chinese leaders have argued for a more compromising approach toward both superpowers, and it is certainly conceivable that if—after Mao passes from the scene—a collective leadership dominated by pragmatic moderates were to emerge, such a leadership could decide to move in that direction.

A second important variable that will clearly influence future strategic options as viewed from Peking will be trends affecting China's actual defensive military capabilities vis-à-vis the two superpowers and Chinese leaders' perceptions of their vulnerability to military threats. If, gradually, over time, Chinese leaders became confident of their ability to deter or counter military threats as the result of an improved military position, the basic arguments for pursuing a classical Maoist balance-of-power strategy could be weakened. In fact, the acquisition by the Chinese of an embryo nuclear deterrent in the late 1960's and early 1970's may already have had some influence on China's strategic posture, contributing to the Chinese leaders' decision to play down (beginning in late 1973) the dangers of any imminent direct Soviet military threat to China itself while stressing the global Soviet threat, particularly to Europe (although it is difficult to judge to what extent the Chinese really believe their current line on this or are merely promoting it for tactical reasons).

It is not easy, however, to estimate what future trends in China's comparative military position are likely to be or how these are likely to affect the Chinese leaders' sense of military vulnerability. Peking's limited defensive deterrent will probably become increasingly credible in the next few years, but China has no foreseeable prospect of approaching nuclear parity with either the US or the USSR. In fact, after China has achieved its initial goal of acquiring a minimal deterrent, the gap between China and the superpowers, in terms of total sophisticated nuclear capabilities, conceivably could actually widen. Nor can Chinese leaders be confident that their relative position in conventional military terms will soon improve in any dramatic fashion; in recent years, it has probably deteriorated in some respects as China's aircraft and other items of materiel acquired in earlier years have become increasingly obsolete. Consequently, even if one assumes that Chinese leaders may acquire a greater sense of confidence in their ability to deter possible nuclear strikes—which would obviously reduce their sense of acute vulnerability to certain kinds of foreign attack—their overall inferiority in the military balance will doubtless continue. This fact will probably argue in favor of the need to continue pursuing some kind of balance-of-power strategy designed to fend off potential military threats, whether or not this strategy is identical to Mao's.

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[19] The following are examples of recent articles that indicate continuing debate on whether to pursue a confrontation policy or a more compromising policy toward the Soviet Union: "Lo Ssu-ting Discusses Patriotism, National Betrayal," *Hung Ch'i* (Red Flag—Peking), No. 11, 1974, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China*, Nov. 20, 1974, pp. E1-10, and An Miao, "Confucianist Capitulationism and Traitor Lin Piao," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily—Peking), Aug. 12, 1975, in *Survey of People's Republic of China Press* (Hong Kong), Aug. 22, 1975, pp. 171-80.

[20] Liu Shao-ch'i himself implied at one point that Teng Hsiao-p'ing had proposed such a policy, but Liu later claimed that he had not known about it. (See *Collected Works of Liu Shao-ch'i, 1958-1967*, Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1968, pp. 361 and 367.) Even if Liu himself did not promote this line, it is highly likely, in light of the charges made, that some important leader(s) did.

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A third major variable which is certain to affect Peking's overall strategy in the future, as in the past, will be the policies of other major powers toward China. Peking's sense of threat in recent decades has not been without foundation. Even though, as stated earlier, Mao's particular approach to dealing with external threats has tended at times to exacerbate tensions in China's foreign relations in ways that have sometimes increased rather than decreased China's sense of danger, there is no question that both the United States and the Soviet Union, at different times, have pursued policies of containment and pressure directed against China which have posed threats that have appeared very real from the Chinese perspective and to which Peking has responded with the kind of confrontation-cum-balance-of-power strategies described above.

If in the future a limited Sino-Soviet détente were to occur in parallel with continuing limited détente between the United States and both China and the Soviet Union, one might hope for a break in the action-reaction cycle that has been such a fundamental factor shaping Chinese policies—and those of the other major powers as well—in recent years. However, there is no basis for any confidence that this is likely to happen soon. If it does not, Peking's leaders will probably continue to feel in the period immediately ahead, and even after Mao's demise, that because China is still relatively weak and vulnerable to potential (even if not imminent) threats, it must pursue some kind of balance-of-power strategy to compensate for its own relative weakness. There remains, however, the question of whether China's post-Mao leaders will choose to continue pursuing a classical Maoist balance-of-power strategy or will opt for some new approach, possibly one that calls for more flexibility in dealing with all potentially threatening powers rather than requiring hostile confrontation with one. The answer to that question will help to determine what the prospects are in the period ahead for developing the emerging four-power relationship in East Asia into an equilibrium that will be more stable than the situation that exists today.

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A Debate on Collectivization
Was Stalin Really Necessary?

James R. Millar and Alec Nove

EDITORS' NOTE: In recent years, a number of analysts have sought to gain a better understanding of the present Soviet political system by reexamining some of the traditional interpretations of the formative years of the USSR. The following debate on Soviet collectivization between the noted economists James R. Millar and Alec Nove grew out of this effort. Originally an oral exchange of views, the debate took place on November 10, 1975, at Duke University, Durham, North Carolina. It was jointly sponsored by the Department of Political Science and the Committee for Russian and East European Studies, with a special helping hand from Professor Vladimir Treml of the Department of Economics. The moderator was Jerry F. Hough of the Department of Political Science, who transcribed and edited this record of the debate and added some afterthoughts of his own.

Introductory Remarks

Jerry F. Hough

IN ALL SCHOLARLY fields, there are certain questions or subjects which for a time become the focus of intense interest and study by a disproportionate number of the best minds in the field. In Soviet studies of the last decade, the question that, more than any other, has caught the attention of a generation of scholars and provided the basis for exciting reanalysis and debate has been the nature of the 1920's and the First Five-Year Plan—that is, the origins of the Stalin system and the validity of the basic assumptions of the totalitarian model which embodied our understanding of those origins.

There have been a number of major (and, of course, controversial) attacks upon our fundamental assumptions about the Soviet system. It has been argued that Lenin came to accept NEP as the long-term road to communism rather than a temporary retreat; that Bukharin's program rather than Stalin's represented the logical culmination of Leninism; that "the revolution from above" of 1928-29 actually had many societal sources; that there was little need for massive renewal of capital stock in the First Five-Year Plan period and that relatively little occurred; that women were perhaps the major "source of accumulation" during the early industrialization drive; that Lysenko's enshrinement as genetics tsar had little relationship to Marxist ideology other than an *ex post facto* one. All of these propositions have been force-

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fully advanced—and challenged—by leading scholars of the last decade.[1]

Of all the events of the 1920's and early 1930's, however, none has received more serious reconsideration than the collectivization decision of 1928-29. At the center of attention has been not only the process by which the decision was taken, but, more important, the relationship of the decision to the industrialization drive and "the Soviet model of economic development." One of the leading figures in that reconsideration is James R. Millar of the Department of Economics of the University of Illinois (Urbana), and he has been asked to begin this discussion with a summary of the revisionist position as he sees it.[2] The other participant in the debate is one of the most distinguished economists in the history of Soviet studies, Alec Nove of the University of Glasgow. The actual title of the debate is taken from the title of a famous article which he wrote in 1962.[3]

What's Wrong with the "Standard Story"

James R. Millar

THERE ARE SEVERAL possibilities as to what the somewhat elliptical title "Was Stalin Really Necessary?" actually means. One is: Was Stalin somehow inevitable? Historians of the Soviet period have almost all tended toward some degree of determinism in answering this question and have suggested that to some extent Stalin represented the culmination of forces set in motion at a much earlier date—say, at the turn of the century. But I am not going to charge Alec Nove with asserting some kind of historical inevitability. I take the title to mean: Was collectivization really necessary? Was it necessary in order to achieve the ends—that is, to achieve the rapid rate of industrialization—that the Soviets, in fact, achieved? As we proceed, I want to change the question from "Was it necessary?" to "Was it optimal, given the development objectives of the Soviet leadership?"

In dealing with this question, I could follow one of two strategies. I could attack on a very narrow corridor in hopes of overpowering my adversary with detailed statistics and highly abstruse formulations, or, on the contrary, I could attack broadly—launch a broadside against the standard interpretation for which the answer to the question "Was Stalin really necessary?" is the culmination. I have elected the latter course—to take a running shot at the overall interpretation of what I am calling the "standard story" of the role of agriculture in industrialization in the Soviet Union. We shall begin at the beginning, and we shall conclude at the end of the First Five-Year Plan. Along the way, I hope to attack a number of elements of what I consider to be the standard interpretation.

The most convenient recent summary of the standard story can be found in the new textbook by Paul R. Gregory and Robert C. Stuart, *Soviet Economic Structure and Performance,* which is based on the work of most of the economic historians who studied the Soviet Union in the 1950's and early 1960's.[4] In abbreviated form, the story goes something like this: Once the Bolsheviks had gained control, once the Civil War had come to a close and it became obvious that it would be impossible to establish an economy on the principles underlying War Communism, the New Economy Policy (NEP) was introduced. Yevgeniy Preobrazhenskiy, among others, began to attempt to reconcile himself to the institutions of the New Economic Policy.[5] He noted that the policy established a

[1] The propositions are advanced, respectively, in Moshe Lewin, *Lenin's Last Struggle,* New York, Pantheon Books, 1968; Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution,* New York, A. A. Knopf, 1973; Sheila Fitzpatrick, Ed., *The Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-1931,* forthcoming; David Granick, *Soviet Metal-Fabrication and Economic Development,* Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1967; Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, *Women in Soviet Society,* forthcoming; David Joravsky, *The Lysenko Affair,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970.

[2] The other two major proponents of a revisionist position in this area are Moshe Lewin and (especially) the late Jerzy F. Karcz. See Moshe Lewin, *Russian Peasants and Soviet Power,* London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1968; Jerzy F. Karcz, "Thoughts on the Grain Problem," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), April 1967, pp. 399-435; Jerzy F. Karcz, "Back on the Grain Front," *ibid.,* October 1970, pp. 262-94; Jerzy F. Karcz, "From Stalin to Brezhnev: Soviet Agricultural Policy in Historical Perspective," in James R. Millar, Ed., *The Soviet Rural Community,* Urbana, Ill., University of Illinois Press, 1971, pp. 36-70; James R. Millar, "Soviet Rapid Development and the Agricultural Surplus Hypothesis," *Soviet Studies,* July 1970, pp. 77-93; James R. Millar, "Mass Collectivization and the Contribution of Soviet Agriculture to the First Five-Year Plan," *Slavic Review* (Columbus, Ohio), December 1974, pp. 750-66.

[3] *Encounter* (London), April 1962, pp. 86-92. The article was republished in Nove's collection, *Economic Rationality and Soviet Politics, or Was Stalin Really Necessary,* New York, Praeger, 1964.

[4] New York, Harper & Row, 1974. See esp. Chaps. 2, 3, 4, and 12.

[5] Yevgeniy Preobrazhenskiy, *The New Economics,* trans. by Brian Pearce, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1965.

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mixed economy, and he argued that the socialist sector would obviously have to grow more rapidly than the private sector during NEP if the socialist revolution was to have a favorable outcome.

According to the standard story, however, Preobrazenskiy said much more than this. He is said to have claimed the need for very rapid industrialization and to have developed the concept of "primitive socialist accumulation," which is translated in the standard story to mean "exploiting the peasants in support of industrialization." The story goes on to say that Nikolay Bukharin—perhaps the other major theorist of the period [6]—retorted with the argument that if the terms of trade were turned against the peasantry, or if the peasants were taxed heavily in any other way, the peasants would simply withdraw from the market, as they already allegedly had done during the "scissors crisis" of 1922-24.[7]

Thus, the historical issue is presented as a dilemma. For the purposes of military defense against a possible renewed intervention by the West and for the purposes of establishing socialism in the Soviet Union, it was necessary for the economy to industrialize and modernize rapidly. The means proposed to do it—that is, taxing in one form or another the 80 to 85 percent of the population who were peasants—was said to be not feasible, for the peasantry would withdraw from the market and, doing so, would sabotage the possibility of rapid industrialization.

The standard story then turns from the dilemma of NEP to the grain crisis of 1927-28. Marketings of grain were off sharply at this time, and "emergency measures" were taken in 1928 to confiscate hoards of grain from the peasantry. These emergency measures were ultimately followed by collectivization. According to the argument, the First Five-Year Plan, which had been approved in 1927, did call for a high rate of industrialization, and, just as had been foreseen, the peasants began—whether for political or economic reasons—to sabotage the hopes of industrialization in Soviet Russia.

Stalin then is said to have thought of something Preobrazhenskiy had not—coercion. He thought of forcing the peasants into the collective farm and thereby depriving them of discretion over the level of sowings and over the share of marketings. The state was therefore able to ensure rapid industrialization at the expense of the peasantry. The story asserts that collectivization *did work* in this sense, that it did permit the extraction or the mobilization of a surplus from the peasantry (grain marketings rose sharply during the First Five-Year Plan), and that this squeeze on the peasantry was a significant factor among the sources of rapid industralization. Preobrazhenskiy was right, it is said, in terms of where the resources had to come from, but he didn't think of collectivization. Stalin was right *and necessary* because he saw that the extraction of the surplus required coercion, since peasants would not surrender the resources voluntarily, and because he was willing to supply the coercion.

That, briefly, is the standard story, and in many ways it is a neat one—easy to teach and easy to remember. Here was Preobrazhenskiy who had the principles clear as to what was necessary. There was Bukharin who pointed out the fatal flaw in the argument. While in Preobrazhenskiy's presumed view, this left a hopeless situation, Stalin arrived to resolve Preobrazhenskiy's dilemma. Collectivization was a necessary step if the Soviet Union was to achieve the rate of industrialization that it did in the 1930's. If the *only* way to achieve that rate of industrialization was through collectivization—if it was the single means available—the word "necessary" would acquire the same value, or meaning, as the word optimal. From this it would follow that Stalin himself was also necessary—at least *given* the end. Necessary, but, of course, not necessarily desirable.

This is the standard story. What is wrong with it? The answer is—almost everything. Almost every single proposition, every fundament of the story, is either misleading, false, or wrong-headed.

The first problem with the standard story is that Alexander Erlich's famous article on Preobrazhenskiy

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[6] See the very full discussion in Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1883-1938*, New York, Vintage Books, 1975, esp. Chaps. 5 and 6.

[7] The "scissors crisis" was considered a crisis by the Bolsheviks because they expected that the sharp adverse change in the terms of trade that occurred in 1922-23 for agriculture would cause the peasants to cease bringing their products to market, thereby creating great hardships for the urban population. It was apparently Leon Trotsky who first described the situation as the "scissors crisis." The phrase was based on the fact that the two indexes which were being used to measure the "adverse" change in the purchasing power of agricultural income, when portrayed on a graph, crossed each other and thus resembled an open pair of scissors.

The most recent examination of the original data, of the price indexes, and of the various interpretations put forward by Soviet economists at the time of the crisis shows that the peasants did not in fact withdraw from the market and that there was little reason to suppose that they would have done so subsequently. This study also argues that the data and indexes used in the famous scissors diagram are quite unreliable for measuring changes in the purchasing power of agricultural incomes. See Corinne Ann Guntzel, *Soviet Agricultural Pricing Policy and the Scissors Crisis of 1922-23*, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Illinois (Urbana), 1972.

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contains more of Erlich (and of John Maynard Keynes) than it does of Preobrazhenskiy.[8] Erlich read a great deal more intelligence, consistency, and meaningfulness — particularly contemporary economic meaningfulness—into Preobrazhenskiy's writings than was ever there, and particularly more than was ever there during the time of the industrialization debate itself, for Preobrazhenskiy continued to refine his arguments long after the original debate was over.

Preobrazhenskiy spoke of primitive socialist accumulation, and many mistakenly think that this concept is merely analogous to Marx's primitive capitalist accumulation. (The people who say this have not understood what Marx meant by primitive capitalist accumulation.) What Preobrazhenskiy called for in his discussion of primitive socialist accumulation was simply the New Economic Policy. He says so very clearly in several footnotes and in the text of *The New Economics (Novaya ekonomika)*. His proposal was little more than that the terms of trade be turned against the peasantry as a way of financing industrialization.

The reason for Preobrazhenskiy's proposal was very simple. Given the size of the private sector and the size of the public sector, socialism could succeed in Russia only if the public sector were to grow more rapidly than the private. Otherwise, the country would lapse back into a private economy. He argued for a more rapid public growth, and this required intercepting surplus value created in the private sector and transferring it into the public sector. Preobrazhenskiy also called for "self-exploitation" by the workers in the public sector. In his view, rapid growth required not just exploitation of the peasants, therefore—the proletariat would also have to make sacrifices to finance industrialization. Preobrazhenskiy made a very important point that people in public finance will recognize: given the fact that the premodern direct taxes associated with the tsarist regime had been abandoned, the most efficient form of taxation was almost certainly some kind of indirect taxation, whether imposed through an indirect sales tax or by turning the terms of trade against the peasantry. On this point Preobrazhenskiy was right in terms of modern fiscal theory, but he was more correct generally than most people have realized, as we shall see.

In this debate, Bukharin argued that the peasants would withdraw from the market in the face of such taxation. There is no evidence at all for his assertion. On the other hand, numerous studies of Russian peasant behavior in the 19th century and early 20th century by Russian scholars (one notable example is A.V. Chayanov[9]) suggest that the peasantry would *not* react in this way. In fairly undeveloped countries, peasants do respond to changes in relative prices rather quickly (usually given a year's lag, of course). Consequently, if the terms of trade turn against a *particular* product, the peasants will quit producing and/or marketing it and transfer their efforts to other products. This is true and well-established. But what happens when the terms of trade *turn as a whole against the peasantry?* They maintain or even increase their production and their marketings (or leave the farm for nonrural employment, but only where it is available). When, for example, the peasant family suffers an adverse change in its economic situation through the addition of an extra unproductive mouth to feed (whether a baby or an invalid doesn't matter), the response is for the working members of the family to work harder.[10] This effort of the family to maintain its standard of living in the face of a general adverse economic change takes place not only when there is the birth of a child, but also when there is a new tax, an across-the-board change in the terms of trade, and so forth. This is true not only of the Russian peasantry, but of every agricultural population for which any investigation has been made. For example, it was true of farmers in the United States during the 1930's. What's more, it was true of the Soviet peasants during the 1922-23 "scissors crisis," for, contrary to a widespread misconception in the profession today, they did not withdraw from the market then.[11]

One of the factors that made many people feel the peasants would withdraw from the market was a fallacious notion of peasant self-sufficiency. The problem is partly that, as W.W. Rostow once en-

[8] Alexander Erlich, "Preobrazenski and the Economics of Soviet Industrialization," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (Cambridge, Mass.), No. 1, February 1950, pp. 57-88.

[9] A. V. Chayanov, *The Theory of Peasant Economy*, ed. by Daniel Thorner, Basile Kerblay, and R. E. F. Smith, Homewood, Ill., Irwin, 1966.

[10] This is also true with respect to labor. In the urban sector of the Soviet Union during the 1930's, the real wage fell. What was the response of the urban family? More members of the family entered the work force, and those who already had jobs worked longer hours in an attempt to maintain per capita family consumption.

[11] See Guntzel, *op. cit.*, esp. Chap. 3. For an example of an unsupported assertion to the contrary, see William L. Blackwell, *The Industrialization of Russia*, New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1970, pp. 84-85.

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titled an article, "Marx was a city boy." [12] So were the Bolsheviks, and so have been most Soviet and Western students of the period. They have not understood that there is no such thing as a self-sufficient peasant household, and there wasn't in Russia in the 1920's. Many have a notion that agriculture receives nothing from industry but a few luxuries like a pair of trousers or sugar. But the peasants also need kerosene, matches, soap, salt, condiments, steel for plows, milling services, and a number of other goods and services that a peasant community cannot produce, or at least can in no way produce efficiently.

Indeed, the peasants often weren't even self-sufficient in agricultural products. We have a false picture of a peasant farmer who produced a full range of agricultural goods and marketed a little bit on the side, but that's not the way it was. In the 1920's as well as in the late 19th century, certain peasants produced grain or industrial crops like cotton or flax for the market, and these peasants had to purchase other farm products from other peasants. There were others—in fact, most peasants—who produced the animal husbandry products, fruit, and vegetables for local or urban markets. The production functions and interdependencies of even the poorest peasants in the country were, therefore, very complicated.

If we turn to the grain crisis of 1928, then the standard story clearly is right in suggesting that this event persuaded many Bolsheviks that the end of the NEP had come—that the New Economic Policy had either served its usefulness or that the peasants had decided to sabotage Bolshevik plans. The Bolsheviks were city boys. They didn't understand the peasants, they didn't like the peasants, and there were an awful lot of peasants. Thus, the Bolsheviks were quite prepared to accept an alarming and sinister explanation for the falloff in grain marketings.

However, if the standard story suggests that Draconian measures were necessary to solve the 1928 grain crisis, then it is wrong. As the late Jerzy Karcz has argued—although this is somewhat more controversial—the grain crisis really was a consequence of unfavorable price policy with respect to grain products. The somewhat neglected Soviet economist of the 1920's, Yuriy Larin, pointed out that the peasants considered their animals, as well as their alcohol, their banks, and when grain prices were low, they put grain in these "banks." [13] In fact, an unfavorable price relationship had developed between grain and livestock prices during the 1920's, and simultaneously there had occurred a gradual falloff in the marketings of grain during the period. An adjustment of prices within the agricultural sector might well have solved the grain marketing problems rather easily, but the Bolshevik leadership certainly did not understand this.

The final aspect of the standard story—and the crucial one from the point of view of the argument about the necessity of Stalin—is the belief that Preobrazhenskiy was at least right in suggesting that industrialization would occur at the expense of the peasantry. It is argued that since grain marketings *did* increase and the country *did* industrialize rapidly, industrialization must have been carried out at the expense of the peasants—that is, with resources extracted from them.

Yet, as a Soviet economic historian named Barsov has recently shown, Soviet agriculture did not contribute in any significant measure to industrialization during the First Five-Year Plan. Although Barsov's is a very serious and careful analysis, his conclusions may be questioned in the West because of his (Marxist) methodology.[14] However, as I have shown elsewhere,[15] when his data are reworked according to Western conventions and measured in 1928 prices, the contribution of Soviet agriculture—strictly defined as a Western, non-Marxist economist would define it[16]—*actually turns out to have been negative*. The case seems to be even stronger than Barsov realized. Agriculture was a net recipient of real resources in the First Five-Year Plan from 1928 through 1932. Far from there being a net flow of

[12] W. W. Rostow, "Marx Was A City Boy, or Why Communism May Fail," *Harper's Magazine* (New York), February 1955, pp. 25-30.

[13] Yuriy Larin, *Sovetskaya derevnya* (The Soviet Countryside), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn', 1925, p. 217.

[14] A. A. Barsov, *Balans stoimostnykh obmenov mezhdu gorodom i derevney* (The Balance of Value Exchanges between the City and the Countryside), Moscow, Nauka, 1969; see also his "Agriculture and the Sources of Socialist Accumulation in the Years of the First Five-Year Plan (1928-1933)," *Istoriya SSSR* (Moscow), No. 3, 1968. For a sympathetic Western confirmation of Barsov's findings, see Michael Ellman, "Did the Agricultural Surplus Provide the Resources for the Increase in Investment during the First Five-Year Plan?" *The Economic Journal* (Cambridge, England), December 1975, pp. 844-64.

[15] James R. Millar, "Mass Collectivization . . .," *supra*.

[16] In such a definition, a type-of-product distinction is made—that is, the agricultural sector is defined to include enterprises or portions of enterprises producing agricultural products only, and rural enterprises producing nonagricultural products are treated properly as part of the industrial sector. This is in opposition to a simple geographical distinction between urban and rural areas.

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resources out of agriculture into the industrial sector, there was a reverse flow—and a reverse flow of some consequence when measured in 1928 prices. What is most surprising of all is that the terms of trade did not turn against agriculture during the First Five-Year Plan. *Prices changed—and significantly so—in favor of the agricultural sector.*

How did this favorable change in the terms of trade occur in the face of the terrible suffering? Why weren't the peasants better off? The favorable change in the terms of trade for the peasantry does not mean that the peasants were better off. It simply means that they were able to pass a portion of the burden placed upon them by collectivization, and by the procurement system erected upon it, onto the urban sector.[17]

What really happened? How did this flow of resources into agriculture take place, and how did people overlook it? In the first place, both the Bolsheviks and Western scholars have focused far too exclusively upon a single crop—grain. This crop may have been the most important from the standpoint of the Bolsheviks, but from the standpoint of the peasantry that wasn't the case. Before collectivization most peasants did not market grain at any time. When they marketed, they marketed animal husbandry products or other products raised on the plot. Grain was a major item marketed by some farms, but it was not the item marketed by the majority of peasant farms.

The focus on grain was one of the factors that led people to think that collectivization was successful, at least initially. While grain marketing did rise substantially, Jerzy Karcz has shown that if one takes livestock losses caused by peasant defiance of collectivization and multiplies this figure times official Soviet feeding norms of the period, one arrives at a surplus of grain for marketing purposes that is greater than the actual increase in grain marketings. That is, the animals that were slaughtered did not eat grain, and this left more grain available for marketing.[18] Of course, it also left less in the way of animal husbandry products to market, so the value of total marketings fell.

In the second place, Stalin's compromise with the peasantry, which left the private plot and the collective-farm market in existence, allowed the peasants to charge very, very high prices to the urban area for the products from their own private plots. If one thinks of exploitation in terms of the total Soviet population—urban and rural—the collective-farm market served as a valve tending to equalize the burden on the two sectors. Peasants on their own private account—their own private purchases and their own private sales—produced a net inflow of material resources during the First Five-Year Plan.

In the third place, people neglected the fact that the state was obliged to invest heavily in the Machine-Tractor Stations and in the state farms in order to compensate for the loss of draft power caused by the slaughter of livestock. The state was obliged not only to produce more tractors than it had intended (and to finance their purchase and delivery to agriculture) but also to import more tractors than had been originally planned.

Thus, resources came into agriculture in the form of capital investment in the Machine-Tractor Stations and the state farms, plus an increased and continuing charge for intermediate inputs such as fuel, lubrication, machine maintenance, and so forth. Material resources also flowed into agriculture in the form of peasant purchases of real products. There was only one subsector of agriculture from which there was a net outflow—the collective farm taken by itself, independent of the Machine-Tractor Stations and the peasant private plots. But this outflow was not sufficient to counterbalance the reverse flows. The fact that analysts have focused on the collective-farm sector alone is one of the reasons for the misunderstanding of this period.

In short, rather than Stalin's collectivization program being necessary to finance industrialization, rapid industrial development actually took place during the First Five-Year Plan without any net accumulation from agriculture—in fact, with a net overflow of resources *to* agriculture. While it might seem striking that the successful Soviet industrialization drive was accompanied by a turning of the terms of trade in favor of agriculture, the same pattern is

[17] The terms of trade changed gradually but significantly in favor of American agriculture, for example, during 19th- and early 20th-century US development. This does not mean that American farmers were made better off than American industrial workers as a result. It merely means that the greater productivity gains of the industrial sector were shared in this way with the agricultural sector, where productivity increases were smaller. The real income of farmers remained below that of workers throughout the period. The "favorable" change in the terms of trade for American agriculture merely helped to keep the gap between the two from widening. See Ralph A. Loomis and Glen T. Barton, "Productivity of Agriculture, United States, 1870-1958," *Technical Bulletin* (Washington, DC, US Department of Agriculture), No. 1238, April 1961, esp. Table 7 and pp. 28-38.

[18] Karcz, "From Stalin to Brezhnev . . .," *supra, pp.* 42-46.

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found in the industrialization of Western countries prior to the 1930's. Throughout the 19th century and the early part of the 20th century, productivity changes everywhere (including in the United States) were occurring predominantly in the industrial sector, not the agricultural. The only way the agricultural sector could survive was for the terms of trade to change gradually in its favor, so that it could share the productivity gains made in the industrial sector. It is only with the development of mechanization, pesticides, herbicides, and hybrids that the possibility of an agriculture-first policy has arisen, and this means only *since* the 1930's.[19]

What there is evidence for in the late 1920's in Soviet agricultural policy is complete incompetence. There is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that the peasants would have withdrawn from the market even had the terms of trade been turned against them, and there is no evidence that the terms of trade even *had* to be turned against them. Collectivization was not necessary for the industrialization drive, and it was not optimal either. It was instead a disaster just like a hurricane or any other natural disaster. Economically, no one gained from collectivization, including those promoting rapid industrial development.

The "Logic" and Cost of Collectivization

Alec Nove

"WAS STALIN really necessary?" and "Was collectivization really necessary?" are not quite the same question, although I agree they are related. I accept straightaway that there were alternatives to the policy being followed and that in certain respects collectivization was just the disaster that my colleague said it was. But it was very difficult for the Bolsheviks to accept any alternative. There are circumstances in which people who have a particular set of beliefs do not regard a particular practical alternative as a practical alternative. If there is a genuine alternative for me to eat either a cheese sandwich or a ham sandwich, this is not an alternative for a rabbi.

[19] Loomis and Barton, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 9-11 and pp. 28-29.

In a review of my book, Alexander Gerschenkron strongly objected to the use of the term "necessity," [20] and perhaps it can be misleading. Certainly, as my article made clear, it has nothing to do with "desirability" as I use it, and nothing to do with inevitability. For Poland to survive as an independent state in the 18th century, it was necessary to make major political changes. They were not made, and Poland did not survive as an independent state at that time. Moreover, there are in the world a number of different "necessities"—or, in Russian, *"zakonomernosti,"* a nice word for which there is no easy English translation. There are trends, there are tendencies, which have an inner logic and which work themselves through. But, of course, they can be contradicted by other trends and tendencies, and at various crossing points in the processes of history, it is by no means obvious what the outcome will be. Yet one still can identify a series of regularities, a series of tendencies, which I think makes the word "necessity" meaningful.

Whatever word is used, the essence of the argument about Stalinism in general rests on the totalitarian logic of the seizure of power by a small socialist minority in an overwhelmingly peasant country. There is the logic of the one-party state, there is the logic of trying to change society from above, which *is* part of the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in the name of building socialism in a peasant country. There is the logic of the tough, organized bureaucracy which the party *had* to become in order to carry out these changes. There is also involved here the Russian autocratic tradition—a tradition of which Stalin was acutely aware. (He thought that there was a necessity for a substitute tsar and naturally preferred, for good personal reasons, that the mantle be his rather than anybody else's.) All of this was exacerbated by the sense of isolation, the sense of danger, and the consequent need for speed as perceived by Stalin and his cohorts. This is not an excuse, of course, for the *wild* excesses that, in fact, occurred during the First Five-Year Plan in a race that was run much too fast. Still, the felt need for speed really was genuine.

So far as agriculture is concerned, and I happily concentrate on that aspect of the question, we must begin with the fact that peasant attitudes really went

[20] Review of Nove, *op. cit.* (see footnote 3), in *Economic History Review* (Welwyn Garden City, England). No. 3, April 1965, pp. 606-09. Reprinted in Alexander Gerschenkron, *Continuity in History and Other Essays*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 485-89.

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back to medieval times. It is interesting to note that the peasant program which the Bolsheviks found it politically convenient to adopt at the time of the revolution included a ban on the purchase and sale of land, a ban on employment of labor, and a gearing of the size of the family holding to the number of people available for work and the number of mouths to feed. This program reflected the pre-Stolypin-reform attitudes which still were dominant in the minds of the peasants,[21] but such attitudes also represented a problem for the Bolsheviks as they contemplated rapid change in the face of what appeared to them to be an obsolete peasant agriculture.

I recall a conversation with a former official who said, "You know, at the time when we were imposing on the peasants a policy which we knew they didn't like, some of us who knew our history remembered the potato riots under Catherine." Catherine II had ordered the Russian peasants to grow potatoes, which was, of course, the right thing to do. Peasants, being a lot of conservative dunderheads, refused, whereupon Catherine ordered that any peasants not growing potatoes be whipped. After a while, the peasants, having been whipped, planted potatoes and within a number of years were happily eating them. If the Bolsheviks were convinced that the peasants still were outmoded in their thinking and didn't know what was good for them, then it surely must have seemed as proper for the Bolsheviks as for the tsars to make the peasants do something for their own good.

We must also recognize that the effect of the revolution on agriculture was profoundly reactionary. The commercial estates were largely wrecked and redivided, and many, though not all, of the peasant holdings that were consolidated as a result of the Stolypin reforms were also divided. Back it all went into the three-field medieval system—strips, periodic redistributions in some cases, etc., etc. This was an antique system of agriculture, and everybody, including Chayanov, agreed that it was even inconsistent with efficient small holdings, let alone large-scale production.[22] The Bolsheviks may have overestimated the technical advantages of large-scale agriculture, as Marxists have tended to do in the past, but the extent to which they were wrong was perhaps disguised from them by the fact that the existing arrangements in agriculture were very, very obsolete.

The statement that agriculture was not self-sufficient in the 1920's, if taken literally, is, of course, perfectly true. If, however, the statement seems to imply that there was not a reversion to greater self-sufficiency as a result of the revolution, then obviously the statement is wrong. Jerzy Karcz, Robert Davies, I myself, and others have joined in discussions about the measure of marketings, but in the end I am convinced by the following simple argument. In 1913—admittedly a very good year—the total of all out-of-the village marketings was something like 21 million tons. Stalin claimed that by 1928-29 they had fallen to 12 million. The difference of 9 million tons equals the level of exports in 1913, and exports in 1926-27 were negligible.[23] Since the size of towns was approximately the same in 1913 and 1926, it seems to me that what, in fact, happened is that the peasants and their animals—and I acknowledge that the focus is on grain alone here—were eating what was once exported. It seems to me that the peasants regarded themselves, quite properly, as beneficiaries of their own acquisition of land and as a result ate better than before the revolution. They *were* eating a potential exportable surplus. There is no doubt whatever that if the economic conditions of a family decline, if an extra mouth exists to feed, people will make an effort to feed it, but there should not be a confusion between production response and selling on the market. What the Bolsheviks were concerned about was marketings. While peasants are not completely self-sufficient, they can at the margin make the decision to shift more toward consumption rather than take produce to the market. Industrial workers are in a different position. If you are working more and producing more ball-bearings, you can't eat them. You *can* eat more cabbage and meat.

One can view primitive socialist accumulation—however defined—as a means of mobilizing agricultural exports to pay for the imports of capital goods from the West. That is just one way of looking at the first stages of industrialization from the vantage point of the Soviet leadership—and not an entirely unrealistic way of looking at it. Now, James Millar very properly says that there were alternative means of

[21] The reform introduced by P. A. Stolypin in 1906-11 was intended to break up traditional peasant communal-land tenure and gradually replace it by private ownership of land.

[22] See footnote 9.

[23] The marketing figures are discussed in the two Karcz *Soviet Studies* articles cited in footnote 2 and in R. W. Davies, "A Note on Grain Statistics," *Soviet Studies*, January 1970, pp. 314-29.

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getting more marketings, and I'm sure there were. The great problem is—what would the consequences of the alternatives be? It seems that both Bukharin and Preobrazhenskiy did run into a dilemma, for Preobrazhenskiy said more than that there was a need to turn the terms of trade against the peasant. He also said that there is a terrible danger from kulaks. And what on earth is a kulak? A kulak is a prosperous peasant. So long as you have this attitude (which Bukharin at first didn't have, but which even he later came to share, or said that he did), you must base yourself and the health of agriculture on the middle peasant. What is a middle peasant? A moderately unsuccessful one.

So long as all the Bolsheviks, including Bukharin (at least after 1925), agreed that the emergence of a powerful, commercially-minded peasantry was a deadly danger to them, they had closed off one potentially viable alternative. This is my point about rabbis and ham sandwiches. If this alternative—which did exist and which may have been a much healthier one even for accumulation (I'll grant that)—was foreclosed, the Bolsheviks were in a fix. I'll also grant at once (and this is in my book) that their fix was rendered considerably worse by the price policy they adopted in agriculture. The grain crisis of the winter of 1927-28 was due much more to price relationships, which were very unfavorable to grain, than to any other single cause in the short run. That I completely accept. But in the longer run, the general level of productivity of agriculture was limited by the settlement of the revolution. The belief that the successful peasant was a kulak and an enemy prevented what would otherwise have been the natural development of a prosperous, commercially-minded peasant agriculture.

The Bolshevik's range of choice was also limited by their attitude toward the market. The whole price policy of the second half of NEP was inconsistent with the maintenance of any sort of market equilibrium, and a number of persons at the time made this point. However, most of the Bolsheviks (though not Bukharin, I think) followed Preobrazhenskiy in regarding the market as the enemy. They saw no reason to make the adjustments required in order to maintain equilibrium. They would say: "The markets, the traders, the uncontrolled part of the economy are something we have tolerated since 1921 through dire necessity, but really we ought to fight all this." Preobrazhenskiy only accepted NEP because there was no alternative. As Bukharin pointed out, he saw a *conflict* between socialist planning and what he called "the law of value," *i.e.,* the market.[24] This kind of approach awoke responsive chords among the Bolsheviks because they were who they were. This is also part of the pattern we are discussing.

Finally, it should be recognized that, while the solution adopted was partly due to Stalin's personal predilections for violence and to the spirit of enthusiasm of the First Five-Year Plan, the Bolsheviks were the first ever to try such a policy, and they had few guidelines. Western economics at the time was interested in equilibrium and in the explanation for trade cycles. The word "growth" was never mentioned, and discussion of appropriate investment strategies for development was unheard of. Development economics was born in the West after World War II. I don't want to excuse the absurdities of some of Stalin's policies, because a number of people warned him that they were absurd and were rewarded with prison. But at the very least, we have to admit that had he, in fact, studied Western economists of the time, he would have learned very little that was of the slightest relevance to the problems the Bolsheviks were facing.

Now, what about the role of agriculture as a source of accumulation? This is a difficult question because we have here a distinction between intention and outcome, and we also have the problem of measurement in the wake of a disaster. It is not a source of disagreement that there was a disaster. Indeed, even Stalin would probably agree about that. It was, of course, not intended that one-half of the horses and most of the livestock in the USSR should be slaughtered in three years. It was an appalling situation.

So far as intentions are concerned, it is clear that Stalin and his cohorts were discussing ways and means of mobilizing material and financial resources largely, although not exclusively, from agriculture. The term "pumping over" (*perekachka*) was widely used in the discussions. When Stalin began his policy of industrializing rapidly in tandem with "soaking" the peasants, Bukharin called it "military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry" (this is the language he used in 1928).[25] In the outcome, Stalin *et al.* may have been wrong, but that they *thought* they were soaking and exploiting the peasantry was certainly

[24] See the discussion in Alev Nove, "Some Observations on Bukharin and His Ideas," in S. Abramsky and Beryl J. Williams, Eds., *Essays in Honour of E. H. Carr,* London, The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1974, pp. 183-203.

[25] Quoted in V. M. Molotov, "On Two Fronts," *Bolshevik* (Moscow), Jan. 21, 1930, p. 14. See Cohen, *op. cit.,* pp. 306-07.

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the case, even though the text of the First Five-Year Plan (an absurd document in this respect) indicated that not only accumulation but also consumption would go up at a fast rate.

So far as outcome is concerned, I think we agree that the agricultural disaster resulting from the slaughter of farm animals and the precipitous decline in farm output completely transformed the situation. It is perfectly true, therefore, that (1) the total amount the Bolsheviks could get out of agriculture was notably less than they expected, and (2) the amount that they had to put in (primarily as the result of the slaughter) was greater than they expected. All this is completely true.

However, I have looked at Barsov and puzzled over the implications of his argument that the burden of industrialization was carried on the shoulders of the working class. I put this argument to one of the Russian émigrés, and he said, "Oh, my God. *Who starved during this period?*"

What, then, is wrong with the argument that is put forward? Firstly, it all ends in 1932, because Barsov ends his article with 1932. If one carried the analysis on through 1935, one would find a reduction in the investment in agriculture in the years following 1932. Moreover, the free market prices were extremely high in 1932-33 (25-30-35 times higher than the official prices for foodstuffs), which certainly benefited those peasants who were able to get to the nearest town and sell their cabbage or some flour. By 1935 these prices were very sharply reduced, and I strongly suspect that if we had the average prices of these years, they would be much lower than in 1932. Thus, it may very well be that emergency inputs to maintain agricultural production in the wake of the draft-animal disaster were followed by a much more effective mobilization of agricultural products in subsequent years.

Indeed, I think that if the relevant figures were available, they would show that the maximum degree of exploitation of the peasantry—in the sense of pumping resources out of agriculture while providing the minimum returns for people and the minimum of technical inputs—took place from 1948 to 1953. In the late Stalin period the government was still paying for compulsory procurements the same prices or almost the same prices as in 1928, and delivery quotas were higher. The undersupply of inputs to the peasants at the time was appalling.

Secondly, I am much bothered by the argument with respect to the prices of 1928 and the alleged improvement in the terms of trade thereafter. Part of the problem is a suspicion that such improvement is notably weighted by the relatively low prices of industrial inputs into agricultural *production* (*e.g.*, items such as tractors), and that it does not necessarily reflect the kind of prices peasants had to pay for consumer goods. If one looks at Malafeyev's book,[26] for instance, one finds that prices were rising toward the end of the First Five-Year Plan, and always more rapidly for rural areas than for uban areas.

An even greater problem is the fact that this was a time of grave shortage. Precisely by the end of 1932, and even worse in 1933, a number of things could not be bought at any price. For a peasant, trousers were by no means unfavorably priced in relation to the price he was able to get for the cabbage he sold in town, but, most unfortunately, there were no trousers to be had. The price system in 1932-33 was unbelievably complicated, with some goods rationed, others distributed through closed shops which were accessible only to those with special cards, etc., etc. Under those conditions, what on earth did prices mean? I know there is also evidence about the volume of movements of goods, but I am worried about these prices which have to be used as weights. The analysis just doesn't seem to square with the realities of the time.

It does seem to me that figures on food consumption graphically illustrate who actually bore the brunt of the worsening situation. From the accompanying table, one can see that by 1932 there was a very sharp decline in the quality of food consumption in the towns, with the population filling their bellies with more bread and potatoes and eating less of the

Food Consumption, 1928-32
(kilograms per capita)

	Bread & Grains	Potatoes	Meat
Urban			
1928	174.4	87.6	51.7
1932	211.3	110.0	16.9
Rural			
1928	250.4	141.1	24.8
1932	214.6	125.0	11.2

SOURCE: Yu. A. Moshkov, *Zernovaya problema v gody sploshnoy kollektivizatsii sel'skogo khozyaystva SSSR—1929-1933 gg.* (The Grain Problem in the Years of All-Round Collectivization of USSR Agriculture—1929-1933), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1966. P. 136.

[26] A. Malafeyev, *Istoriya tsenoobrazovaniya v SSSR* (History of Price Formation in the USSR), Moscow, Mysl', 1964, p. 148.

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better food (specifically meat). On the other hand, the rural population ate less of *everything* by 1932, and this was before the famine of 1933. These figures suggest that the burden was not borne primarily by the urban population (although unmistakably a decline in the income of the urban population contributed substantially to the high level of investment in agriculture).

Finally, one should not forget the export of labor from the villages. This was both planned and unplanned, and it was massive. Life in the villages was so miserable, and people were so frightened of being labeled kulaks and arrested, that perhaps up to 10 million of them fled to the construction sites and factories that were being built. I don't quite know how to measure it, but it was an important contribution of agriculture to industrialization. The peasants' arrival helped to depress the per capita consumption figures (and the labor productivity) in the cities, thereby creating the impression that the original urban inhabitants suffered more than they did.

In conclusion, let me repeat once more my belief that the actual collectivization program carried out by Stalin, which was a most dreadful thing, was not inexorably predetermined and that it was not morally justified by the outcome of the industrialization drive of the 1930's. One can say that the events which occurred have a pretty powerful explanation, given the nature of the Bolsheviks, the extent to which other alternatives seemed closed to them, and the extent to which they were ideologically predisposed in certain directions. The survival of the regime, given the Bolsheviks' aims and their rapid industrialization program, required a harsh, autocratic type of regime. Yet, as Roy Medvedev has contended in his book,[27] if there is an inherent logic in a cult of personality, much depends on the nature of the personality. When Stalin was in a position to make arbitrary and personal decisions, he went in for wild excesses, both in economic policy and, of course, in the terror. Not for a moment, and certainly not in my article, did I suggest that this was in any sense necessary. This was Stalin showing the face of an oriental despot and behaving in a manner which only became possible after he had succeeded in getting into power, having shown a more moderate and human face while doing so.

[27] Roy A. Medvedev, *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism*, ed. by David Joravsky and Georges Haupt, New York, Knopf, 1972.

Rejoinders

Mr. Millar:

IT SEEMS TO ME that the disagreements between Professor Nove and myself are of two different types. In the first place, our images of the Russian countryside in the 1920's are somewhat different. I don't agree, for instance, that Chayanov's studies demonstrate the antique nature of Russian agriculture. On the contrary, the implication of Chayanov's argument is that peasant agriculture could have survived the Soviet regime, as it had the Tsarist, had it not been for the Bolsheviks' misperceptions of the peasantry.

I also do not agree that the decline in marketings can be attributed simply to increased peasant consumption. The great famine of 1921-22 caused a very sharp reduction in animal stocks, and these had to be rebuilt in 1923-24, naturally at some cost in grain. Moreover, the international grain market was a disaster during the 1920's, particularly during the early part of the 1920's. The international price of grain had fallen precipitously, and the Soviet regime had not established an institution to organize the export of grains in these conditions. (The regime did put together an organization to export flax, and this did help to create the necessary demand to maintain the production and sowings of flax.) It does seem absolutely clear to me that the peasants were not self-sufficient and that a turning of the general terms of trade against them would have increased marketings, not just production.

I might add that I also do not believe that the labor which moved out of agriculture in the First Five-Year Plan should be considered a contribution to industrialization. There is no evidence of a shortage of labor in Soviet Russia of the 1920's and the 1930's, nor any evidence of a need to take extraordinary measures to mobilize labor from the countryside. The experience of most developing countries both before and since the Soviet industrialization drive has been an excessive off-farm flow of population, and this without collectivization or anything like it. The unskilled, uneducated Soviet peasants who poured into the cities at that time were in many ways more of a nuisance than a help.

But much more important than any disagreements between us on interpretation of detailed questions is, I think, a fundamental methodological difference in our approaches. Professor Nove is concerned with

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explaining how things happened, and he is trying to say that, given the Bolsheviks, given the circumstances they faced, given their understanding of the agricultural situation, given the backwardness of Soviet agriculture, given the world situation—given all these factors, how could anything else have been decided?

It seems to me, therefore, that Professor Nove comes perilously close to a determinist position at times, but I am not concerned with arguing this point. I am trying not only to explain what happened, but to evaluate it as a means-end relation. Professor Nove uses "necessity" in two senses: first, as a "tendency that has an inner logic"; second, as something that is needed. It was this latter meaning of "necessity" that he had in mind when he cited the example, "For Poland to survive as an independent state in the 18th century, it was necessary to make major political changes." And it is this latter meaning of "necessity" that primarily interests me. I don't care whether or not Bukharin or Preobrazhenskiy or Stalin or anyone else considered the various alternatives, for that is irrevelant in *evaluating* the appropriateness (optimality) of collectivization as a means to achieve the goal of rapid industrialization. My interest is in assessing whether collectivization or some similar coercive "squeezing" of the peasantry was needed for the Soviet rapid industrialization program to succeed.

The essence of my argument is that collectivization could not have been necessary for rapid industrialization for the simple reason that it did not, in fact, contribute net resources to the industrial sector. An analysis in terms of "surplus" is very confusing to anyone raised in neoclassical economic analysis, for what we are talking about is a *net* surplus, a *net* of the movement of goods flowing out of and into agriculture. We are putting prices on these counterflows and measuring the *net* difference. The approach is akin to measuring an export or an import surplus in a country's foreign trade, and treating agriculture and nonagriculture as though they were different countries. In my opinion, Professor Nove is right about the contribution of capital stocks (in contrast to consumer goods) to the improvement in the terms of trade, but since the argument concerns agriculture vs. nonagriculture, the fact that many of the resources flowing into agriculture were directed toward maintaining production simply buttresses my case.

Our knowledge about the net flow between agriculture and the nonagricultural sector after 1932 is, unfortunately, rather meager. Not only does Barsov's main study stop in that year, but on the basis of an examination of the archives, he says we never will have a definitive understanding of the question because some of the necessary data were not collected.[28] In any case, the "standard story" has always focused on the First Five-Year Plan, not the Second, and it is already a significant revision of the standard theory to say that the contribution of agriculture was postponed until after 1932. I personally am doubtful that the situation changed much after 1932. So far as the postwar period is concerned, I thought that no one argued that collectivization was beneficial to the industrialization drive over a 15- to 20-year span. Collectivization was supposed to have solved an immediate procurement problem, but at a long-term cost to the economy as a whole. As recent developments in the Soviet Union have shown, so many raw materials for industrial production come out of agriculture that there is no way to discriminate sharply against the agricultural sector without in the end discriminating against overall growth.

In my opinion, we don't really know about the relative suffering produced by collectivization. That is, we don't know how the burden was shared between the agricultural and nonagricultural populations. We just know that both suffered losses in real wages and probably losses in real income. The measure in Nove's Table 1 is not definitive, but I don't disagree with it. It is not relevant to the issue between us.[29] In any case, I certainly never said or meant to imply that the burden was placed primarily on the working class. It fell on both classes. *The crucial point is that so much of this suffering was completely unnecessary and contributed in no way to industrialization.*

In conclusion, let me emphasize one point very strongly. One of the reasons that I have been attacking the standard story is that the question at hand is not merely of historical interest. The standard story has worked its way into the accepted Western developmental literature as "the Soviet model for economic development." This model (one famous

[28] Barsov, *Balans . . ., supra, pp. 186-90.* However, see his recent article, "The NEP: The Leveling of Economic Relations between the City and the Countryside," in M. P. Kim, Ed. *Novaya ekonomicheskaya politika* (New Economic Policy), Moscow, Nauka, 1974, where he attempts some analysis of the Second Five-Year Plan period.

[29] See note 17 above. The lower real income of American agricultural workers during the 19th century does not imply that industrial growth occurred at the expense of the agricultural sector. The truth is quite the opposite.

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version is the Ranis and Fei model[30]) describes an experience of industrialization in which very rapid growth is achieved, with the agricultural sector playing a real and substantial role as a source of investment resources. But if this model does not describe the actual Soviet experience—and it doesn't—we are left with the question: How *did* the Soviet Union achieve rapid industrial development? Once we get rid of some simple notion that the Soviets extracted resources out of a particular sector, we may be able to start thinking about this question seriously and to come to some accurate understanding of what the Soviet model for economic development really was.

Mr. Nove:

IT IS, I THINK, wrong to say that I am arguing for a determinist position so far as the initiation of collectivization is concerned. I have contended that there were powerful objective reasons for a despot to be in a position to act and that there were powerful ideological reasons for him to be suspicious of any agricultural policy that created a strong and independent peasantry. But almost by definition, a despot has a range of choices. Of course, Stalin had around him a group of people—a stratum of semi-educated, tough commissars whom he represented and whose interests on the whole they thought he was defending until he killed half of them—but some of the choices were his own.

I have also emphasized that some aspects of the collectivization program were counterproductive in the literal sense. There is nothing to be gained from taking grain away from starving peasants and then exporting it in order to buy machinery which was then wrecked by former peasants who hadn't been taught how to use it. This kind of thing is completely counterproductive, and obviously it occurred.

I recall listening to a woman who was defending a PhD thesis in Moscow University. In the course of discussion, she said: "I would regard the Soviet agricultural model not as a model for socialism in agriculture, but at best as a tragic necessity. We must hope that no other socialist country would be compelled to follow that road." She said it to an audience of 100, none of whom rose to object. "At best," therefore, "a necessary tragedy"—and the word "necessary" in this connection can very well be argued about, for in the end Stalin's course proved so counterproductive with respect both to the agricultural sector and to the aims of the First Five-Year Plan. I agree entirely that there could well have been an unexplored range of possibilities, for example, in the form of increased taxation. It is one of the astonishing features of the 1920's that the taxation on the peasants was always rather low, until it became penal as part of the policy of destroying individual peasant farming.

Yet, it does seem to me that the collectivization decision should be treated with some historical perspective. The policy of rapid tempos—of breaking out of what the pro-Stalin Bolsheviks believed to be the vicious circles that were holding them back—is quite understandable. It is quite logical that they should have tried. Moreover, if one adopts a particular strategy for good or for ill, then along with that strategy inevitably go a number of disadvantages which can be seen as costs of the chosen strategy. Look at the Western war economy and all its bureaucratic deformations. If one assumes that a strategy is rational—which it may not be—the errors and waste with which it is associated also in a paradoxical way have a rationality of their own. In a "great leap forward" strategy, at least some—though not all—of the waste and deformations, including excesses on the part of overenthusiastic comrades, must be expected.

So far as the burden of the industrialization drive is concerned, I agree, of course, that it was not limited to the peasants. (After all, the high free market prices were paid not by the state but by the urban citizens.) Nevertheless, I continue to worry about any calculation based on 1928 prices. In any other circumstances, the consequences of collectivization would naturally have included much higher prices of agricultural products simply by reason of the extreme shortages. The use of highly artificial prices both for outputs and inputs can produce very misleading results.

The best indicator, I think, is the relative welfare, the relative income, of different strata of the population. One must study the relativities and dynamics of peasant and urban incomes during and after collectivization. At the time of Stalin's death, the difference of income between the urban worker and any kolkhoz peasant not within very easy reach of the market was very strongly in favor of the urban worker, whatever way one weighs the evidence.

[30] Gustave Ranis and John C. H. Fei, "A Theory of Economic Development," *The American Economic Review* (Nashville, Tenn.), September 1961.

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If one looks at the post-Stalin statistics, one sees a trend in the direction of evening out this difference to a very considerable extent. Today, the difference is much smaller and more the kind one would expect in a society at the Soviet Union's level of development. A fiscal reflection of this change is the gigantic budgetary subsidy that is given to maintain the difference between the quite high purchase prices for meat at the farms and the lower retail prices for meats in the shops. Instead of a high turnover tax revenue originating through the resale of agricultural products obtained at low prices, this particular item of revenue probably is insignificant today.

It is only with such an evening-out of the income difference that one can say the original Soviet method of socialist construction—if that is the name to give it—was finally, by stages, abandoned. Industrialization involving the pressing down of peasant standards—or in a sense, the exploitation of agriculture—cannot be said to have ended until sometime in the late 1960's.

A Moderator's Afterthoughts

Mr. Hough:

FEW DEBATES HAVE, I think, been so successful as this one in clarifying issues and advancing our understanding. The debate makes clear that several quite separate issues have been intertwined in our arguments about the collectivization phenomenon. The first question is the historical one: Why did it occur? Clearly this is a question that interests Professor Nove very much and Professor Millar very little. On this question, Professor Nove's real protagonists would seem to be those scholars, such as Moshe Lewin and Stephen Cohen, who see Bukharin's program in the late 1920's as the true Leninist one and who see NEP as a viable (maybe even natural) long-term Bolshevik alternative. While Professor Nove obviously believes that Bukharin's program was economically viable (and even desirable), he seems to be saying that that program was not politically viable and that any Bolshevik would have been pushed toward something like collectivization at the end of the 1920's.

The second question is: Who suffered most as a consequence of collectivization? To me, the most important contribution of the debate was to clarify that this question can be quite distinct from the question: Which sector contributed most to industrialization? A regime may willingly or unwillingly invest so much in agricultural mechanization that little "net surplus" is received from the agricultural sector, but, of course, peasants can't eat tractors. Undoubtedly, the question of relative suffering is partly a metaphysical one (What did groups receive in comparison with what was proper or "natural" for them to receive?), and undoubtedly any accurate analysis of it would have to be quite subtle and differentiated. Many peasant youths surely rejoiced at the newly-created opportunity to move to city jobs, and those peasants near the cities suffered less than more remote peasants. Cotton farmers fared better than those in the non-black-earth region. Similarly, those workers who became Stakhanovites or who simply took advantage of new programs to raise their skills or even to receive higher education are in a much different category from those who remained unskilled. The gross distinction that may make the most sense is one based on age (the young being seen as beneficiaries in overall terms, the middle-aged and the old as the greatest losers), but in general terms Professor Nove must be right in emphasizing that conditions were not good in the villages. Whatever the relative costs borne by the urban and rural family in statistical terms, the urban family, unlike the peasant, often had an unemployed wife who could go to work in an effort to maintain family standards of living.

The third question—or set of questions—involves the concerns that interest Professor Millar most: Did the suffering of the peasants and workers at least "buy" a rapid rate of industrial growth for the Soviet Union? Was collectivization or something like it necessary for such growth, at least given the regime's reluctance to seek large-scale foreign investment? If it turns out that, whatever the intentions of the leadership, agriculture did not provide much (if anything) in the way of a net surplus to the industrial sector, what was going on that explains the very high rates of industrial growth? What was the "real" Soviet model of economic development in the sense of the way in which resources were actually mobilized for the industrialization drive? Professor Millar is surely right in holding that this is a question which deserves a most serious reexamination on the basis of new data. It is a question of vital interest not only to historians of the Soviet period but also to theorists of economic development in general—and to those charged with promoting such development in the Third World.

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Books

China and Grain: A Matter of Import

By Kenneth R. Walker

US CONGRESS, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE: *China: A Reassessment of the Economy—A Compendium of Papers.* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1975.
DWIGHT H. PERKINS, Ed.: *China's Modern Economy in Historical Perspective.* Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1975.

We realize that China's grain production is not yet abundant; nevertheless, China is a country in which an extremely large agricultural population produces grain. Provided that it is rationally distributed, not only will we have no need to import it; we can, moreover, continue to export a certain amount. To reduce essential grain exports would be harmful to the state, because if we do so, then we shall have to cut our imports of industrial equipment and consequently slow down the rate of socialist industrialization. To import a large quantity of grain is, therefore, harmful and unnecessary: apart from causing the rate of socialist industrialization to fall, in a large country like ours with such a vast population, we simply cannot rely on grain imports to solve the people's grain requirements.

THIS STATEMENT by Ch'en Yün, China's leading economic expert during the first decade of Communist government, appeared in 1955.[1] And yet, even though one would not find an identical quotation in a published speech of any of the current Chinese leaders, Ch'en Yün's analysis remains as relevant in 1976 as it was twenty-one years ago. Indeed it is certain that the inadequacy of domestic grain production and the implications for the economy of the resulting need to import grain are well recognized, in private, by the Chinese government, and it is equally certain that China's leaders are deeply divided over how to deal with this situation.

There are basically two strands to the issue as put by Ch'en Yün: an economic aspect, focusing on the interrelationship between agricultural and industrial growth; and, secondly, a more political or "cultural" aspect, *i.e.*, the desire of the Chinese to be independent of foreign countries. The two recent volumes reviewed here enrich our understanding of both these themes and, taken together, provide the most comprehensive analysis yet available of the *long-run* development of China, from the late 19th century to the mid-1970's.

The first, a volume of the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress (hereafter JEC) which supplements earlier JEC compendia of 1967 and 1972,[2] assembles 27 papers written by leading analysts of China (all American except one) at universities and government agencies. The papers are particularly interesting since they reflect (a) the increasing availability of Chinese economic statistics; (b) the knowledge obtained from the large number of visits made to China in recent years by American scholars (including some of the authors); and (c) the adoption by many American analysts of a less hostile approach to China than that discernible in earlier publications—for example, the 1967 JEC volume.[3]

The second book, edited by Dwight H. Perkins, will surely help to correct the all too prevalent view among Western students of China that anything of interest to be said about Chinese economic development must pertain to the Communist period. The subjects

[1] See Chen Yün, "Questions Concerning the Central Purchase and Supply of Grain," *Hsin-hua Yueh-pao* (Peking) No. 8, 1955, pp. 50-54.

[2] See JEC, *An Economic Profile of Mainland China*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1967, and *People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1972.

[3] John Gurley criticized the tone adopted by some of the authors of the papers in *An Economic Profile . . ., op. cit.*, in his testimony published in JEC, *Mainland China in the World Economy: Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1967, pp. 184-89.

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covered in the nine essays in this volume are varied, reflecting the authors' individual interests rather than any clear, unifying theme.[4] For example, there are papers on the role of the foreigner in China's economic development, on skills and resources in late traditional China, and on cooperation in traditional agriculture, to mention just three. Perhaps inevitably, the Perkins volume lacks the coherence of the JEC collection and will seem rather specialized for the general reader, but it, too, belongs on the shelves of all serious students of modern China, including those who wish to understand China's current economic problems and also to speculate about the future.

Although both books deal with a multitude of subjects, one is constantly brought back to the overwhelming importance of agriculture (and especially the basic question of food supply) in China's long-run development. And while some of the contributors to these collections would probably disagree, the reviewer finds little in these books to warrant any but the most cautious predictions regarding the prospects for this sector and hence for China's economy as a whole. Let us explore briefly the basis for such an assessment of the PRC's situation.

IN THE FIRST place, we have the startling fact that grain output per capita in the mid-1970's remains at virtually the same level as in the mid-1950's (before the disruptions of the Great Leap). Based on China's own published statements relating to grain output,[5] and on the assumption of even a conservative population figure for the end of 1974,[6] grain output per head of total population in the years 1974 and 1975 turns out to have been, at most, 12-18 kilograms greater than the 295 kilograms achieved in 1957, the last year of the 1950's for which there are reliable official data. Perhaps more revealing, if we compare averages for two six-year periods, we find that average annual output of grain per capita for the years 1970-75 (298 kilograms) was only marginally above the average for the years 1953-58 (293 kilograms), and in no year has grain production per head reached the 316-kilogram peak of 1958 suggested by Kang Chao's production figures for that year.[7] Furthermore, annual per capita output has remained more or less constant since 1970

[4] The contributors include Robert F. Dernberger, Carl Riskin, Mark Elvin, Kang Chao, Thomas G. Rawski, John C. H. Fei, Ramon H. Myers, Peter Schran, and Perkins (who also provided an introduction).

[5] All production figures used here are official ones except that for 1958, when the collapse of the Chinese statistical system led to the publication of figures that were totally unacceptable. For that year, the author has therefore used the careful estimate provided by Kang Chao in his study, *Agricultural Production in Communist China, 1949-1965*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1970, p. 260. The 1974 grain output was given by Yang Li-kung, Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Forestry at the Rome Conference of the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization in November 1975. No firm figure for 1975 output has been published, but the New China News Agency on November 13, 1975, claimed that it was "greater than that of 1974"—a statement interpreted by the author as indicating a small rise of perhaps 1 million tons over 1974.

[6] A population of 879 million (as of the end of 1974) has been assumed, although a somewhat higher estimate of 920 million—for mid-1974—is used in the new JEC compendium. See Arthur G. Ashbrook, Jr., "China: Economic Review, 1975" (p. 35), and Alva Lewis Erisman, "China: Agriculture in the 1970's" (p. 342).

[7] See fn. 5.

Reviewers in This Issue

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(with the possible exception of 1974).

Given the existing commodity structure of grain output in China, current levels of per capita output would provide an average of approximately 2,280 calories per head per day (net of seed and a small deduction for livestock and industrial requirements, but without any allowance for stocks). This (fairly liberal) estimate is clearly above minimum subsistence levels. It is, however, only an average figure, and one must therefore bear in mind Ch'en Yün's point about rational distribution.

Looking at China's record in this regard, we find that during the 1950's—in fact right up until the crisis year of 1960—Ch'en Yün's policy of mobilizing the grain "surplus" within the People's Republic of China so as to provide adequate supplies for all was implemented by the government with remarkable success. Potential surpluses had, of course, existed for many years in the 1920's and 1930's,[8] but they had not been used in the interests of China's overall economic development, because of the behavior of landlords, the weakness of government, and the gross inadequacy of the transport system. In the period 1953-58, the Communist government, which replaced the landlords and private traders as the mobilizing agent and imposed strict controls on consumption, was able to transfer as much as 9-10 million tons of grain each year from surplus to deficit provinces (including the great urban areas of Shanghai, Peking and Tientsin)[9] and additionally managed to export (net) over 2 million tons a year to pay for imports of machinery and other industrial goods.

In recent years, however, the situation has changed, even though China's per capita grain output remains at the same level as in the 1950's or may even be marginally higher. While we do not know how much grain is now transported from surplus to deficit areas, it is clear China is no longer "self-reliant" in respect of grain. In recent years, the People's Republic has imported (gross) 6.5 million tons of grain per annum, accounting for 13-16 per cent of the total import bill, at an annual cost of over US$600 million. And even after grain exports (1.7 million tons a year) have been deducted, net imports have still reached almost 5 million tons, and the net cost has been around US$250 million per year. The policy of importing grain, begun in 1960 as an emergency measure, has thus become a chronic feature of China's economic life.[10]

WE RECALL that in the mid-1950's Ch'en Yün was determined that grain must not be allowed to compete with those imports upon which the industrialization of China depended. His argument against importing grain has, perhaps, even greater force today, for during the 1970's, in contrast to the 1950's, a meaningful increase in the rate of growth of agriculture can only be achieved by the injection into this sector of inputs produced by modern industry,[11] and to achieve this end will require significant imports for the corresponding industrial branches. Hence, future competition for scarce foreign currency between plants producing industrial products and those producing for agriculture is going to be very keen. Irrespective of whether China (a) emphasizes increasing rice production in south and central China (with the aim of stepping up rice exports to finance wheat and maize imports); (b) attempts to increase wheat output in the northern half of China (to permit the reduction or even the elimination of wheat imports); or (c) substitutes rice for wheat in northern China on the ground that the calorie yield of rice per hectare in China may be as much as two and a half times that of wheat [12]—the demand for tractors, earth-moving equipment, irrigation machinery, chemical fertilizers, oil,

[8] For an analysis of the economic surplus (broadly defined) *potentially* available to a Chinese government in the 1930's, see Carl Riskin's essay, "Surplus and Stagnation in Modern China" (Perkins, pp. 49-84). Somewhat surprisingly, Riskin gives scant attention to the grain surplus, but one can find much information on this in Perkins' earlier book, *Agricultural Development in China, 1368-1968*, Chicago, Aldine, 1969.

[9] This is the author's estimate.

[10] The import burden created by Chinese agriculture is even more severe than suggested by the figures for grain imports. As a result of intense pressure to raise grain production, no additional acreage can be made available for producing raw cotton. Although cotton production has increased by 50 percent since 1964 (mainly through increasing yields), raw cotton imports are still necessary and now cost US$360 million per annum. Thus, in 1973 and 1974, the value of grain and cotton imports was US$1,360 million, or 20 percent of total imports.

[11] See Erisman's essay cited above (fn. 6) and Dwight H. Perkins, "Constraints Influencing China's Agricultural Performance," also in the reviewed JEC volume (pp. 350-65).

[12] This estimate of calorie yields is based on data concerning total areas sown to wheat and rice in 1973, given to the author in Peking in 1974 by an official of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. These figures were applied to official production figures for rice and wheat to arrive at physical yield figures for the two grains. It is worth noting that, despite the improvement in economic statistics published by the PRC in recent years (a trend which has perhaps been exaggerated by some authors in the JEC report), there are still significant gaps in our knowledge, and one of the most important is the lack of data relating to land utilization and crop yields.

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and electric power will rise fast and, with it, the level of demand for related industrial imports.

Quite apart from the needs of agriculture, serious deficiencies in the overall structure of industry must also be remedied, again largely through the importation of capital equipment, as noted in several of the papers in the new JEC volume.[13] Some of these weaknesses themselves are the direct result of the sluggish growth of agricultural production in the 1960's, which forced the government to channel limited investment resources into those branches of industry which could assist agriculture in the shortest time. For example, coal and iron-ore mining and steel finishing were neglected, and the consequent shortages have had to be made up out of imports.[14] Those who are optimistic about China's ability to finance the needed imports expect an enormous rise in Chinese oil exports. However, as Bobby A. Williams makes clear in his essay in the JEC collection,[15] the very expansion of oil production will depend to a significant extent on China's willingness and ability to import equipment for oil exploration and extraction.

Recently, despite the lip service paid to the doctrine of "self-reliance," China has stepped up her imports of plant dramatically.[16] She has bought petroleum equipment worth US$127 million, plus thirteen large ammonium-urea fertilizer complexes and eleven man-made fiber plants, valued at around US$1,400 million.[17] The total value of plant imports for which contracts were signed in 1973-74 is roughly US$2,000 million. To this, one must add heavy imports of cotton and grain, which, as noted above, amounted to US$1,360 million in 1974 alone. Consequently, one can hardly doubt the desire of the Chinese government to reduce the burden of agricultural imports.

In time, of course, the imported fertilizer and fiber plants will reduce the need to import grain and cotton. The provision of more fertilizer alone, however, will not be enough to promote rapid agricultural growth. For this, the proper balance between water, high-yielding seeds, and fertilizer must be obtained. Both Perkins and Erisman suggest in their JEC contributions that the future supply of these complementary inputs may not be sufficient. They point, especially, to weaknesses in the basic research into plant breeding being carried out in China.

Moreover, even if *all* the necessary agricultural inputs are available in optimum amounts, there is still the sensitive problem of how to provide relevant financial incentives to encourage the peasants to make efficient use of them. China's collective agriculture has had a checkered history in regard to incentives, and although there has been considerable organizational stability since 1963,[18] there always lurks the temptation for the leaders to buy a few years' "breathing space" by trying to restore the "redistributionist" solution, with its inevitable squeeze on the consumption of the relatively rich peasants. It is by no means clear, however, at what point the peasants' limit of tolerance would be reached.[19] Any new pressure, including an extension of the collective sector or a more centralized form of organization, could have a disastrous effect on incentives at a time when the food-population balance is precarious.

What does all this bode for the future of the PRC's economy? In 1968 Mao is reported to have said: "When we have two things—grain and steel—we shall have no difficulty in carrying out any undertakings."[20] Today, China not only remains short of both, but in existing circumstances grain production is dependent on steel production and vice versa. To break out of this vicious circle will provide a severe test of the political and economic skills of the Chinese leaders during the coming years.

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[13] See especially Alfred H. Usack, Jr., and James D. Egan, "China's Iron and Steel Industry" (pp. 164-88), and Robert Michael Field, "Civilian Industrial Production in the People's Republic of China, 1949-74" (pp. 146-74).

[14] For example, the value of iron and steel imports per year in the period 1970-72 was in the range of US$400-500 million, and in 1973, it jumped to US$930 million. See Nai-Ruenn Chen, "China's Foreign Trade, 1950-74," in the JEC volume (pp. 617-72).

[15] "The Chinese Petroleum Industry: Growth and Prospects" (pp. 225-63).

[16] An excellent review of China's changing attitude toward foreign technology is provided in Hans Heymann's essay in the JEC compendium, "Acquisition and Diffusion of Technology in China" (pp. 678-729). A complementary essay is Robert F. Dernberger's "The Role of the Foreigner in China's Economic Development, 1840-1949" in the Perkins collection (pp. 19-47).

[17] Ashbrook points out that these imports will do nothing to increase China's machine-building and mining capacity (p. 31 of the JEC volume).

[18] See Frederick W. Crook's article, "The Commune System in the People's Republic of China, 1963-1974," in the JEC study (pp. 366-410).

[19] Some basis for judgment in this regard is provided in Ramon H. Myers' thoughtful contribution to the Perkins volume, "Cooperation in Traditional Agriculture and Its Implications for Team Farming in the People's Republic of China" (pp. 261-77).

[20] This statement has frequently been quoted by the Chinese, but for a particularly interesting article in which it appeared, see "Why Do We Say Agriculture Is the Foundation of National Economic Development?" *Liaoning Jih-pao* (Shenyang), Sept. 23, 1960.

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Mass Campaigns, Past and Present

By Thomas Fingar

RICHARD BAUM: *Prelude to Revolution: Mao, the Party, and the Peasant Question, 1962-66.* New York, Columbia University Press, 1975.
PARRIS H. CHANG: *Power and Policy in China.* University Park, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975.

MANY ELEMENTS of the current campaign to build Tachai-type counties throughout China are reminiscent of previous efforts to rectify and revitalize basic-level organs in the countryside, but we should resist the mood of *déja vu* and the temptation to regard the campaign as simply old wine in new bottles.[1] We have observed earlier campaigns from a distance, but China's peasants and rural cadres have experienced them directly; it would be a mistake to discount the differing effects of political and social learning or to assume that the rural population will respond to old slogans precisely as it did in the past. Although the components of the campaign are familiar, they have been fitted together in new ways and within a substantially altered political context. Are the differences significant? Perhaps not, but we should not assume so from the beginning.

The first step toward understanding the present is to know what has occurred in the past. What were the content and consequences of earlier campaigns which bear at least superficial similarities to the present movement to "learn from Tachai"? What kinds of policy debate or political maneuver preceded or became associated with earlier campaigns? How were the mix and ranking of campaign objectives determined, and why was the campaign style adopted rather than some other mode of political activity? These are difficult and important questions—and they have been addressed head on by two recently published studies. Professor Baum's *Prelude to Revolution* both chronicles and analyzes developments in the 1962-66 Socialist Education Movement (SEM). It is a well-written companion to his earlier monograph (written with Frederick Teiwes)[2] and provides a useful basis for placing elements of the current campaign in historical perspective. *Power and Policy in China,* by Parris Chang, is a revised version of his doctoral thesis, one of the most frequently cited dissertations on modern China.[3] Concerned less with what happened in the course of particular campaigns than with the political activity that preceded them, Professor Chang employs an interesting approach to policymaking which, with the caveats indicated below, is also useful for analyzing contemporary developments.

The campaign to transform one-third of China's counties into counterparts of the famous Tachai Production Brigade by the end of this decade evidences both objectives and procedures found in earlier campaigns. The dispatch of urban cadres to the rural areas, for example, recalls the *hsia-fang* ("to the countryside") campaigns of the 1950's and 1960's; the concerted effort to teach peasants the differences between socialism and capitalism in their daily activities reminds one of campaigns during the Yenan years and of the 1957 Socialist Education Movement; and the drive for agricultural mechanization seems at least superficially similar to the

[1] It may or may not be significant that the current campaign is said to be based, in part, on a speech by Teng Hsiao-p'ing to the September-October conference in Tachai. That speech has not been released, but parallels between the present campaign and the period of the Second Ten Points (to be discussed in detail later) may reflect Teng's dominant role in both. If so, systematic analysis of this campaign and comparison with that decribed by Baum may provide important clues to the issues and political maneuver that led to Teng's dismissal in April.

[2] Richard Baum and Frederick C. Teiwes, *Ssu-Ch'ing: The Socialist Education Movement of 1962-1966,* Berkeley, Calif., Center for Chinese Studies, 1968.

[3] Parris Chang, *Patterns and Processes of Policy-Making in Communist China 1955-62: Three Case Studies,* Columbia University PhD dissertation, 1969.

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one which followed the March 1958 Chengtu Conference. Viewed in its entirety, however, the present campaign — which was launched at a State Council-sponsored conference on the lessons of Tachai in September-October 1975—seems most similar to the second phase of the 1960's SEM. Baum's book is therefore of particular importance not only for an understanding of the mid-1960's but for the analysis of contemporary policies.

BAUM'S ANALYSIS divides the 1960's SEM into four carefully-delineated stages. The first phase lasted roughly from the spring through the autumn of 1963. This was the period of the so-called "First Ten Points," which envisioned revitalization of the Poor and Lower-Middle Peasant Associations (PLMPA) for the purpose of monitoring the activities of basic-level cadres and for educating the peasants through direct participation.

In September 1963 the First Ten Points, which purportedly had been drafted by Mao, were replaced by the "Second Ten Points," authored by Teng Hsiao-p'ing. This ushered in the second phase of the campaign, which lasted until the following September. Whereas the First Ten Points had predicated a strong monitoring role for the PLMPA, Teng's formulation assigned responsibility for supervision and rectification of cadres to party-led work teams from higher-level organs. The peasant associations were accorded only vaguely-stated rights and relegated to the task of cheering on efforts to raise production. At the *hsien* (county) level and above, party units were to conduct self-rectification. At the same time, the work teams dispatched to supervise rectification in basic-level units were instructed not to undermine the leadership role of local cadres. Guidelines specified that only a very small percentage of local cadres were to be found guilty of serious deviations and that the party cadres were to be examined in "closed door" meetings. Only nonparty cadres were to be rectified in "open door" sessions at which the masses could participate as individuals (rather than through the PLMPA).

Persuaded that the methods of the second phase were inadequate to cope with the problems of cadre corruption, Liu Shao-ch'i issued a new set of guidelines in September 1964. Known as the "Revised Second Ten Points," these guidelines broke sharply with the earlier practice of self-rectification and generally lenient treatment of errant officials. Outside work teams were empowered to mete out immediate and harsh criticism wherever they deemed it warranted and without regard to the kind of "quotas" that had previously been in effect.

This phase ended in January 1965 with promulgation of the so-called "Twenty-three Points." In the new (fourth) stage, work-team excesses were condemned, and the focus of criticism was shifted from local cadres to high-level officials. Baum does an excellent job of delineating the differences between all of these stages.

It is perhaps too early to make firm judgments about the objectives and style of the current campaign, but there seem to be a number of parallels to the period of the Second Ten Points (as described by Baum). For example, even though rectification of *hsien* party committees is assigned high priority, it appears that the initiative and responsibility for carrying out rectification are being left primarily to the members of those committees themselves. Work teams from higher levels assigned to assist in the rectification effort at the *hsien* level and below appear to have only a vaguely-defined mandate to intervene if the locals do not do a proper job of self-cleansing. In any event, the repeated assertion that 95 percent of the cadres are good, and that most of those who have erred can be reformed, seems to presage the kind of "light breeze and gentle rain" rectification of 1963-64.

A second parallel between the present campaign and the Second Ten Points period concerns the role of the masses and, more specifically, the PLMPA. In 1963-64, the rights and duties assigned to the peasant associations were vague and imprecise. In the current campaign the associations have been given no formal role at all; they are not even mentioned in the hundreds of documents which have been published since the September-October conference. What kind of monitoring role, if any, should be assigned the masses has been a matter of dispute since the Hundred Flowers Campaign of 1957, and it would appear that those favoring supervision of, rather than by, the masses have carried the day in the latest round of debate.

Although there are similarities, there are also important differences between the current Tachai campaign and the period of the Second Ten Points. In the generally tolerant atmosphere of 1963-64, little effort was made to educate the peasants about the virtues and requirements of socialism. Private sideline activities were encouraged, and appeals were made to the peasants' self-interest in order to raise produc-

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tion. Traces of this attitude can be found in the current campaign, but the predominant theme seems to be that placing collective, let alone individual, interests ahead of the interests of the nation as a whole is a manifestation of bourgeois thinking. Past emphasis on self-reliance and local initiative appears to have been interpreted by some local cadres as providing the rationale for circumventing production plans worked out by higher authorities. Press comments indicate that some cadres have reduced grain or cotton acreage in order to grow more profitable crops, and that others have "neglected" agriculture by channeling manpower and other resources into commercial or industrial activities. These cadres seem to have reasoned that departures from the plan are justified if they raise the income and living standard of the local production teams, brigades, or communes (the successive levels of local collective organization). Departures may accord with the wishes of the masses, at least within the production unit, but they impede the attainment of national targets. The task of educating the peasants—and perhaps some cadres—about the need to follow the proletarian path (*i.e.,* to subjugate individual *and* collective interests to those of the nation as a whole) has been assigned to the militia. This in itself is an important new departure.

THESE EXAMPLES merely illustrate the kinds of comparisons which can and should be made to determine if and how current policies relate to those of previous campaigns. Studies such as Professor Baum's are especially valuable because of the light they can shed, at least indirectly, on contemporary developments. *Prelude to Revolution* does not, however, examine the means through which particular policies are adopted. This problem is addressed by Professor Chang, but his *Power and Policy in China* reveals the limits of his approach even as it alerts us to a new set of questions about campaigns or any policies adopted by the leaders in Peking.

Whereas Professor Baum's study almost totally avoids the questions of whether—and how—Chinese leaders sought support for particular policies, *Power and Policy in China* faces them directly and concludes, *inter alia,* that policymaking in the PRC involves a complicated process of conflict and consensus-building similar to political processes elsewhere (p. 2). This and the book's other conclusions are said to be based on an analysis of five issue-areas—the Twelve-Year Agricultural Program, administrative decentralization, the commune movement, the Socialist Education Movement, and ideological rectification—but the latter two receive such perfunctory treatment (only 22 pages) that it is difficult to determine whether they support the hypotheses or not. I use the term "hypotheses" deliberately because, even though I am sympathetic to most of Chang's conclusions, I do not feel that he has sustained them or that he has adequately considered alternative or supplementary explanations.

My discomfort with the Chang analysis (and *mutatis mutandis* with that of Baum) stems from the way in which the issue-areas are compartmentalized. No issue exists in isolation, but Professor Chang fails to indicate that Chinese policymakers always confronted a number of problems simultaneously and that many other issues became linked to those few which he examines in detail. If studies of governmental policymaking in other countries tell us anything, it is that issues compete for attention, are of different salience to different participants, and frequently become linked either through conscious manipulation designed to build a consensus or winning coalition, or simply because they are active at the same time. Were other issues drawn into policy debates in order to recruit support for programs of particular importance to key participants (including but not limited to Mao), or, conversely, were new participants added because the mix of issues expanded in a certain manner? What kind of bargains were struck between participants, and what impact, if any, did they have on subsequent rounds of policymaking? Unfortunately, *Power and Policy in China* focuses almost exclusively on expansion and contraction of the pool of participants through changes in the "locus of decision" and/or Mao's success in adding provincial-level supporters to the decision-making circle. By neglecting issue linkages and alternative forms of political maneuver, Chang presents a picture of Chinese politics which is considerably less dynamic or exciting than we might anticipate from the kinds of questions posed in his introduction. Perhaps issue linkages and the simultaneous (and often partially contradictory) efforts to recruit coalition partners across a wide range of matters were not terribly important in the PRC. Perhaps it is true, as Professor Chang concludes, that policy shifts resulted from slight alterations in the balance between "conservative/pragmatic" and "radical" orientations

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to economic development; but this is something that should be determined empirically and not by oversight.

Given both the similarities and differences between the current Tachai campaign and others which have waxed and waned in China, what tentative judgments can be advanced about the politics underlying present policies, and what predictions can be made about future developments in the current campaign? Since the present campaign contains elements of programs previously advocated by "radicals," as well as components of "conservative" approaches to rural problems, we might speculate that current policies signify either consensus or stalemate between the two groupings described by Chang. It could also indicate, however, that the categories are not now (and perhaps never were) as sharply differentiated as he suggests. Regarding the future, it would be rash to assume that developments will closely parallel those of the 1960's as Baum describes them, but we should carefully consider if and why they might or might not. The precise nature of future developments and their impact on the politics of policymaking will, I suspect, depend more on the particular problems or successes associated with current policies than on any inherent tendency for PRC policy to oscillate between "radical" and "conservative" poles.

Mao, the Teacher Society, the School

By David M. Raddock

JOHN N. HAWKINS: *Mao Tse-tung and Education: His Thoughts and Teachings*. Hamden, Conn., The Shoe String Press, 1974.
THEODORE HSI-EN CHEN: *The Maoist Educational Revolution*. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1974.

AS A FORMER revolutionary guerrilla leader who has remained at the helm of state for more than two decades since the triumph of the revolution that he headed, Mao Tse-tung has suffered from a confusion of roles, and this has in recent years led him to take concrete steps to try to prevent modernization from causing China to veer away from revolutionary goals. An important area of his efforts has been the ongoing experimentation since the beginning of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) with the use of education as an agency for radical social change. The two books under review afford a basis to form some judgments about Mao's vision of social change and the practical attempts to implement this vision during the last several years.

As a preface to discussion of this theme, let us briefly survey the contents of the books. Drawing on the corpus of Mao's available works,[1] John Hawkins has traced a continuum of Mao's pedagogical thinking and statements on education throughout his life—from his student days and his early formation of a self-study university in his native Hunan Province in 1921, through the Kiangsi Soviet and Yenan periods, and then through the post-revolutionary epoch, culminating in the Cultural Revolution and its attendant revamping of the educational system. Hawkins contends that, in an almost unilinear fashion, Mao has been developing a mix of control and decentralization and of theoretical and practical work in education in order to arrive at an equation for the new socialist person—that individual who can combine spontaneity and initiative with conformity to the collective inter-

[1] Including the Japanese collection, *Mo Taku-to Shu* (Mao Tse-tung's Collected Works), Tokyo, Hokubo-sha, 1971; Jerome Chen, *Mao's Papers*, London, Oxford University Press, 1970; and other miscellaneous translations.

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est and who can unite political "redness" with technical expertise. In tracing the development of Mao's thought, particularly since the 1940's in Yenan, the author seems to place more emphasis on the opportunities that Mao seized upon in order to implement his ideals rather than on the objective circumstances that may have generated new ideas and reshaped old ones. While Mao may now perceive himself as "the teacher"—as he indicated in a 1970 interview with Edgar Snow[2]—an assessment of his capacity to continue to be a "schoolboy"—as he described himself in 1966[3]—would have been highly desirable.

Theodore Chen's *The Maoist Educational Revolution* focuses, in remarkable detail, on the concrete changes in educational institutions and procedures which have been implemented in the wake of the GPCR; it also furnishes the reader with a very useful appendix containing translations of relevant articles and directives in the Chinese press. The first chapter depicts the conventional modern school system that prevailed in China after 1949 and underscores the elitism that it bred, leading to disparagement of coexisting work-study and spare-time schools. (Strangely, however, Chen's lament in his final chapter over the disappearance of a sector of the educational system devoted to higher-quality education designed to produce broadly-trained leaders seems to overlook the problem of elitism in connection with higher learning in China.) The bulk of the book comprehensively describes the new work-study orientation of the entire school system at all levels and the pervasiveness of political controls on youths, teachers, intellectuals, and cadres.

In essence, then, the two books are complementary. One provides an overview of Mao's educational purpose, and the other describes and analyzes current efforts to transform that purpose into reality.

THIS BRINGS us to the question of whether or not it is actually possible for China to produce Mao's brand of "revolutionary successors." Both authors seem to agree that the current innovations have had positive results with respect to the popularizing of education and the training of middle-level technicians, but only Hawkins appears to have unwavering faith in the realization of Mao's vision of the new socialist personality. Nevertheless, it may be swinging to the opposite extreme to argue that the continued inculcation of political values holds no prospect of success. Problems such as individual psychological defenses against group study at school and the large number of "drop-out" youths during the early phase of the Cultural Revolution in the schools might not, in the end, prove insoluble. To get a better feel for what the true outlook may be, we need to have a firm understanding of the difficulties with which the Maoists are trying to grapple.

Although some Western scholars thought that they observed a uniformity of socialization between home and school in China by the early 1960's,[4] the Cultural Revolution exposed the contradictions between the two. In effect, the family often constituted an officially undesired negative focus of indentification alternative to identification with the peer group (and its accompanying ideology).

Several factors entered into the explanation for this situation. To begin with, there was a conspicuous lack of personal coordination between socializing agents in the home and at school in the cities during the period before the GPCR—indeed, parents seldom set foot on the campuses of "regular" middle schools and universities. Second, on the eve of the GPCR, in the spring of 1966, an estimated two-thirds of the student bodies in "regular" middle schools in large cities like Canton were from families of nonproletarian class background,[5] and a substantial portion of this group had probably been exposed to "politically backward" ideas in the home and had developed similar viewpoints. Third, the intensification of the schools' efforts to politicize students and to impose sanctions for resistance through in-group ostracism prior to the Cultural Revolution tended to force many youths into primary identification with their families. Parents and elder siblings who had suffered from attack in previous political campaigns because of questionable class background often urged youngsters to be cautious about political involvement. Youths who might have liked to "draw a clear line" between themselves and their families were frequently reluctant to do so because they could not be sure that they would be allowed to find alternate outlets through affiliation with the class-conscious Youth League at school. A number of youngsters

[2] *Life* (New York), April 30, 1971, p. 46.
[3] "His Wish", in Chen, *op. cit.*, p. 115.
[4] Lucy Jen Huang and Alan G. Hickrod, "Communist Chinese and American Adolescent Sub-Cultures," *China Quarterly* (London), April-June 1965.
[5] Based on reports of respondents this reviewer interviewed in Hong Kong in 1971-72 and corroborated in a lecture by Professor R. Sinha at Columbia University, East Asian Institute, Spring 1973.

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could not find the psychological strength to make a total break with their families and hence, confronted with a conflict of loyalties, chose their families. Finally, children of the urban proletariat sometimes looked upon their families as protectors of their right to pursue values not totally in keeping with those of the regime. One such youth now in Hong Kong told the present author that he had attended a university in quest of the formal education that his father did not have (in Chinese literature, no less!) and had managed to avoid political participation by hiding behind the "redness" of his class background; however, when his worker father had appeared on campus after the GPCR as the new type of auxiliary, proletarian teacher, he himself had disgustedly withdrawn from school.

To the extent that the home and the school socialized youth in the same way, the result was often not a positive one from the regime's perspective. Both encouraged youths to pursue upward mobility and thereby to eschew the humility necessary not just to act *for* the masses, but to serve them in the literal sense and to identify with them emotionally. Many students found themselves aspiring either to intellectual or political position in order to be a "credit" to their families in the traditional Chinese manner.

NOW, the Chinese leadership is trying to meet the challenge of this general state of affairs by proletarianizing the whole educational system and "making all society into a school." One technique it has used has been the widespread establishment of *min-pan* (people-run or neighborhood) schools, which are patterned after the ideal decentralized educational model employed in the prewar revolutionary base area of Yenan (*not,* it should be noted, after the schools of the same name which were set up after 1949 and which subsequently fell into disrepute[6]). This approach to primary and secondary education is intended to make the learning process the cooperative responsibility of school, place of work, and neighborhood. All schools are tied into factory or rural commune work. Teachers, parents, and representatives of revolutionary committees, youth organizations, worker-peasant-soldier propaganda teams (who actually share in the teaching responsibilities at schools and universities), and party convene to plan a coordinated program of extracurricular activities for the student. The student has a program of labor and political study mapped out for him even during vacations. Teachers bring students' problems to the attention of their parents and attempt to work out solutions. Thus, in these schools a major attempt has been made to eradicate the basis of the elitism of the past. According to one person whom this author interviewed in Hong Kong, ending up in a *min-pan* upper middle school after previously having attended "regular" schools was like "falling from heaven to earth."

The informal political education process extends to all areas of society. When educated youths in the countryside receive leave to return home for a holiday, welcome committees greet their arrival and hold symposia for parents and others to discuss the positive lessons of working in the countryside. And before peasants going to university in the cities leave their homes, they are given farewell rallies, the main point of which is to remind them of their origins. These experiments may be abhorrent to "bourgeois intellectuals," but they represent a unique plan for coordinating educational efforts in a single direction.

At the same time, there remains the question of whether human beings can be remolded so that the continued development of the self is not at cross-purposes with submissiveness and responsiveness to the masses. While the GPCR and the subsequent transfer of youths to the countryside for a lifetime of labor may be viewed as two aspects of a movement designed to combine individual spontaneity with submission to the authority of the people, some young people who left China after the GPCR could not resolve the contradiction between self-assertion and submissiveness: "If I could not fulfill myself in society, society was misdirected." If similar difficulties in psychological adjustment exist among youths to a greater or lesser extent in China today, new totalistic schemes of socialization like those described above may provide a corrective. As long as there is no perceived discontinuity between socializing agents and the grass roots of society, it is conceivable that self-improvement through formal education could produce a new socialist person who derives his social rewards from family, workers, peasants, and soldiers for his dedicated *service* rather than as a consequence of his *position*.

Still, one wonders whether the

[6] After the Communist takeover of the Chinese mainland in 1949, a dual-track system of schools was established. This consisted of (1) "regular" six-year middle schools (lower and upper), admission to which was based on competitive examinations, and (2) various types of neighborhood, vocational, and spare-time schools. Qualifying for the former became a matter of prestige.

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dissociation of education from the desire for status in China is sufficient to forestall a general quest for position and a subjective feeling of superiority such as many youths now in Hong Kong recall so fondly from participating in the GPCR. While the majority of young people throughout China qualify for the "Little Red Soldiers" (the present-day counterpart of the Young Pioneers), fewer are admitted to the older-aged Youth League, and still fewer to the party. As long as such a hierarchy continues to exist, there is always the possibility that those on the *inside*, who have the power to decide in large measure which persons will be admitted, may abuse their power and positions. The mere existence of a hierarchical structure, in short, can foster self-serving ambition.

The PLA: Peacetime Model and War Machine

By Harvey Nelsen

GERARD H. CORR: *The Chinese Red Army*. New York, Schocken Books, 1974.
YING-MAO KAU: *The People's Liberation Army and China's Nation-Building*. White Plains, NY, International Arts and Sciences Press, 1973.
ANGUS M. FRASER: *The People's Liberation Army*. New York, Crane, Russak and Co., 1973.

WITH THE termination of hostilities in Southeast Asia, the American approach to the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has shifted away from threat assessments and toward analyses of the military's domestic peacetime functions. The massive political use of the PLA during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the later power struggle between the former Defense Minister, Lin Piao, and Mao Tse-tung prompted a number of books and articles on party-army relations, internal PLA history, and the prospective role of the military in the post-Mao period. A subsidiary topic, recently receiving increased attention, is the socioeconomic function of the PLA. Numerous foreign visitors to the showcase 196th Division have come away deeply impressed with its ongoing agricultural and industrial undertakings. Civil-military relations seem unusually close and harmonious at the grass-roots level, and young people are so eager to get into the PLA that the conscription system is in the enviable position of selecting only the most highly qualified and motivated candidates to fill the ranks of the world's second-largest military establishment.

Peking has gone to considerable lengths to convince the outside world and its own populace that the PLA approaches the ideal of the civic-action army. This review will try to distinguish some of the images from the realities. The perspective that must not be lost, despite the changed emphasis in Western scholarship, is that the PLA remains first and foremost a fighting force. Two authors of the works discussed here remind us of this fact, and one of them raises interesting questions concerning the rates of modernization and improvement of capabilities of the Chinese military machine. These questions will be explored after a short introduction to the books under review.

GERARD CORR is a British journalist who worked for some years in the Far East. He correctly surmised that a book was needed which would introduce the general reader to the PLA. He has succeeded in writing such a volume, and therein lie the strengths and weaknesses of the book. It is doubtless the most readable work yet written on the PLA. Its scope is extremely broad, including discussions of origins and development, PLA campaigns since 1949, internal political roles, and capabilities in the 1970's. The author also provides praiseworthy treat-

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ment of the prolonged civil war in Tibet, the Korean War, and the border conflict with India.

At the same time, students of the PLA and scholars in general will find *The Chinese Red Army* a frustrating reading experience. The book contains a number of errors and distortions, most of them caused by overgeneralizations inherent in a work of such large scope and so few pages (150 pp. of text). There are no footnotes and only a brief bibliography. But the greatest difficulty in using the book for any scholarly purpose is that Mr. Corr provides no means for the reader to distinguish among the author's speculations, judgments based on limited evidence, and historical fact. Qualifications interfere with a smooth style; apparently for that reason, they are not used. On every topic, regardless of the availability of evidence, Mr. Corr makes flat assertions. Therefore, the book must be considered on the terms intended by the author—as an introduction to the Chinese military for the general reader. Despite its errors, it fills that role quite well, especially since the author has no ideological axe to grind and thus presents a balanced treatment which indulges in neither puffery nor disparagement of the PLA.

YING-MAO KAU'S book also has a considerable historical sweep, but it is less demanding of its author —first, because it focuses strictly on peacetime domestic functions of the military, and second, because it is a selection of documents requiring only an introduction and logical organization of the materials. The 50-page introduction is replete with lucidly presented, thought-provoking analysis. Professor Kau attempts the difficult task of defining the Maoist military model, describing the challenges to it since 1949, and speculating on the likelihood of its survival after its creator departs the scene. The author draws freely from the concepts of military-civilian interrelationships developed by the American scholars Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, contrasting them with the Maoist model.[1]

Summarizing Professor Kau's presentation requires oversimplification, but essentially he argues that the Maoist concept is unique in its use of the military for political mobilization and training, economic construction, and social change. The PLA has been used as a "great school," to quote Mao's term. It is the largest single source of Communist Party members. Veterans are an elite who usually receive responsible jobs, a fact that makes the military one of the most attractive ladders to success in China. The PLA does a great deal of political work within the society, disseminating information and generally helping to mobilize the population for the aims of the state. Professor Kau also maintains that the PLA plays a significant role in building the national economy (a point which is discussed further below).

In Kau's view, the greatest potential challenge to Mao's concept of the PLA's role is posed by military professionalism, which nurtures the view that soldiers must concentrate on soldiering if the PLA is to be an effective fighting force and if the military is to master modern arms and techniques. Kau concludes that the Maoist approach may be scrapped in coming years, when it is deemed ineffective and no longer needed; he adds, however, that as long as China relies on mass mobilization in its nation-building efforts, the Maoist military model will still have relevance.

A shortcoming of Kau's study is the fact that the documents he has selected for publication often do not sufficiently speak for themselves. The author might have considered writing introductions for each of his organizational categories, since out of context the selections lose some of their meaning and could even mislead those attempting to understand the contemporary PLA. Also, in one case Professor Kau put too much faith in materials supplied by the Chinese Nationalist government. His Document 27—allegedly a central directive concerning the role in the Cultural Revolution of "central-support-the-left" PLA units—is probably a forgery.[2] The Nationalist government, in its eagerness to discover and circulate materials which reflect unfavorably on the People's Republic, still occasionally purchases and publishes documents of dubious authenticity which other governments have wisely passed over. These pose a danger for scholars who are ill-

[1] The seminal works of these two authors are: Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relationships*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1957; and Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations*, Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1964.

[2] After the document was published in the Nationalist periodical, *Fei-ching Yen-chiu* (Taipei), the US Central Intelligence Agency traced its source to a known forger in Hong Kong. There is also some internal evidence which points to a forgery: the document—dated June 1968—implies that the "central-support-the-left" units were something new as of that date, but such units were first used no later than the summer of 1967. This spurious directive was to have been excluded from all US government-produced materials, but was accidentally included in *Translations on Communist China*, produced by the Joint Publications Research Service of the US Department of Commerce, Washington, DC.

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equipped to identify a skillful fake and have no way of determining a document's true origins.

ANGUS M. FRASER'S *The People's Liberation Army* is the least ambitious of the three books but perhaps the most successful in attaining the author's objectives. Colonel Fraser, a research analyst since his retirement from the US Marine Corps in 1964, seeks to analyze China's military capabilities—the extent to which the PLA menaces other countries, and vice versa. He does this quite well within the confines of a monograph-length volume. But there is one problem—the fact that information on capabilities is relatively perishable. Thus, even since the 1973 copyright date, certain changes have taken place, and some new information has become available.

What is the current status of PLA capabilities? Using five questions posed, and some of the information provided, by Colonel Fraser, the reviewer would like to suggest some up-to-date answers.[3]

(1) First, what has been done to improve the firepower of the ground forces? China now has about the same number of tanks as does the United States (10,000) but only one-fourth of the Soviet Union's inventory. It has considerably more artillery than the US, including longer-range weapons, but due to the huge size of the ground forces (over three million), it is still short of artillery on a per-unit basis. Conclusion: the PLA is relatively better off now than in the past, but there is still a considerable gap between its firepower and that of more modern armies.

(2) What scale of improvement has been sought in tactical and logistical mobility? The PLA is tactically foot-mobile and, within China, strategically rail-mobile. Except for some armored personnel carriers and expanded truck production, nothing has been done to mechanize the Chinese infantry. Size substitutes for tactical mobility. However, the logistical system is much stronger and less vulnerable to attack than in the past, due to a 600-percent increase in roads, a 200-percent increase in rail lines, and a great expansion and dispersion of industry since 1949. Also, tactical communications equipment is greatly improved.

(3) Have any measures been developed to extend attack capabilities, thus rendering vulnerable the rear areas and lines of communications of the enemy? China still relies on the "people's war" concept of drawing the enemy deep into hostile territory, thus allowing guerrillas to harass rear areas, rather than developing heliborne or other special forces for this purpose. However, the PLA is in the process of developing a tactical missile system. Such weapons are invaluable under nuclear combat conditions but virtually useless in conventional warfare.

(4) What about the air force? Has anything been done to strengthen air support and defense? Relative to advances in other nations, very little. Herein lies the PLA's greatest technological failure. It has so far been unable to design and build an advanced fighter-interceptor aircraft. The Chinese copy of the obsolescent MIG-21 is a failure, and production has been halted. The indigenously designed "Sino-A" interceptor has been in testing stages for over six years; production has yet to begin. China's new F-9 fighter-bomber is a decade behind similar US, European, and Soviet aircraft. Peking may be forced to purchase fighters and advanced jet engines on the international market. China's surface-to-air missiles are also obsolescent, but its conventional anti-aircraft artillery proved effective against US aircraft in North Vietnam.

(5) Finally, what about naval strength? The Chinese navy is primarily a coastal defense force, and not a very good one at that. Its 50 to 60 submarines are old-design diesels which are easily detected, and its guided-missile patrol-boat fleet, while large, uses old missiles which are very vulnerable to electronic countermeasures.

In sum, the PLA is in a strong position to defend its homeland against land invasion, but China remains vulnerable from the air and sea and cannot project its power abroad over discontinuous lines of communications.

APART FROM capabilities, there are four persistent questions about the PLA which these books implicitly or explicitly raise.

First, is the military under tight civilian control? As of early 1976, yes, but none of these authors indicates the extent to which the PLA was politically out of hand in the 1967-71 period. In the sequential developments of the Cultural Revolution, the Communist Party apparatus was first weakened by attacks from mass organizations, the latter were in turn wracked by increasingly severe factional struggles, and Mao Tse-tung was finally forced to rely heavily on the armed

[3] The following information on military capabilities is from the reviewer's forthcoming study, *The Chinese Military System*, in addition to Colonel Fraser's book.

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forces in order to protect the economy and carry out political reconstruction. The upshot was that Mao exchanged one unresponsive bureaucracy (the party) for another—the PLA. That situation was a major cause of Mao's power struggle with the late Defense Minister, Lin Piao. The "Great Helmsman" was forced to travel to various military region commands eliciting support against his rival. Following Lin's death in 1971, most of the top military positions remained vacant for three years, and when a Chief of Staff and General Political Department Director were finally named last year, Peking felt compelled to appoint civilians.

Second, is the PLA unique or even special with respect to its contribution to the economy? In the reviewer's opinion, no—at least not in the sense argued by Ying-mao Kau. Professor Kau uses documents from the Great Leap Forward of 1958-60 to show massive commitments of PLA manpower to civilian projects. He ignores the well-established fact that such usage of the PLA declined drastically under Lin Piao's leadership and shows no sign of an upswing in the 1970's. It can be shown, moreover, that armies in many emerging nations contribute at least as much to the civilian economic sector as does the PLA. Of couse, bridges built by the Engineering Corps and track laid by the Railway Corps for military purposes benefit the civil sector, but there is nothing exceptional about these contributions. In short, the notion that the PLA is a significant force in the civilian economy is a myth, carefully nurtured by Peking as part of its effort to maintain close civil-military relations.

It is true that the paramilitary "production-construction corps" have made significant contributions in land reclamation and public works, especially in frontier areas. However, these corps are not part of the regular army, and there is now some doubt whether they remain under military control.

It is also true that the PLA *is* unique in its degree of economic self-sufficiency. No other army grows so much of its own food, and few others produce as many industrial items. This greatly reduces the national cost of maintaining the world's largest standing ground force and is more efficient than sending soldiers back and forth between military bases and civilian communes to labor in the fields. But only in this auxiliary sense can the PLA's self-sufficiency be counted as a contribution to the economy.

Third, is the PLA special in terms of its sociopolitical role? Probably, but is the PLA more active in this regard than, for instance, the Cuban army? Until a book is written which compares the military's role in socialist societies with that in emerging nations generally, it is difficult to say. As Professor Kau amply documents, the PLA is an extremely important institution in terms of Communist Party recruitment and ideological training. Veterans are relied upon to help effect social change and generate enthusiasm for state goals. However, there is room for doubt regarding the extent to which the PLA assists in disseminating propaganda and mobilizing the civilian population. Peking paints an image of continuous liaison at the grass-roots level. However, it seems that this has been the case only when the PLA has been overcommitted to functions of political control, such as in the 1949-53 period of martial law and during the Cultural Revolution, when the party apparatus was under attack.

Finally, does China intend to use the PLA for expansionist purposes? No—at least not beyond the area encompassing long-established Chinese territorial claims. Gerard Corr argues convincingly that the PLA has been used to date only to protect and consolidate China's borders. Angus Fraser demonstrates conclusively that the force structure is defensive. However, he adds an important caveat. Some US historians have argued that the agrarian nature of Chinese society makes it a peaceful, stay-at-home nation. Fraser rejects that argument as false and irrelevant. In a tough-minded analysis, he attributes the fact that China presents very little threat to its neighbors to political, economic, and military constraints—both domestic and foreign. This relegates any dreams of hegemony to the indefinite future (but by implication does not rule them out).

In summing up the military's peacetime role and wartime potential, it is fair to say that the PLA's high morale and prestige at home are due more to the elite status accorded its troops and veterans than to the direct assistance it gives to the civilian economy. At the same time, the military's efforts at self-sufficiency render the PLA a remarkably inexpensive army in terms of national cost per soldier. There is no reason to doubt the dedication and fine fighting ability of the infantry. Yet, despite steady advances, the PLA has not closed the technological gap between itself and other modern armed forces. Happily for China, its growing nuclear capabilities should overcome the temptation for present and future rivals to take advantage of its relatively weak air and naval forces.

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The Yenan Years

By Michael Lindsay

P. P. VLADIMIROV: *China's Special Area, 1942-1945,* Bombay, Allied Publishers, 1974.
PETER VLADIMIROV: *The Vladimirov Diaries, Yenan, China, 1942-1945.* New York, Doubleday & Co., 1975.
JOSEPH W. ESHERICK: *Lost Chance in China. The World War II Dispatches of John S. Service.* New York, Random House, 1974.
KENNETH E. SHEWMAKER: *Americans and Chinese Communists, 1927-1945. A Persuading Encounter.* Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1971.

ONE RESULT of the post-1972 transfiguration of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China has been to redirect public attention to the whole subject of the American experience in China during World War II—and, more particularly, the highly controversial question of whether the United States did not then miss a favorable opportunity to reach an understanding with the Chinese Communists that might have greatly altered the postwar evolution of international politics in East Asia. The books reviewed here all have to do with these matters, directly or indirectly, but they are by no means all authoritative or enlightening

Easily the least enlightening and authoritative are the purported "diaries" of P.P. Vladimirov, who served as liaison officer for the Comintern and military correspondent for the Soviet news agency TASS at the Chinese Communists' Northwest China headquarters at Yenan from May 1942 to November 1945. The circumstances surrounding the publication of the "diaries" were curious, to say the least. Vladimirov evidently died in 1953, and the manuscript reportedly was later "discovered" by his son, who turned it over to the Soviet feature service Novosti, which published a Russian version in 1973. The first English-language version, as indicated in the list of books under review, appeared in India in 1974 under the title, *China's Special Area, 1942-1945,* and a second English version was published in the United States by Doubleday & Company in December 1975 (under the title, *The Vladimirov Diaries, Yenan, China: 1942-1945*) amidst a furor of controversy over its authenticity.[1] The latter version includes passages totaling five or six pages that were not in the former and omits a smaller amount of material that was; otherwise, the two versions are the same, except for some changes in spellings.

The furor caused by Doubleday's publication of the "diaries" was well justified, for they can hardly be taken at face value. While they contain some details that almost certainly came from Vladimirov's actual experiences in Yenan, they also contain a much larger number of passages which could not have been written by an honest and well-informed observer in Mr. Vladimirov's position. Either large parts of the book were written after the Sino-Soviet split by someone who wanted to denigrate the Chinese Communists and the Americans, and who knew very little about North China in the 1940's; or else Mr. Vladimirov was so isolated at Yenan that he got very little information and wrote his diary largely from imagination. The two explanations are not mutually exclusive; both may be true.

To begin with, the book reveals a curious ignorance about the military situation. In 1942-43, the Japanese were gradually gaining ground in North China through their fort-and-blockade-line strategy and a succession of "mopping-up" campaigns against the Communist base areas. However, as the Japanese began shifting their first-line troops from North China to other, more critical war fronts, the Communists started to recover

[1] See Bernard Gwertzman, "A Soviet 'Diary' Critical of Mao," *The New York Times,* Dec. 17, 1975, and "Fake Books as International Weapons," *ibid.,* Jan. 11, 1976. According to these reports, Doubleday consulted John S. Service before publishing the book but went ahead with its publication despite a critique submitted by Service strongly questioning the authenticity of the diaries.

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territory at an accelerating rate in 1944-45. While the book has many entries about the war in Europe and about the Japanese campaigns against the Kuomintang forces, it strangely says nothing about these developments in the Communist areas. Instead, without offering any supporting evidence, it dismisses Communist claims of success as fiction and criticizes the Communists for lack of activity against the Japanese.

The *Diaries* also reveal a remarkable ignorance of even such a simple and noncontroversial subject as the organization of the Communist areas. One of the earlier parts shows confusion about the distinction between the Communists' "Special Area" (*i.e.*, the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region) and the other regions where Communist forces operated. Only in January 1944 does the diary record information received from K'ang Sheng, then a Communist security official, about the military and governmental regions in North China, and not until November 1944 is there an entry giving a complete list of the areas where Communist forces were active, taken from a book published in Yenan. Even these later entries show some confusion: *e.g.*, Hopei-Jehol-Liaoning was not a separate region but an extension of Shansi-Chahar-Hopei. If Vladimirov had ever had a briefing from someone in the Communist 18th Group Army Command, he would have understood the basic organization of the Communist regions (and even some study of the Communist newspaper published in Yenan would have told him a great deal).

AS A military correspondent for TASS, Vladimirov should also have learned that the ability of the Communist forces to stage any large-scale operations was severely restricted by a lack of heavy weapons and an extreme shortage of ammunition except for locally-produced hand grenades and land mines. Members of the US Army Observer Group stationed in Yenan reported that even limited supplies would enable the Communists to expand their operations against the Japanese greatly. Yet, Vladimirov's diary entry of May 5, 1945, says, "It was not at all because of the lack of arms or the superiority of the Japanese that Mao Tse-tung switched the Army over to passive defense." The American military observers traveled widely over the front-line regions, often crossing Japanese-held railways, whereas Vladimirov's diary records only two brief visits to Shansi-Suiyuan, one by himself and another by a Soviet colleague.

Even the diary report of Vladimirov's visit to Ho Lung's Shansi-Suiyuan operational area in September-October 1942 seems largely fictional. There are grotesque errors such as references to buffalo (limited to South China) as the main farm animal and to Kirghiz and Uighur racial minorities (found only in Sinkiang). The diaries' general picture of poor morale in the Communist armed forces, of widespread banditry, etc., is completely at variance with the accounts of other foreign observers (which are summarized in Professor Shewmaker's book). The diary refers to talk of a blockade of the Communists' Special Area as "a propaganda hoax started by K'ang Sheng," claiming that it was easy to cross "both the front line and the border of the Special Area." However, there is nothing to indicate that Vladimirov ever

A 1944 picture showing welcomers waiting on the airfield at Yenan to greet the arrival of the second contingent of the US Observer Mission. Some of those appearing in the picture are: (1) Colonel David D. Barrett, first commanding officer of the group (only partially visible); (2) Mrs. Michael Lindsay, wife of the reviewer; (7) Chou En-lai; and (8) P. P. Vladimirov, TASS correspondent in Yenan and author of the "diaries" reviewed here.

—Photo of David D. Barrett, published in his book, *Dixie Mission: The United States Army Observer Group in Yenan, 1944*, China Research Monograph No. 6, Berkeley, Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, 1970.

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actually crossed the front line into Japanese-held territory—and certainly no one could expect a blockade between two Communist base areas separated only by the Yellow River. Besides, it was common knowledge in Yenan that the blockade from the Kuomintang areas caused real economic difficulties by cutting off the Shansi-Kansu-Ningsia region from its normal supplies of cotton and other commodities.

The diaries contain many comments on the US Army Observer Group, but with curious omissions and errors. The successive commanding officers (or acting commanders) of the Observer Group up to Lt. Col. Wilbur J. Peterkin are correctly reported, but there is no mention of a later commander, Col. Ivan D. Yeaton, who should have been of special interest to Vladimirov not only because he had previously served in Moscow but also because he made a real effort to improve the Group's relations with the Communists.

An entry dated March 22, 1945, is pure fiction. It describes the Americans as lavish in distributing presents of whisky. ("Now in the houses of party and local government workers, I fairly often notice Black & White on the tables"), and in giving parties for lower-ranking Communists (". . . only the pawns of both sides are here. And they drink, drink, drink . . . both in thirst and in the performance of their official duty, in order to loosen the other side's tongues"). The Americans may have made some presents of whisky, but certainly not on any lavish scale. Post Exchange supplies at this time did not even meet the Group's own demand for alcohol, and some of its members, after denuding the local shops of regular *pai-kan'rh* (a strong distilled liquor) started drinking the medicinal *hu-ku* ("tiger bone") wine. As for the alleged drunken parties, the reviewer would almost certainly have heard about them if they had actually occurred. Moreover, by March 1945, the Chinese Communists' relations with the Observer Group had become strained to the point where no lower-ranking party member would have dared to accept an American invitation. It was only after some argument with a sentry and with liaison officers that Mrs. Lindsay and the reviewer were able to take two Chinese friends to visit the Americans.

The examples cited above represent only a sampling of the many passages in the diaries which are completely implausible as the reporting of a supposedly informed observer in Vladimirov's position. When those parts of the book which can be checked show so much that is false or confused, it is reasonable to entertain the gravest doubts about the accuracy of the parts which cannot be checked, such as the reports of interviews Vladimirov claims to have had with Mao Tse-tung—especially when they so conveniently support the current Soviet anti-Chinese propaganda line (Vladimirov portrays Mao as a petty-bourgeois nationalist ready to abandon his allegiance to international communism for an alliance with the US if only the Americans had been willing to cooperate). It seems odd that Novosti did not attempt to make the alleged Vladimirov manuscript more plausible by getting one of Moscow's well-qualified China experts to remove some of the obvious errors. Perhaps the agency felt that capitalist publishers would be more interested in whether the book would sell than in whether or not it was authentic.

IT IS somewhat ironic that Vladimirov's portrayal of Mao as ready to sacrifice the international Communist cause for the sake of an understanding with the United States appears, at least superficially, to tie in with the central theme of Joseph W. Esherick's study, *Lost Chance in China,* based on the World War II despatches of John S. Service, a Foreign Service officer who was then stationed in China and was sent to Yenan as a political observer attached to the US Army Observer Group. Service was one of several younger American diplomatic officers serving in China who recommended a more cooperative US attitude toward the Chinese Communists and whose careers consequently suffered damage in the bitter controversies of the 1950's over US China policy.

Mr. Service's despatches reveal him to have been an accurate reporter,[2] but one can raise some questions about his judgment. His main argument for US cooperation with the Communists was the military contribution they could make against Japan. However, by mid-1945, this consideration had become much less important. John Paton Davies, another member of the same group of younger "China hands," showed better judgment in perceiving that the crucial question was the Chinese Communists'

[2] The reviewer could detect only one slight factual inaccuracy in the dispatches cited by Esherick. The captured general who gave an account of Yen Hsi-shan's cooperation with the Japanese did not visit Mrs. Lindsay on his own initiative as indicated in one of these dispatches (see p. 58). He was brought to see us by a Communist officer who had been 18th Group Army liaison officer to Yen Hsi-shan, in response to an inquiry by the reviewer as to whether there was any evidence to support the purely abusive attacks on Yen Hsi-shan published in the Communists' Yenan newspaper, *Chieh-fang Jih-pao* (Liberation Daily). Service's despatch correctly reports what the general said.

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relationship to the Soviet Union. Service did not entirely ignore this issue but did not press it very vigorously in his conversations with the Chinese Communist leaders. Consequently, his reports did not meet the argument that Communist control of North China would merely replace a Japanese puppet state with a Soviet one—an argument put forward by Everett F. Drumwright, then Chief of the State Department's Division of Chinese Affairs, and accepted by General George C. Marshall on the eve of his mission to China to try to effect a postwar accord between the Communists and the Kuomintang.[3] (It is a weakness of Professor Esherick's concluding analysis that he does not mention the importance of this consideration for US policy.)

In fact, neither Drumwright nor Service recognized that there was inadequate evidence for coming to any conclusions about the Chinese Communists' relationship to Moscow. Only Davies argued that the US authorities simply did not know whether the Chinese Communists would behave like the Communist parties of Europe in uncritically following the Soviet line and that it was important to try to find out.[4]

When the then US Ambassador to Chungking, General Patrick J. Hurley, blocked the reporting of any information that conflicted with his own misinformed prejudices, Service, as a patriotic Foreign Service officer, could understandably feel it his duty to break the rules and publish the information which Hurley was trying to suppress. However, his choice of the magazine *Amerasia* as the outlet was certainly poor judgment. The material would have been more effective if it had appeared in a publication without any Communist connections,[5] and Service himself would have avoided a great deal of trouble.

Service's reports on the Kuomintang areas very clearly describe the defects of the Nationalist government system but tend to ascribe everything wrong to a lack of democracy. This was almost certainly a wrong diagnosis. What was most seriously wrong with the Kuomintang in the 1940's was an increasing lack of competence. The Nationalist regime had become involved in an interacting set of vicious circles, the most serious of which was that the Kuomintang leaders reacted to increasing difficulties with an increasing refusal to face reality. Once this syndrome was broken by the shock treatment of complete defeat on the mainland, the performance of the Kuomintang rapidly improved.

The reviewer generally supports the contention that there was a "lost chance" in China but would argue that the question was not as simple as Professor Esherick makes it appear. After all, in Yugoslavia, Britain and the US followed the very policy that Service recommended for China—*i.e.*, full cooperation with Communists for the common war effort—yet this did not prevent Tito from becoming violently hostile to the West in 1945, even though he eventually broke with Stalin in 1948.

Nevertheless, on the evidence available in 1945, a break between Mao and Stalin had to be seen as more likely than a break between Tito and Stalin. Mao had gained leadership of the CCP by displacing the earlier Moscow-trained Chinese Communist leaders; he was claiming the right to apply his own interpretation of Marxism-Leninism; and his practical policies deviated in many respects from Stalinist orthodoxy. Suppose that the US had given some cooperation to the Chinese Communists in 1945 instead of taking a policy line based on Hurley's misguided views—a policy line seen by the Chinese Communist leaders as an expression of bad faith. Suppose also that the US had then used the issue of Soviet behavior in Manchuria to present the Communists with a clear-cut choice between Chinese patriotism and loyalty to international communism—certainly no patriotic Chinese could excuse the Soviet looting of Manchurian industry under the pretext of "war booty" or the undisciplined behavior of Soviet occupation troops toward the local civilian population. Had the US taken such a course, the Chinese Communists might have broken with Stalin in early 1946, or the party might have split. And even if all the party leaders had chosen loyalty to Stalin, they would have found it hard to retain the support of the large majority of rank-and-file Communists who had joined the party out of patriotic motives after 1937.

THE DEFECTS in Western thinking about the Chinese Communists that caused the US to "lose its chance" in China can be seen in Professor Shewmaker's *Americans*

[3] See US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945*, Vol. 7, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1969, pp. 633 and 768.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 157 and, especially, 768.

[5] The chairman of the editorial board of *Amerasia* was Frederick V. Field, who was also editor (and later managing editor) of *New Masses*. In May 1945 he was listed by the Communist Political Association (as the US Communist Party then called itself) as a correspondent of the New York *Daily Worker*. See US Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Internal Security, *Hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1951-52, pp. 30, 114, 118, and 125.

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and Chinese Communists, 1927-1945. The author has produced a very interesting and readable book in which he examines the attitudes of all the important Americans—and some non-Americans—who had contacts with the Chinese Communists during this period. It not only summarizes the material they published about the Chinese Communists but also gives excellent characterizations of most of the main figures involved. The reviewer could spot ony a few omissions and some minor errors, the only really bad error being a very inaccurate map of the Communist areas as of August 1945.

Professor Shewmaker's summaries show that few of the foreigners in contact with the Chinese Communists had sufficient knowledge of communism or of political philosophy to understand the different lines of development that were possible for the Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese Communists won admiration from many non-Communist observers during the 1936-45 period because their system was very different from Stalinism, though not all observers recognized this. The question was whether the Chinese Communist leaders should be taken seriously when they said that they would continue their reasonable policies for a long period.

In his own contacts with the Chinese Communists, the reviewer noted a wide range of differences between doctrinaires and reasonable people in the CCP, though he badly underestimated the strength of doctrinaire views. The doctrinaires were philosophical idealists for whom the set of ideas cumulatively developed by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin represented the highest source of truth. The reasonable people were materialists for whom the highest source of truth was evidence from what Lenin called "the external world . . . *things* outside and independent of our mind." [6] The term "materialists" seems more accurate than the term "pragmatists," which is confusing because it often means concentration on immediate results and refusal to consider indirect and long-term consequences.

If the materialist attitude had become dominant in the CCP, the Chinese Communists would have accepted the evidence that their moderate reformist policies really served the people while the Stalinist system did not, and they would eventually have seen the need to revise their Marxist-Leninist postulates. In fact, the idealist attitude became dominant—helped by an American policy that forced the CCP to rely on the Soviet Union. The later Chinese Communist split with the Soviet Union was only the product of a conflict between rival forms of idealism—or, perhaps, of a conflict between Chinese idealism and a pragmatic Soviet determination to preserve the primacy of the CPSU.

Shewmaker's book also reveals a Western tendency to treat organizations as constants instead of judging changing organizations by constant principles. The Western view of the Kuomintang as leading a united China in gallant resistance to Japan had some truth in the early period of the war, but Western observers maintained this view up to 1943, long after unity had disappeared. Professor Shewmaker himself shows a similar unwillingness to recognize the change that has taken place in Chinese communism since 1945. He pictures the Communists as having welcomed foreign observers and not restricted their reporting, while the Kuomintang reacted violently to any criticism, tried to censor or suppress any critical reports, and often refused reentry to foreigners who were critical. He explains this by arguing that the influence of Confucian tradition was stronger in the Kuomintang, whereas ". . . the values of the CCP were more compatible with American values" (p. 346). This explanation ignores the subsequent reversal of roles between the KMT and the CCP. Today, the Nationalist government of the Republic of China (on Taiwan) welcomes foreign observers and imposes few restrictions, while the government of the People's Republic of China reacts violently to criticism and goes much further than the Kuomintang regime ever did in refusing visas and restricting the movements and contacts of foreign observers. A better explanation than Professor Shewmaker's is that any regime will restrict criticism and reporting when it is trying to maintain a public image that is widely at variance with its actual performance.

[6] V. I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-criticism,* Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1972, p. 86.

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Sino-Soviet Relations: Moscow's View

By Kenneth G. Lieberthal

O. B. BORISOV and B. T. KOLOSKOV: *Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1945-1970.* A translation of *Sovetsko-Kitayskiye Otnosheniya,* Moscow, 1971. Trans. and ed. by Vladimir Petrov. Bloomington, Ind., and London, England, Indiana University Press, 1975.

O. B. BORISOV and B. T. KOLOSKOV: *Sino-Soviet Relations 1949-1973.* Trans. by Yuri Shirokov. Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1975.

WHY DID the Soviets put out two versions of largely the same book? Indeed, why did they publish the 1971 edition (which Vladimir Petrov translates) only in Russian and the updated 1975 edition only in English? One can only guess, but the answer most likely relates to the fact that the Sino-US rapprochement became a reality almost immediately after the 1971 edition of this volume went to press. The volume had probably been conceived both as a standard Soviet text on a very sensitive political issue and as the major Soviet effort to influence Western analyses of the origins, development, and probable future of Sino-Soviet relations. Almost certainly, the dramatic trips to China by Henry Kissinger in 1971 and Richard Nixon in 1972 required serious rewriting to make the book of contemporary interest to a foreign audience.

The "updated" version of this work, however, is generally disappointing. Its major potential interest lies in a new chapter on Sino-Soviet relations during the early 1970's, but the authors have chosen to keep this chapter superficial. It does not, for instance, even bring together all the Soviet offers to China that have been revealed in the Soviet press during these years. There are some interesting tidbits—such as a passing reference to a Central Committee Plenum in China in late August-early September 1972 (p. 354) that has not previously been mentioned in either the Chinese or Western media—but the pickings are slim. Like the 1971 edition, this version strongly articulates the fundamental Soviet position that a Sino-Soviet rapprochement remains a distinct possibility in the post-Mao era.

Should anyone buy the Petrov translation when the updated Soviet version is available in English for about one-third the price? Petrov's volume has two elements not available in its Soviet counterpart—an introductory essay by the editor and an excellent index. The latter considerably enhances the worth of the book; the former does not. One must also consider that the 1975 Soviet edition presents an *abridged* version of the material covered in the 1971 edition. In a book whose value for the Western specialist inheres in its details rather than in the general thrust of its argument, this is a serious shortcoming—although the chapter on the Cultural Revolution bore the brunt of these cuts, and no other chapter of the 1971 edition so richly deserved such treatment. Petrov has himself pruned some 15 percent from the 1971 Russian work, but his edition still retains many of the details missing in the 1975 Soviet edition. On balance, for a specialist conducting research on Sino-Soviet affairs, both versions are a must (Petrov for the period to 1970; the 1975 Soviet edition for the post-Cultural Revolution years). However, someone less concerned with the minutiae of the subject might do well to purchase the less expensive 1975 Soviet edition.

SUBSTANTIVELY, the major portion of both volumes by Borisov and Koloskov[1] focuses on Sino-Soviet bilateral agreements of the 1950's and 1960's and their implementation. Both books also clearly present the standard Soviet analysis of Chinese factional poli-

[1] According to Petrov (p. xiii), these are pseudonyms for two high-ranking nonacademic specialists on Chinese affairs.

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tics concerning the "Soviet question" during the two decades. These two components of the books, in turn, provide insights into an important aspect of current Chinese and Soviet strategies.

Throughout their narrative, Borisov and Koloskov view Chinese politics in terms of a two-line struggle between the anti-Soviet Maoist nationalist/chauvinists and the pro-Soviet internationalists. According to the two authors, the Maoists had by 1962 gained the initiative—for a variety of reasons not systematically analyzed—and subsequent Chinese political history reflects their attempt to retain this advantage. The major thrust of the Maoist strategy aimed at completely isolating China from all contact with the Soviet Union.

How did the USSR respond to this challenge? According to Borisov and Koloskov, the Soviet strategy[2] sought to limit the damage while Mao retained power, and to build bridges to the less anti-Soviet people in the Chinese bureaucracies in anticipation of the post-Mao era in China. Although the Chinese tried to erect numerous obstacles to normal state-to-state relations, Moscow persisted in these efforts so as to place "those among the Chinese leadership who stubbornly and actively opposed the [Soviet] program[s] in a difficult position" (Petrov ed., p. 266).

Mao must have been keenly aware of the persistent Soviet effort to keep in contact with people outside the highest ranks of the Chinese Communist Party (symbolized by the offer, when all else had failed, to negotiate an agreement to allow Chinese tourists to vacation in the USSR), and this may well help to explain why he now remains so adamantly opposed to accepting any Soviet offers of economic, scientific, and cultural aid. He correctly perceives that the Soviets are still trying to communicate to potential friends in China that the USSR remains willing to reestablish many of the programs of the 1950's when the Chinese become agreeable.

Moscow also learned some lessons from its experiences during the early 1960's. Specifically, it now recognizes that its offers are unlikely to elicit a positive response while Mao retains power. Ironically, the longer the Chinese Party Chairman refuses to "go to see Karl Marx," the fewer "healthy forces" from the earlier years will remain in the Chinese bureaucracy. The fact that there have been no Soviet offers mentioned in the press since the summer of 1974[3] suggests that Moscow is sensitive to this problem.

Other sources have itemized the formal agreements reached between the PRC and the USSR,[4] but in no other place can one find in such detail the Soviet offers that did *not* produce agreements, the initial negotiating positions of both sides prior to some agreements, and the problems in implementing many agreements once they had been signed. Thus, while the Borisov and Koloskov books were clearly written to highlight Soviet grievances, they nevertheless provide many fascinating items of information regarding bilateral exchanges and thus contribute substantially to our knowledge and understanding of Sino-Soviet relations during the 1950's and 1960's.

IN THE ABOVE WAYS, the Borisov and Koloskov volumes speak directly to current (and future?) Soviet policy toward China. Not only do they enhance our understanding of the extensive history of bilateral exchanges between the USSR and China; they also drive home the fact that the Soviets have used these exchanges for many years to cultivate individuals and organizations in China that might oppose Mao on the Russian issue. By strongly affirming that the Chinese apostasy is attributable to Mao and his "clique," the authors make clear that there remains hope for China's future return to the socialist fold.

The narrative of the two books, in addition, is sprinkled with fascinating tidbits of various sorts. While it is not easy to generalize about these gems, they appear sufficiently frequently throughout the volumes to provide the specialist reader with a steady stream of pleasant surprises. For instance, Borisov and Koloskov often use the same conceptual tools to analyze the Chinese press that Western observers employ (see Petrov ed., p. 256); they hint at K'ang Sheng's betrayal of the CCP underground apparatus in the 1930's

[2] Other than the famous Central Committee polemics that have received ample attention in the Western literature.

[3] For the last reference to one, see TASS, Aug. 19, 1974.

[4] For example, Douglas M. Johnston and Hungdah Chiu, *Agreements of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1967: A Calendar*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968.

CORRECTION

In Robert F. Zimmerman's article, "Insurgency in Thailand" (*Problems of Communism*, May-June 1976), the place of publication for *The Nation*, mentioned in Footnote 6 (p. 20), should be Bangkok.

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(Petrov ed., p. 113); they reveal that the Soviet embassy in Peking continued to receive the Chinese provincial periodicals to which it subscribed until February 1968 (Petrov ed., p. 317); they note that during 1948-49 Manchuria under Communist rule exported more to the USSR than it imported from there (Petrov ed., p. 54); and so forth.

As might be expected, Borisov and Koloskov choose to ignore and distort major elements in the history of Sino-Soviet relations. Thus, they argue that the only personal idiosyncracies that have affected the relationship have been Mao Tse-tung's (Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev's name never finds its way onto these pages); that the USSR has successfully avoided tactical blunders in its relations with China (apparently Soviet leaders, like all good Samaritans, fully expect that their beneficent works will not always inspire an appropriate sense of gratitude in their recipients); and that the threat and use of force have never formed a part of Soviet policy (the bourgeois press and Chinese slanders notwithstanding).

These volumes, then, remain only partially instructive regarding Soviet policies toward China. Nevertheless, they provide a significant addition to the available literature on Sino-Soviet affairs.

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